發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-01-08 01:22

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：基于生態(tài)位理論的航空復(fù)雜產(chǎn)品研發(fā)團(tuán)隊(duì)技術(shù)共享機(jī)制研究　出處：《南昌航空大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 航空復(fù)雜產(chǎn)品 技術(shù)共享 演化博弈 生態(tài)位理論

【摘要】：二十一世紀(jì),我國經(jīng)濟(jì)強(qiáng)國之路越來越依賴于復(fù)雜技術(shù)產(chǎn)業(yè)的創(chuàng)新和發(fā)展。航空復(fù)雜產(chǎn)品集多種復(fù)雜技術(shù)、密集型知識于一體,屬于典型的復(fù)雜產(chǎn)品。航空復(fù)雜產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新趨向于多領(lǐng)域跨組織異地協(xié)同研發(fā)。該協(xié)同研發(fā)機(jī)制要求合作關(guān)系相對穩(wěn)定的核心企業(yè)系統(tǒng)集成商與上游組建供應(yīng)商、用戶、下游互補(bǔ)方、專業(yè)科研機(jī)構(gòu)、政府等關(guān)聯(lián)企業(yè)組成的研發(fā)團(tuán)隊(duì),釋放技術(shù)創(chuàng)新能力,提高技術(shù)創(chuàng)新效率,升級航空產(chǎn)業(yè)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新水平。然而,在現(xiàn)實(shí)的協(xié)同合作過程中,各研發(fā)主體擁有的技術(shù)存量、技術(shù)的經(jīng)濟(jì)屬性及價(jià)值存在差異,影響研發(fā)主體技術(shù)共享決策,給技術(shù)共享帶來了障礙,使技術(shù)鏈容易扭曲甚至中斷。這加劇了各研發(fā)主體追求自身利益最大化的動機(jī),可能會出現(xiàn)不積極或部分技術(shù)成果不進(jìn)行共享和“搭便車”行為。為了探索各研發(fā)主體在不同位勢下的技術(shù)共享決策,本文基于生態(tài)位理論和演化博弈理論,通過建立引入“態(tài)”“勢”參數(shù)的航空復(fù)雜產(chǎn)品研發(fā)主體演化博弈改進(jìn)模型,分別對生態(tài)位視角下不同類型的研發(fā)主體技術(shù)共享行為進(jìn)行分析。本文展開邏輯如下:首先闡述了現(xiàn)實(shí)背景和研究問題,介紹了研究內(nèi)容與方法;隨后界定了相關(guān)概念以及介紹國內(nèi)外研究現(xiàn)狀、生態(tài)位理論以及演化博弈理論。接著依據(jù)生態(tài)位理論將航空復(fù)雜產(chǎn)品研發(fā)團(tuán)隊(duì)分為四個(gè)類型。其次依據(jù)演化博弈理論分別對不同類型的博弈模型求均衡點(diǎn),并對均衡點(diǎn)進(jìn)行穩(wěn)定性分析;在此基礎(chǔ)上,分析研發(fā)主體技術(shù)共享意愿演化方向的影響因素,并運(yùn)用數(shù)值仿真驗(yàn)證了理論分析的結(jié)果。最后構(gòu)建相應(yīng)的機(jī)制促進(jìn)研發(fā)主體進(jìn)行技術(shù)共享。研究結(jié)果表明:(1)研發(fā)主體的技術(shù)共享行為與其各自的“態(tài)”值和“勢”值密切相關(guān)。當(dāng)研發(fā)主體的“態(tài)”值和“勢”值處在不同的范圍時(shí),構(gòu)建的二維動力系統(tǒng)會依次呈現(xiàn)不同演化均衡策略。(2)在“態(tài)”“勢”參數(shù)的影響下,生態(tài)位視角下航空復(fù)雜產(chǎn)品單群體研發(fā)主體間博弈的演化方向與多群體層級間研發(fā)主體博弈的演化方向不同。(3)技術(shù)共享成本系數(shù)、收益分配系數(shù)、協(xié)同收益系數(shù)以及額外收益影響不同位勢的研發(fā)團(tuán)隊(duì)的技術(shù)共享行為的效果是一致的。(4)構(gòu)建了成本分擔(dān)機(jī)制、資源整合機(jī)制、激勵(lì)機(jī)制以及聯(lián)盟合作機(jī)制來提高研發(fā)主體的技術(shù)共享意愿。
[Abstract]:In twenty-first Century, the innovation and development of China's economic power of the road increasingly rely on sophisticated technology industry. Many complex technical aviation complex products, intensive knowledge in one, belongs to the typical complex products. Aviation complex product innovation tend to cross organizational multi domain distributed collaborative development. The core enterprise system integrators and users upstream of the co R & D cooperation mechanism requires a relatively stable form, downstream suppliers, complementary, professional research institutions, government and other related enterprises R & D team, release the ability of technological innovation, improve the technological innovation efficiency, upgrade the aviation industry technological innovation level. However, in the cooperation of the real process, the main R & D technology stock owned and the economic attribute and the value of technology differences, the main impact of the development of technology sharing decision, brings the obstacle to sharing technology, the technology chain is easy to distort Even interrupt. This increased the main R & D to pursue their own interests to maximize motivation, there may be less active or not sharing part of technological achievements and the "free rider" behavior. In order to explore the research subject at different potentials technology sharing niche theory and decision making, this paper based on Evolutionary Game Theory, through the establishment of the "state" and "potential" parameters of the aviation complex product development the main evolutionary game model, the main technology R & D respectively on the different types of ecological perspective sharing behavior analysis. This paper expounds the logic is as follows: firstly, the realistic background and research questions, introduces the research contents and methods; then defines the related concepts and introduction the research status at home and abroad, niche theory and evolutionary game theory. Then based on niche theory to aviation complex product development team is divided into four types. The time Based on the evolutionary game theory of game model for different types of equilibrium, and the equilibrium stability analysis; based on the analysis of the factors influencing the willingness to share the evolution direction of the main technology research and development, and the use of numerical simulation results verify the theoretical analysis. The construction of the corresponding mechanism to promote the development of the main technology sharing. The results showed that: (1) the main R & D technology sharing behavior and their "state" and "potential" value is closely related. When the research subject of "state" and "potential" values in different range, two-dimensional dynamic system construction were presented different evolutionary equilibrium strategy (2). "State" "potential" parameters under the influence of the evolution direction of the main game single group R & D aviation complex products from the ecological perspective and the multi group between the levels of development of the main game. (3) technology Cost sharing coefficient, coefficient of income distribution, income coefficient and additional income synergistic effects of different potential of R & D team technology sharing behavior of the effect is the same. (4) construct the cost sharing mechanism, resources integration mechanism, cooperation mechanism and incentive mechanism to improve the development of the main body of the Alliance Technology sharing.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：南昌航空大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F426.5;F273.1;F224.32

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