企業(yè)競爭戰(zhàn)略的模糊博弈建模與分析
本文關鍵詞:企業(yè)競爭戰(zhàn)略的模糊博弈建模與分析 出處:《五邑大學》2017年碩士論文 論文類型:學位論文
更多相關文章: 企業(yè)競爭戰(zhàn)略 模糊博弈 市場容量 古諾模型 伯川德悖論
【摘要】:當今時代消費者受到信息和技術不斷更新和發(fā)展的影響,生活需求變得復雜、不穩(wěn)定和多元化;另一方面,企業(yè)同樣受到來自消費者和競爭對手反應的影響,因此所做的戰(zhàn)略決策實際上是在模糊的市場環(huán)境下進行的。本研究基于模糊數(shù)學、博弈論和企業(yè)競爭戰(zhàn)略決策理論,對市場容量進行模糊化,構建模糊博弈模型,并在此基礎上分析企業(yè)競爭戰(zhàn)略決策現(xiàn)象,為企業(yè)市場競爭提供相關解釋和啟示。第一,構建了區(qū)間相同的模糊市場容量古諾模型,重點分析企業(yè)超額利潤獲得。通過建立模糊市場容量估計函數(shù),企業(yè)可以根據(jù)自身的樂觀程度在相同的模糊市場容量區(qū)間內估計模糊市場容量,并以有限理性進行產量決策。從模型方面看,該模型擴展了經典古諾模型的均衡數(shù)量,經典古諾均衡成為它的特例;從實際產量競爭決策方面看,企業(yè)獲得超額利潤需要比競爭對手更樂觀的市場容量估計,在這種情形下企業(yè)對自己的產品更有自信。第二,構建了區(qū)間差異的模糊市場容量古諾模型,重點分析企業(yè)市場進入退出策略和市場定位。該模型改進了第一個模型,假設企業(yè)對模糊市場容量區(qū)間的估計存在差異性,企業(yè)進行估計和決策前需要首先通過模糊市場容量區(qū)間估計函數(shù)確定好各自的市場容量區(qū)間,分析模糊市場容量反應函數(shù)發(fā)現(xiàn),潛在進入者需要在進入前調查清楚在位企業(yè)的實力和模糊市場容量的匹配程度;處于產量劣勢的追隨者需要緊跟市場領導者的步伐,注重產品質量;企業(yè)需要堅持產品創(chuàng)新,擴大市場容量。第三,構建了模糊市場容量伯川德模型,從模糊市場容量的角度對伯川德悖論給出新的解釋。通過分析模糊市場容量條件下企業(yè)進行價格戰(zhàn)的過程以及模糊市場容量伯川德均衡,發(fā)現(xiàn)企業(yè)基于模糊市場容量的競爭價格要高于邊際成本且具有不相同的正利潤。因此從模糊市場容量的角度對伯川德悖論和價格戰(zhàn)進行新的解釋。并為防止企業(yè)過度競爭給出了相關解釋和啟示。
[Abstract]:Nowadays, consumers are affected by the continuous updating and development of information and technology, and the needs of life become complex, unstable and diversified. On the other hand, firms are also affected by reactions from consumers and competitors, so strategic decisions are actually made in a fuzzy market environment. This study is based on fuzzy mathematics. On the basis of game theory and enterprise competitive strategic decision theory, the market capacity is fuzzy and the fuzzy game model is constructed, and on this basis, the phenomenon of enterprise competitive strategic decision is analyzed. To provide relevant explanations and revelations for the enterprise market competition. First, the paper constructs a Cournot model of fuzzy market capacity with the same interval, focuses on the analysis of the excess profits of enterprises. Through the establishment of fuzzy market capacity estimation function. Enterprises can estimate fuzzy market capacity in the same range of fuzzy market capacity according to their own optimistic degree, and make output decision with limited rationality. This model extends the equilibrium quantity of classical Cournot model, and the classical Cournot equilibrium becomes its special case. From the point of view of actual production competition decision, enterprises need more optimistic market capacity estimation than competitors to obtain excess profits. In this case, enterprises have more confidence in their own products. Second. In this