【摘要】：開放式基金以超常規(guī)的發(fā)展態(tài)勢在十年間迅速成長為中國基金產(chǎn)業(yè)的主流，但在發(fā)展規(guī)模不斷擴大的過程中，基金不正當(dāng)關(guān)聯(lián)交易也隨之肆意滋生，嚴重影響了中國基金產(chǎn)業(yè)的投資公信力、阻礙了基金產(chǎn)業(yè)進一步健康發(fā)展。關(guān)聯(lián)交易黑幕的不斷曝出，引起監(jiān)管部門高度重視，頒布多項法案，但基金關(guān)聯(lián)交易仍屢禁不止。究其根源，開放式基金契約型的組織形式使基金管理公司內(nèi)部形成雙重代理關(guān)系，公司容易被“內(nèi)部人控制”產(chǎn)生關(guān)聯(lián)交易，，與此同時外部治理機制又尚未形成，內(nèi)部治理監(jiān)管關(guān)聯(lián)交易的有效性更顯重要。 現(xiàn)有對基金管理公司內(nèi)部治理與關(guān)聯(lián)交易研究主要是采用理論分析，對二者關(guān)系的實證研究文獻很少。因此，本文基于委托代理理論，以開放式基金為研究對象，利用實證方法探索分析基金管理公司現(xiàn)有內(nèi)部治理機制對基金關(guān)聯(lián)交易監(jiān)管的有效性，以期為完善基金管理公司內(nèi)部治理提出建議。 首先本文對基金關(guān)聯(lián)交易進行理論分析，探索關(guān)聯(lián)交易產(chǎn)生原因，基金管理公司內(nèi)部治理缺陷，再對關(guān)聯(lián)交易進行理論界定，對具體的三種關(guān)聯(lián)交易形式進行量化，最后通過多元回歸、單因素方差分析實證研究基金管理公司內(nèi)部治理機制對關(guān)聯(lián)交易的抑制作用并進一步對三類基金管理公司進行比較分析。實證結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)，提高具有證券或基金從業(yè)經(jīng)歷的獨立董事在董事會中比例將能抑制基金關(guān)聯(lián)交易的發(fā)生，而獨立董事占比的提高對抑制同一基金管理公司旗下基金共同重倉持股具有顯著作用；董事會的冗余將不利于對基金關(guān)聯(lián)交易托管費規(guī)模和關(guān)聯(lián)交易傭金規(guī)模的監(jiān)管；監(jiān)事會、督察長對基金關(guān)聯(lián)交易的抑制作用不顯著；投資決策委員會僅對關(guān)聯(lián)交易傭金規(guī)模具有一定抑制作用；而券商“一股獨大”將會促進基金關(guān)聯(lián)傭金分倉的發(fā)生；同時，三類基金管理公司中券商系基金管理公司關(guān)聯(lián)交易最為盛行，內(nèi)部治理機制約束相對乏力；盲目的發(fā)行新基金將會加重同一基金管理公司旗下基金共同重倉持股，增加基金管理公司整體風(fēng)險，最終傷害基金持有人的利益。
[Abstract]:Open-end funds have grown rapidly into the mainstream of China's fund industry in the past ten years, but in the process of expanding the scale of development, the illegitimate related party transactions of funds also breed wantonly. It seriously affects the investment credibility of China's fund industry and hinders the further healthy development of the fund industry. The continuous exposure of related party transactions caused great attention by regulators and issued many bills, but fund related transactions are still prohibited. The reason is that the open-end fund contractual organization forms the double agency relationship within the fund management company, and the company is easy to be controlled by the insiders to produce related party transactions, while the external governance mechanism has not yet been formed. The effectiveness of internal governance regulation related party transactions is more important. The current research on the internal governance and related party transactions of fund management companies is mainly based on theoretical analysis, and there are few empirical studies on the relationship between the two. Therefore, based on the principal-agent theory and taking open-end funds as the research object, this paper uses empirical methods to explore the effectiveness of the existing internal governance mechanism of fund management companies on the supervision of fund related transactions. With a view to improving the fund management company internal governance recommendations. First of all, this paper makes a theoretical analysis on the related transactions of funds, explores the causes of related party transactions, the internal governance defects of fund management companies, then defines the related party transactions theoretically, and quantifies the specific three forms of related party transactions. Finally, through multiple regression, univariate ANOVA empirical study of fund management company internal governance mechanism on related party transactions and further comparative analysis of the three types of fund management companies. The empirical results show that increasing the proportion of independent directors with securities or fund experience in the board of directors can inhibit the occurrence of related transactions. The increase of the proportion of independent directors has a significant effect on restraining the mutual heavy holdings of the funds of the same fund management company. The redundancy of the board of directors will be unfavorable to the supervision of the scale of the escrow fee and the commission scale of the related party transaction, and the board of supervisors and the inspector general have no significant inhibitory effect on the related transaction of the fund. The investment decision committee can only restrain the commission scale of the related party transaction, and the securities firm "one share alone" will promote the occurrence of the related commission sub-position of the fund. At the same time, among the three fund management companies, the securities company is the most popular fund management company related transactions, the internal governance mechanism is relatively weak; The blind issue of new funds will increase the mutual shareholding of funds owned by the same fund management company, increase the overall risk of fund management companies, and ultimately harm the interests of fund holders.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.51

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