本文關(guān)鍵詞： 房地產(chǎn)上市公司 負(fù)債結(jié)構(gòu) 過度投資 負(fù)債相機(jī)治理 預(yù)算軟約束　出處：《集美大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：房地產(chǎn)業(yè)作為我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的支柱產(chǎn)業(yè),房地產(chǎn)投資的合理性對(duì)我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的健康發(fā)展至關(guān)重要�，F(xiàn)今房?jī)r(jià)高漲的情況讓房地產(chǎn)投資愈加火熱,然而空置率的相應(yīng)增長(zhǎng)說明房地產(chǎn)業(yè)存在過度投資的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。需要大量資金投入的房地產(chǎn)企業(yè)主要依靠負(fù)債融資,不同的負(fù)債結(jié)構(gòu)會(huì)對(duì)房地產(chǎn)企業(yè)的投資行為產(chǎn)生不同的影響。從理論上分析,負(fù)債能夠抑制過度投資,而負(fù)債發(fā)揮治理作用的重要前提是負(fù)債對(duì)企業(yè)有足夠硬的約束力,即一旦企業(yè)到期發(fā)生債務(wù)違約,則債權(quán)人將有足夠的能力和意愿對(duì)債務(wù)人實(shí)施相應(yīng)的懲罰。這一前提如果無法成立,負(fù)債將失去抑制企業(yè)過度投資的能力。在現(xiàn)實(shí)中,國(guó)有房企的經(jīng)營(yíng)效率低于非國(guó)有房企,這可能是因?yàn)樵谖覈?guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)制度和資本市場(chǎng)還不夠完善的背景下,作為與政府聯(lián)系較緊密的國(guó)有房企特別容易受到政府的干預(yù)和救助,從而出現(xiàn)預(yù)算軟約束的情況,弱化負(fù)債相機(jī)治理作用�？紤]到我國(guó)房地產(chǎn)業(yè)的行業(yè)特點(diǎn)及實(shí)證數(shù)據(jù)的可得性,本文將經(jīng)營(yíng)規(guī)模和房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)占有率都較大的我國(guó)房地產(chǎn)上市公司作為研究對(duì)象,并以其2009-2015年的經(jīng)驗(yàn)數(shù)據(jù)為研究樣本,借鑒Richardson(2006)模型研究我國(guó)房地產(chǎn)上市公司的過度投資現(xiàn)象,證明我國(guó)房地產(chǎn)上市公司存在過度投資。其次,將存在過度投資的樣本值分為國(guó)有組與非國(guó)有組來對(duì)比分析我國(guó)房地產(chǎn)上市公司負(fù)債結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)過度投資的影響。實(shí)證結(jié)果顯示:(1)從負(fù)債來源來說,相較于非國(guó)有房地產(chǎn)上市公司,國(guó)有房地產(chǎn)上市公司的銀行借款對(duì)過度投資的抑制作用較小,而商業(yè)信用對(duì)國(guó)有與非國(guó)有房地產(chǎn)上市公司的過度投資都有顯著的抑制作用;(2)從負(fù)債期限來說,短期負(fù)債對(duì)國(guó)有與非國(guó)有房地產(chǎn)上市公司過度投資都有顯著抑制作用,而長(zhǎng)期負(fù)債僅對(duì)非國(guó)有房地產(chǎn)上市公司過度投資產(chǎn)生明顯的抑制作用,對(duì)國(guó)有房地產(chǎn)上市公司過度投資的抑制作用并不明顯。最后,基于以上的研究提出相應(yīng)的政策建議:深化改革,減少政府干預(yù),提高銀行借款治理效用;完善法律法規(guī),保證商業(yè)信用治理效用;合理調(diào)整長(zhǎng)短期負(fù)債比例,提高負(fù)債治理效用,以此來充分發(fā)揮負(fù)債的相機(jī)治理作用以緩解房地產(chǎn)業(yè)過度投資的情況。
[Abstract]:As the pillar industry of our country's economic development, the rationality of real estate investment is very important to the healthy development of our economy. However, the corresponding increase of vacancy rate shows that the real estate industry has the risk of overinvestment. The real estate enterprises that need a lot of capital investment mainly rely on debt financing. Different debt structure will have different influence on the investment behavior of real estate enterprises. Theoretically, debt can restrain overinvestment. The important premise of the governance of debt is that the debt has enough hard binding force on the enterprise, that is, once the enterprise matures, the debt defaults. The creditor will have sufficient ability and will to punish the debtor accordingly. If this premise is not established, the debt will lose the ability to restrain the enterprise from overinvestment. The operating efficiency of state-owned housing enterprises is lower than that of non-state-owned housing enterprises, which may be due to the imperfect economic system and capital market in China. As a state-owned housing enterprise closely linked with the government, it is particularly vulnerable to government intervention and rescue, resulting in soft budget constraints. Weakening the role of debt camera governance. Considering the industry characteristics of China's real estate industry and the availability of empirical data. In this paper, the real estate listed companies which have a large scale of operation and market share of real estate are taken as the research object, and the empirical data from 2009-2015 are taken as the research samples. Using Richardson's 2006) model to study the phenomenon of overinvestment of listed real estate companies in China, it proves that there is overinvestment in listed companies of real estate in our country. Secondly. The sample value of overinvestment is divided into state-owned group and non-state-owned group to compare and analyze the impact of debt structure on overinvestment of listed real estate companies in China. The empirical results show that: 1) from the source of debt. Compared with the non-state-owned real estate listed companies, the bank loans of the state-owned real estate listed companies have less restraining effect on over-investment. The commercial credit has a significant restraining effect on the overinvestment of state-owned and non-state-owned real estate listed companies. (2) in terms of the term of debt, short-term debt has a significant effect on the overinvestment of state-owned and non-state-owned real estate listed companies. The long-term debt only on the non-state-owned real estate listed companies overinvestment inhibition effect, the state-owned real estate listed companies overinvestment inhibition effect is not obvious. Finally. Based on the above research, the corresponding policy suggestions are put forward: deepen the reform, reduce government intervention, and improve the governance effectiveness of bank loans; Improve laws and regulations to ensure the effectiveness of commercial credit governance; Adjust the ratio of long-term and short-term debt reasonably, improve the utility of debt governance, so as to give full play to the camera governance role of debt in order to alleviate the situation of overinvestment in real estate industry.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：集美大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F299.233.42

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