paper, a fuzzy market capacity model with interval difference is constructed, which focuses on the analysis of market entry and exit strategy and market positioning. The model improves the first model. Assuming that there is a difference in the estimation of the fuzzy market capacity interval, enterprises need to determine their market capacity interval through the fuzzy market capacity interval estimation function before making the estimation and decision-making. By analyzing the response function of fuzzy market capacity, it is found that the potential entrant needs to investigate clearly the matching degree between the strength of the incumbent enterprise and the fuzzy market capacity before entering. Followers at a productivity disadvantage need to keep pace with market leaders and focus on product quality; Enterprises need to adhere to product innovation and expand market capacity. Thirdly, a fuzzy market capacity Bertrand model is constructed. This paper gives a new explanation to Bertrand's paradox from the point of view of fuzzy market capacity. By analyzing the process of price war under the condition of fuzzy market capacity and the Bertrand equilibrium of fuzzy market capacity. It is found that the competitive price based on the fuzzy market capacity is higher than the marginal cost and has different positive profits. Therefore, this paper gives a new explanation of Bertrand's paradox and price war from the angle of fuzzy market capacity. Excessive competition gives the relevant explanation and enlightenment.
【學位授予單位】:五邑大學
【學位級別】:碩士
【學位授予年份】:2017
【分類號】:F224.32;F272
【參考文獻】
相關期刊論文 前10條
1 肖浩芳;劉霈霈;黃康喬;楊桂玨;;基于古諾模型的移動數(shù)據(jù)(手機流量)定價策略分析[J];科技視界;2016年14期
2 董華平;干杏娣;;我國貨幣政策銀行貸款渠道傳導效率研究——基于銀行業(yè)結構的古諾模型[J];金融研究;2015年10期
3 劉兆讀;;二級供應鏈中模糊古諾競爭零售模型及應用[J];商;2015年09期
4 周高儀;趙曉冬;郭菊花;陸靜;;房地產開發(fā)項目的直覺模糊矩陣博弈分析[J];統(tǒng)計與決策;2014年09期
5 吳險;;伯川德模型概述[J];產業(yè)與科技論壇;2012年19期
6 孟令鵬;韓傳峰;王劍敏;;生產能力限制下價格Stackelberg博弈模型[J];中國管理科學;2012年01期
7 張贊;凌超;;網(wǎng)絡零售商與實體零售商的價格競爭及其對市場績效的影響研究[J];產業(yè)經濟研究;2011年06期
8 鄒杰;何衛(wèi);;非合作博弈模型的模糊構建與應用[J];重慶教育學院學報;2008年06期
9 張倩;陳誠;程玲華;;基于帶模糊信息的兩人一般和有限可信性博弈[J];合肥學院學報(自然科學版);2008年03期
10 楊緯隆;林健;;基于博弈論的企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略管理研究[J];科學學與科學技術管理;2007年08期
相關會議論文 前1條
1 馬麗云;;基于模糊思想的不完全信息動態(tài)博弈解法[A];2007中國控制與決策學術年會論文集[C];2007年
相關博士學位論文 前2條
1 王洪武;基于非線性理論的古諾—伯川德混合模型研究及應用[D];天津大學;2013年
2 王昭;具有模糊支付的博弈問題及其應用研究[D];北京理工大學;2006年
相關碩士學位論文 前3條
1 潘杏早;基于消費者庫存的寡頭產量競爭策略研究[D];武漢科技大學;2012年
2 張素婷;重復模糊合作對策解的研究[D];燕山大學;2009年
3 陳蓉;博弈論均衡理論在價格競爭中的應用分析[D];中國地質大學(北京);2006年
,本文編號:1410279
本文鏈接:http://sikaile.net/jingjifazhanlunwen/1410279.html