本文選題：食品安全 + 政府監(jiān)管��； 參考：《系統(tǒng)工程理論與實踐》2017年01期

【摘要】：有效的政府監(jiān)管是控制食品安全事件的重要途徑.本文研究政府參與下多食品企業(yè)的監(jiān)管策略,通過建立一對多的政府與食品企業(yè)對稱博弈模型,探討當食品企業(yè)個數(shù)增加時,政府監(jiān)管存在的失靈現(xiàn)象及政府最佳監(jiān)管策略.研究表明,企業(yè)的不自律邊際收益會隨著市場上食品企業(yè)的數(shù)量增加而增加,進而誘發(fā)更多的企業(yè)生產(chǎn)不安全食品,而現(xiàn)有的政府監(jiān)管力度難以解決多企業(yè)的食品安全問題.同時,在政府與多食品企業(yè)的博弈過程中,檢查頻率、自律成本與不自律處罰是影響企業(yè)生產(chǎn)行為的重要因素,加大對企業(yè)的檢查概率、減低企業(yè)自律成本、提高企業(yè)不自律的處罰是緩解食品安全問題的有效途徑.
[Abstract]:Effective government supervision is an important way to control food safety incidents. This paper studies the regulatory strategies of multi-food enterprises with the participation of government. By establishing a one-to-many game model between government and food enterprises, this paper discusses the failure phenomenon of government supervision and the best supervision strategy when the number of food enterprises increases. The research shows that the marginal income of non-self-discipline will increase with the increase of the number of food enterprises in the market, and then induce more enterprises to produce unsafe food. However, the existing government supervision is difficult to solve the food safety problem of many enterprises. At the same time, in the process of the game between the government and multi-food enterprises, the inspection frequency, self-discipline cost and non-self-discipline punishment are the important factors that affect the production behavior of the enterprise, so the inspection probability of the enterprise is increased, and the self-discipline cost of the enterprise is reduced. It is an effective way to alleviate the food safety problem by raising the punishment of the enterprise's non-self-discipline.
【作者單位】： 中南大學(xué)商學(xué)院;南洋理工大學(xué)商學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金(71573281,71573280) 中南大學(xué)創(chuàng)新驅(qū)動計劃項目(2016CX040)~~
【分類號】：F203;F224.32
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本文編號：1841556