本文關(guān)鍵詞： 倉(cāng)單質(zhì)押 監(jiān)管努力水平 耗損率 激勵(lì)　出處：《東華大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：當(dāng)前,中小企業(yè)由于缺乏足夠的可抵押不動(dòng)產(chǎn)、信用低等原因,難以通過(guò)傳統(tǒng)融資渠道獲得財(cái)務(wù)資源,導(dǎo)致資金短缺、融資難問(wèn)題成為發(fā)展的瓶頸。在這種情況下,倉(cāng)單質(zhì)押作為一種創(chuàng)新融資服務(wù)得到迅速發(fā)展。實(shí)際操作中,一些存貨存在一定耗損率、較容易變質(zhì),因而質(zhì)押過(guò)程中會(huì)產(chǎn)生耗損量。在質(zhì)押過(guò)程中,物流企業(yè)對(duì)質(zhì)押物起到倉(cāng)儲(chǔ)、監(jiān)管的作用,它可以通過(guò)提供與質(zhì)押物匹配的倉(cāng)儲(chǔ)條件,加強(qiáng)監(jiān)管流程規(guī)范等措施減少質(zhì)押物的耗損量。因此,銀行如何激勵(lì)物流企業(yè)提高監(jiān)管努力是一個(gè)有現(xiàn)實(shí)意義的問(wèn)題。本文研究由供應(yīng)商、零售商、銀行、物流企業(yè)組成的供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng),其中零售商以倉(cāng)單質(zhì)押的融資方式向銀行貸款,在倉(cāng)單質(zhì)押模型中考慮物流企業(yè)監(jiān)管努力對(duì)質(zhì)押物耗損量的影響,進(jìn)而研究銀行對(duì)物流企業(yè)監(jiān)管努力的激勵(lì)契約。首先,建立物流企業(yè)的監(jiān)管努力影響質(zhì)押物耗損量的倉(cāng)單質(zhì)押模型。假設(shè)零售商違約概率外生和存貨具有一定的損耗率,計(jì)算得到銀行對(duì)零售商的最優(yōu)質(zhì)押率決策,分析物流企業(yè)監(jiān)管努力、存貨耗損率和零售商主觀違約概率對(duì)銀行質(zhì)押率和利潤(rùn)的影響;并進(jìn)行數(shù)值分析。研究結(jié)果表明:提高借款企業(yè)主觀違約率、降低質(zhì)押物耗損率和提高物流企業(yè)監(jiān)管努力都能帶來(lái)銀行利潤(rùn)的增加,在借款企業(yè)及其質(zhì)押物固定的情況下,相較于前兩者,通過(guò)激勵(lì)物流企業(yè)提高監(jiān)管努力來(lái)獲得更多的利潤(rùn)更有現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。隨后,討論在這種情形下銀行與物流企業(yè)間的委托代理關(guān)系�？紤]到質(zhì)押物會(huì)因倉(cāng)儲(chǔ)條件、氣溫、外部環(huán)境突變等風(fēng)險(xiǎn)產(chǎn)生損失,假設(shè)物流企業(yè)是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避的。結(jié)合委托代理理論,本文在信息對(duì)稱和信息不對(duì)稱兩種情況下,基于三種不同的契約模式,研究銀行對(duì)物流企業(yè)的激勵(lì)問(wèn)題。重點(diǎn)研究在信息不對(duì)稱情形下銀行激勵(lì)契約以及激勵(lì)和監(jiān)督相結(jié)合契約。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):信息對(duì)稱時(shí),銀行只需采用固定支付模式,就可使供應(yīng)鏈達(dá)到帕累托最優(yōu);信息不對(duì)稱時(shí),銀行可以采取激勵(lì)契約也可采取激勵(lì)與監(jiān)督結(jié)合的契約模式,此時(shí)都需為物流企業(yè)提供固定支付加分成比例的報(bào)酬,才能達(dá)到激勵(lì)效果;引入監(jiān)督機(jī)制,可以降低信息不對(duì)稱的程度,從而提高銀行利潤(rùn)。最后對(duì)三種模式下的激勵(lì)契約進(jìn)行對(duì)比分析,討論銀行利潤(rùn)、質(zhì)押率決策與物流企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避程度、監(jiān)管努力成本系數(shù)和監(jiān)督信號(hào)準(zhǔn)確度間存在的關(guān)系。最后,文章通過(guò)數(shù)值分析對(duì)結(jié)論進(jìn)行了驗(yàn)證,并就參數(shù)對(duì)決策變量的影響做出分析和解釋。
[Abstract]:At present, due to the lack of enough mortgaged real estate and low credit, it is difficult for SMEs to obtain financial resources through traditional financing channels, resulting in a shortage of funds. In this case, warehouse receipt pledge, as an innovative financing service, has been developed rapidly. In practice, some stocks have a certain consumption rate, which is easy to deteriorate. In the process of pledge, the logistics enterprise plays the role of warehousing and supervision of the pledge, it can provide the storage conditions matching with the pledge. Therefore, how to encourage logistics enterprises to improve the regulatory efforts is a practical issue. This paper studies the suppliers, retailers, banks. Logistics enterprises constitute a supply chain system, in which retailers borrow from banks in the form of warehouse receipt pledge, and consider the influence of logistics enterprise supervision efforts on the amount of collateral consumption in the warehouse receipt pledge model. And then study the incentive contract of the bank to the logistics enterprise supervision efforts. First of all. Based on the assumption that the retailer default probability and inventory have a certain loss rate, the optimal pledge rate decision of the bank to the retailer is obtained. The paper analyzes the influence of logistics enterprises' supervision efforts, inventory loss rate and retailer's subjective default probability on bank pledge rate and profit. The results show that increasing the subjective default rate of the borrowing enterprises, reducing the loss of pledge and improving the supervision of logistics enterprises can bring about the increase of bank profits. In the case of borrowing enterprises and their pledge fixed, compared with the former two, it is more realistic to obtain more profits by encouraging logistics enterprises to improve regulatory efforts. In this case, the principal-agent relationship between banks and logistics enterprises is discussed. It is assumed that logistics enterprises are risk-averse. Combined with principal-agent theory, this paper bases on three different contract models in the case of information symmetry and information asymmetry. This paper focuses on the incentive contract of bank and the combination of incentive and supervision in the case of asymmetric information. As long as the bank adopts the fixed payment mode, it can make the supply chain reach Pareto optimal. When the information is asymmetric, the bank can adopt the incentive contract or the contract mode of the combination of incentive and supervision. In this case, it is necessary to provide the logistics enterprise with the fixed payment plus the proportion of the reward, in order to achieve the incentive effect; The introduction of supervision mechanism can reduce the degree of information asymmetry, thereby increasing bank profits. Finally, the incentive contracts under the three modes are compared and analyzed, and the bank profits are discussed. The relationship between pledge rate decision and risk aversion degree of logistics enterprise, the cost coefficient of supervision effort and the accuracy of supervision signal. Finally, the paper verifies the conclusion by numerical analysis. The influence of parameters on decision variables is analyzed and explained.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東華大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F259.23;F832.4;F253.7

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