【摘要】：學(xué)術(shù)界與理論界對(duì)高管薪酬問(wèn)題的研究由來(lái)已久,世界金融危機(jī)使得高管薪酬問(wèn)題被推向了風(fēng)口浪尖。隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展,我國(guó)貧富懸殊的矛盾日益凸顯。目前我國(guó)的收入差距正呈現(xiàn)全范圍多層次的擴(kuò)大趨勢(shì)。地區(qū)、城鄉(xiāng)、行業(yè)、群體間的收入差距有所加大,分配格局失衡導(dǎo)致部分社會(huì)財(cái)富向少數(shù)人集中,這種薪酬差距在壟斷行業(yè)更為擴(kuò)大,高管的高薪酬現(xiàn)象引起了民眾的反感情緒,高管薪酬的不公平成為社會(huì)各界關(guān)注的熱點(diǎn)�；谶@樣的現(xiàn)實(shí)背景,本文從高管薪酬的不公平角度出發(fā),分別研究我國(guó)壟斷行業(yè)與非壟斷行業(yè)高管薪酬不公平哪個(gè)程度更深?這種不公平的披露是否會(huì)對(duì)未來(lái)的高管薪酬產(chǎn)生影響?如果有影響,是否會(huì)在不同高管控制權(quán)的作用下,通過(guò)不同的調(diào)控手段對(duì)高管薪酬產(chǎn)生的效果不同? 本文基于公平理論和管理層權(quán)力理論框架,提出關(guān)于我國(guó)壟斷行業(yè)上市公司高管薪酬不公平的三組假設(shè)。本文選取滬、深證券交易所177家壟斷行業(yè)上市公司2002年—2010年面板數(shù)據(jù)作為研究對(duì)象,用薪酬決定模型衡量高管薪酬的不公平程度,基于總經(jīng)理董事兩職兼任情況、股權(quán)分散度、總經(jīng)理任職年限、總經(jīng)理是否來(lái)自控股單位及綜合權(quán)力視角構(gòu)建高管權(quán)力的綜合衡量指標(biāo)。實(shí)證結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn),與非壟斷行業(yè)上市公司相比,我國(guó)壟斷行業(yè)上市公司薪酬不公平程度較高；中國(guó)壟斷行業(yè)上市公司中,薪酬不公平程度會(huì)降低下一年度高管薪酬；當(dāng)高管權(quán)力較大時(shí),不公平對(duì)下一年度高管薪酬無(wú)影響；當(dāng)權(quán)力較小時(shí),不公平仍然會(huì)降低下一年度高管薪酬。 由此,本文提出了針對(duì)壟斷行業(yè)高管薪酬、控制權(quán)與薪酬不公平的管理啟示,認(rèn)為應(yīng)該加強(qiáng)對(duì)壟斷行業(yè)高管薪酬不公平現(xiàn)象的披露透明度,促使社會(huì)公眾輿論、政府管制對(duì)過(guò)高薪酬的調(diào)節(jié)作用,在完善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)時(shí),要關(guān)注高管控制權(quán)這一因素,避免高管“自定薪酬”現(xiàn)象。
[Abstract]:The academic and theoretical circles have been studying the issue of executive compensation for a long time, the world financial crisis has pushed the issue of executive compensation to the forefront. With the development of economy, the contradiction of the disparity between the rich and the poor in our country is becoming more and more prominent. At present, China's income gap is showing a full range of levels of expansion. The income gap between regions, urban and rural areas, industries and groups has increased, and the imbalance in distribution pattern has led to the concentration of some social wealth to a small number of people. This pay gap is even wider in monopolistic industries. The phenomenon of high executive pay has aroused people's antipathy, and unfair executive compensation has become the focus of attention. Based on such a realistic background, this paper starts from the perspective of unfair executive compensation, respectively to study the monopoly industry and the non-monopoly industry which degree of unfair executive compensation is deeper? Will this unfair disclosure have an impact on future executive pay? If there is an impact, will there be different effects on executive compensation through different means of regulation and control under the role of different executive control? Based on the theory of fairness and the theory of management power, this paper puts forward three hypotheses about the unfair compensation of executives in China's monopoly industries. Based on the panel data of 177 monopoly companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2002 to 2010, the paper uses compensation decision model to measure the unfair degree of executive compensation. The degree of equity decentralization, the tenure of the general manager, whether the general manager comes from the holding unit and the perspective of comprehensive power to construct the comprehensive measure of executive power. The empirical results show that, compared with the listed companies in the non-monopoly industries, the pay of the listed companies in the monopoly industries in China is higher than that in the listed companies in the monopoly industries, and the compensation unfairness degree of the listed companies in the monopoly industries in China will reduce the executive compensation in the next year. When executive power is greater, inequality has no impact on executive pay for the next year; when power is small, inequality still reduces executive pay for the next year. Therefore, this paper puts forward the management enlightenment on the unfair compensation, control and compensation of executives in monopoly industry, and holds that the transparency of disclosure of unfair pay of executives in monopoly industries should be strengthened, and public opinion should be promoted. Government regulation on the regulation of excessive pay, in improving the corporate governance structure, we should pay attention to the control of executive this factor, to avoid executives "self-pay" phenomenon.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F276.8;F272.92;F832.51;F224

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前2條

1 楊蘭品;中國(guó)行政壟斷問(wèn)題研究[D];武漢大學(xué);2005年

2 魯海帆;高管團(tuán)隊(duì)內(nèi)薪酬差距與公司業(yè)績(jī)[D];暨南大學(xué);2008年

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前2條

1 郭雨非;高管薪酬與公司績(jī)效的關(guān)系[D];西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2013年

2 宋子龍;國(guó)企高管超額薪酬與薪酬操縱研究[D];長(zhǎng)安大學(xué);2014年

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本文編號(hào)：2343395