本文選題：政府公益性項(xiàng)目　切入點(diǎn)：尋租　出處：《工程管理學(xué)報(bào)》2017年02期

【摘要】：在綜合分析了政府部門、中介機(jī)構(gòu)和私人企業(yè)相互關(guān)系的基礎(chǔ)上,根據(jù)尋租理論與委托代理理論構(gòu)建了政府公益性項(xiàng)目中尋租與監(jiān)管的博弈模型,探討尋租與監(jiān)管的關(guān)系。通過分析博弈模型的混合策略納什均衡解,對各個(gè)利益主體的選擇策略進(jìn)行研究,進(jìn)而尋求尋租問題相關(guān)的治理對策。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):中介機(jī)構(gòu)及企業(yè)間尋租行為的發(fā)生受政府部門成功監(jiān)督的能力系數(shù)、成本、懲罰因子等因素影響,有效的懲罰及監(jiān)督措施能有效遏制尋租行為。
[Abstract]:Based on the comprehensive analysis of the relationship among government departments, intermediary organizations and private enterprises, the game model of rent-seeking and supervision in government public welfare projects is constructed according to the rent-seeking theory and principal-agent theory, and the relationship between rent-seeking and supervision is discussed.By analyzing the Nash equilibrium solution of the mixed strategy of the game model, this paper studies the selection strategies of the various stakeholders, and then seeks the relevant governance countermeasures for the rent-seeking problem.It is found that the occurrence of rent-seeking behavior among intermediary organizations and enterprises is influenced by factors such as the ability coefficient, cost and penalty factor of successful supervision by government departments, and effective punishment and supervision measures can effectively curb the rent-seeking behavior.
【作者單位】： 河海大學(xué)商學(xué)院;
【分類號】：D630
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本文編號：1719905