【摘要】：綠色建筑是生態(tài)建筑、可持續(xù)建筑。發(fā)展綠色建筑是轉(zhuǎn)變建筑業(yè)發(fā)展方式和城鄉(xiāng)建設(shè)模式的根本途徑。然而綠色建筑發(fā)展涉及政府、開(kāi)發(fā)商、消費(fèi)者等多個(gè)利益主體,彼此間相互依賴(lài),又相互競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。由于不同利益主體有不同的利益訴求,不同利益主體間缺乏共同的利益基礎(chǔ),缺乏有效的協(xié)作激勵(lì)機(jī)制,嚴(yán)重制約了我國(guó)綠色建筑的發(fā)展。因此,分析綠色建筑發(fā)展路徑及其經(jīng)濟(jì)特征,探究綠色建筑發(fā)展過(guò)程中供需兩端利益主體間的利益訴求與博弈關(guān)系,以此建立推動(dòng)綠色建筑發(fā)展的激勵(lì)機(jī)制,對(duì)于促進(jìn)綠色建筑健康可持續(xù)發(fā)展無(wú)疑具有重要意義。本文運(yùn)用利益相關(guān)者理論,基于綠色建筑全生命周期分析了其發(fā)展路徑,運(yùn)用新興產(chǎn)業(yè)生產(chǎn)函數(shù)模型,將綠色建筑發(fā)展過(guò)程劃分為發(fā)展起步、快速發(fā)展和發(fā)展成熟三個(gè)階段,并對(duì)其經(jīng)濟(jì)特征、優(yōu)劣勢(shì)進(jìn)行了分析。以動(dòng)態(tài)博弈模型為分析工具,構(gòu)建了綠色建筑供給端與需求端動(dòng)態(tài)博弈模型,運(yùn)用逆推歸納分析法探究綠色建筑生命周期內(nèi)各階段自然條件下的利益相關(guān)者得益情況,并通過(guò)構(gòu)建政策因素影響下的綠色建筑利益相關(guān)者演化博弈模型,研究了在有限理性不完全信息的綠色建筑利益相關(guān)者演化穩(wěn)定策略,以及在供需兩端,政策要素影響下復(fù)制形成的策略組合。綠色建筑供需各方動(dòng)態(tài)博弈研究表明:從供給端來(lái)看,其市場(chǎng)壁壘(外部性)所增加的額外成本是成為開(kāi)發(fā)商決定是否開(kāi)發(fā)綠色建筑的關(guān)鍵因素。綠色建筑開(kāi)發(fā)商的先行策略是決定后續(xù)開(kāi)發(fā)商是否開(kāi)發(fā)綠色建筑的重要依據(jù)與參考;而從需求端來(lái)看,不論消費(fèi)者先行購(gòu)買(mǎi)還是后續(xù)購(gòu)買(mǎi)綠色建筑,對(duì)綠色建筑價(jià)值增值預(yù)期所增加的額外收益成為消費(fèi)者決定是否購(gòu)買(mǎi)綠色建筑的關(guān)鍵因素。由此可推斷在自然推進(jìn)狀態(tài)下供需各方動(dòng)態(tài)博弈的策略結(jié)果,不利于綠色建筑長(zhǎng)期可持續(xù)發(fā)展。通過(guò)在演化博弈模型中引入政策因素,探討各方演化博弈策略,為綠色建筑各階段的推進(jìn)機(jī)制提供思路:在發(fā)展起步期,負(fù)外部性占優(yōu),政策設(shè)計(jì)要針對(duì)開(kāi)發(fā)傳統(tǒng)建筑的開(kāi)發(fā)商采取嚴(yán)苛的懲罰性措施,才能推進(jìn)利益相關(guān)群體達(dá)到最優(yōu)均衡;在快速發(fā)展期,正外部性占優(yōu),政策制定要傾向于對(duì)綠色建筑供需雙方采取更多激勵(lì)性舉措,才能實(shí)現(xiàn)最優(yōu)均衡;而在發(fā)展成熟期,外部性基本內(nèi)化,政策制定要充分發(fā)揮市場(chǎng)的決定性作用,以滿足稅收收益、政績(jī)收益與環(huán)境收益的平衡目標(biāo)。
[Abstract]:Green building is ecological building, sustainable building. The development of green building is the fundamental way to change the development mode of construction industry and urban and rural construction mode. However, the development of green buildings involves the government, developers, consumers and other stakeholders, mutual dependence and competition. Due to the different interest demands of different stakeholders, the lack of common interest basis among different interest subjects and the lack of effective cooperative incentive mechanism, the development of green buildings in China is seriously restricted. Therefore, this paper analyzes the path of green building development and its economic characteristics, and probes into the interest demands and game relations between the interests of both ends of supply and demand in the process of green building development, so as to establish an incentive mechanism to promote the development of green building. Undoubtedly, it is of great significance to promote the healthy and sustainable development of green buildings. In this paper, based on the theory of stakeholders, the development path of green building is analyzed based on the whole life cycle of green building, and the development process of green building is divided into three stages: start, rapid development and mature development by using the production function model of new industry. And its economic characteristics, advantages and disadvantages are analyzed. Based on the dynamic game model, the dynamic game model of supply end and demand side of green building is constructed, and the benefit of stakeholders in each stage of the life cycle of green building is explored by using the inverse inductive analysis method. By constructing the evolutionary game model of green building stakeholders under the influence of policy factors, this paper studies the evolutionary stability strategy of green building stakeholders with limited rational incomplete information, as well as the two ends of supply and demand. Policy factors under the influence of the replication of the formation of a combination of strategies. The dynamic game study on the supply and demand of green building shows that the extra cost of the market barrier (externality) is the key factor for the developer to decide whether to develop the green building or not. The leading strategy of green building developers is the important basis and reference to decide whether or not the subsequent developers develop green buildings. From the demand side, whether consumers buy green buildings first or later buy green buildings, The additional revenue expected to be added to the value of green buildings is a key factor for consumers to decide whether to buy green buildings. It can be inferred that the strategic results of dynamic game between supply and demand parties in the state of natural propulsion are not conducive to the long-term sustainable development of green buildings. By introducing the policy factors into the evolutionary game model, this paper discusses the evolutionary game strategy of all parties, which provides ideas for the promotion mechanism of the green building in each stage: in the initial stage of development, negative externality dominates. The policy design must take severe punitive measures against developers who develop traditional buildings in order to promote the optimal balance of stakeholder groups; in the period of rapid development, positive externalities dominate. The policy making should be inclined to take more incentive measures to the supply and demand of green buildings in order to achieve the optimal equilibrium, while in the mature period of development, the externality is basically internalized, and the policy making should give full play to the decisive role of the market. In order to meet the tax revenue, performance income and environmental revenue balance goal.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：江西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F426.92;TU201.5

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