本文關(guān)鍵詞： 市場治理 風(fēng)險(xiǎn)轉(zhuǎn)化 制度環(huán)境 政府-市場邊界 風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分擔(dān)規(guī)則　出處：《社會學(xué)評論》2017年03期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：本文從風(fēng)險(xiǎn)轉(zhuǎn)化的理論視角出發(fā),以社會博弈論為基礎(chǔ)分析框架,解釋市場治理過程中的一組頗具反差意味卻又穩(wěn)定重復(fù)的現(xiàn)象,即地方政府市場角色的多重面向、政府-市場邊界的變動不居和經(jīng)濟(jì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分擔(dān)規(guī)則的不確定性等。研究表明,市場轉(zhuǎn)型與法律缺失的內(nèi)在矛盾、經(jīng)濟(jì)治理與政治穩(wěn)定的任務(wù)壓力、契約原則與官民關(guān)系的觀念基礎(chǔ),是地方政府治理市場所面對的三維制度環(huán)境。這些不同維度的制度環(huán)境結(jié)合起來,衍生了系列后果:(1)市場交易的經(jīng)濟(jì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)容易向政府面對的政治風(fēng)險(xiǎn)轉(zhuǎn)化,地方政府需要在經(jīng)濟(jì)治理激勵和政治風(fēng)險(xiǎn)約束的作用下選擇對于市場的治理結(jié)構(gòu);(2)政績信號發(fā)送機(jī)制、經(jīng)濟(jì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)轉(zhuǎn)移機(jī)制、政治風(fēng)險(xiǎn)弱化機(jī)制的搭配組合影響著政府與市場的邊界變動;(3)多元并存的合法性基礎(chǔ),以及地方政府和市場主體利益博弈背后的多重制度邏輯,是經(jīng)濟(jì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分擔(dān)規(guī)則不確定狀態(tài)的結(jié)構(gòu)性來源。
[Abstract]:Starting from the theoretical perspective of risk transformation and taking social game theory as the basic analysis framework, this paper explains a group of phenomena in the process of market governance which are quite contrasting but stable and repetitive, that is, the multi-face of the market role of local government. The study shows that the inherent contradiction between the market transition and the lack of law, the task pressure of economic governance and political stability, and so on. The concept foundation of contract principle and the relationship between the government and the people is the three dimensional institutional environment that the local government governs the market. Derived from a series of consequences: 1) the economic risks of market transactions are easily transformed into political risks faced by the government. Local governments need to choose a mechanism for transmitting political performance signals to the governance structure of the market under the role of economic governance incentives and political risk constraints. The combination of the economic risk transfer mechanism and the political risk weakening mechanism affects the legitimacy foundation of the multiple coexistence of the government and the market, and the multi-system logic behind the interests game between the local government and the market main body. It is the structural source of uncertain state of economic risk sharing rules.
【作者單位】： 中國社會科學(xué)院社會學(xué)研究所;
【基金】：國家社會科學(xué)基金青年項(xiàng)目“我國網(wǎng)絡(luò)借貸的地方治理模式研究”(16CSH037)
【分類號】：D035;F123.9
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本文編號：1542051