我國上市公司獨(dú)立董事辭職行為的信號(hào)傳遞效應(yīng)研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-11-09 20:21
【摘要】：獨(dú)立董事制度是現(xiàn)代公司組織結(jié)構(gòu)中的重要組成部分，，也是降低公司治理中代理成本的重要方式之一。上個(gè)世紀(jì)90年代我國引入獨(dú)立董事制度以來，獨(dú)立董事在改善我國公司治理水平中扮演了重要的角色，但其獨(dú)立性和有效性也一直受到質(zhì)疑。檢驗(yàn)獨(dú)立董事制度的有效性，并且提出更好的發(fā)揮其作用的方式，這是獨(dú)立董事相關(guān)研究的主要內(nèi)容。本文的研究也屬于這一領(lǐng)域。本文以獨(dú)立董事的辭職行為為研究對(duì)象，分析發(fā)現(xiàn)獨(dú)立董事的辭職行為有助于改善公司治理中的信息不對(duì)稱程度，為獨(dú)立董事發(fā)揮自身作用提出了新的途徑。 本文的主要內(nèi)容如下：首先，回顧了獨(dú)立董事的相關(guān)理論，介紹了關(guān)于獨(dú)立董事辭職行為的國內(nèi)外文獻(xiàn)，為本文研究奠定了理論方面的基礎(chǔ)。其次，探討?yīng)毩⒍轮贫仍谖覈陌l(fā)展?fàn)顩r，提出獨(dú)立董事在公司治理中作用有限的原因。并以投資者、獨(dú)立董事和上市公司三者之間信息不對(duì)稱作為出發(fā)點(diǎn)，分析投資者的逆向選擇。另外，建立信號(hào)傳遞模型，分析獨(dú)立董事與投資者的博弈中可能出現(xiàn)的分離均衡、混同均衡和準(zhǔn)分離均衡的條件和表現(xiàn)形式。以此為基礎(chǔ)，提出本文的研究假設(shè)。然后，通過案例分析和實(shí)證研究中的事件研究法兩種途徑，對(duì)理論假設(shè)作以驗(yàn)證。最后，總結(jié)研究結(jié)論，提出相關(guān)政策建議。 理論分析發(fā)現(xiàn)，在特定的條件下，獨(dú)立董事可以用自身行動(dòng)向市場傳遞信號(hào)。本文的實(shí)證研究也證實(shí)了，獨(dú)立董事的辭職行為通常會(huì)伴隨著公司股價(jià)的異常下跌。這表明，獨(dú)立董事辭職行為確實(shí)能夠傳遞某種信息，幫助投資者作出正確決策。這不失為獨(dú)立董事發(fā)揮其在公司治理中作用的一個(gè)新途徑。本文的研究同時(shí)也發(fā)現(xiàn)，獨(dú)立董事從公司領(lǐng)取的薪酬高低與辭職后公司股價(jià)的負(fù)面波動(dòng)強(qiáng)度正相關(guān)。這表明，獨(dú)立董事薪酬的高低顯著影響了其辭職行為的信息含量。因此合理的薪酬激勵(lì)體系，對(duì)獨(dú)立董事制度的完善至關(guān)重要。 本文研究的主要?jiǎng)?chuàng)新之處在于：第一，以信息不對(duì)稱為假設(shè)前提，建立信號(hào)傳遞模型。通過分析該模型的均衡狀態(tài)發(fā)現(xiàn)獨(dú)立董事的辭職行為可以傳遞公司經(jīng)營狀況的信息。同時(shí)用案例分析和實(shí)證研究的方法對(duì)這一結(jié)論進(jìn)行驗(yàn)證。第二，研究發(fā)現(xiàn)薪酬?duì)顩r可以顯著影響?yīng)毩⒍罗o職行為信息含量，說明合理的薪酬是獨(dú)立董事制度發(fā)揮作用的重要條件。第三，在分析獨(dú)立董事辭職后公司股價(jià)波動(dòng)強(qiáng)弱的影響因素時(shí)，剔除了限定性原因的辭職行為，這契合了本文信息不對(duì)稱的分析前提，使研究結(jié)論更具針對(duì)性和說服力。 與已有的文獻(xiàn)相比，本文主要關(guān)注的不是獨(dú)立董事辭職的原因，而是這一行為的意義。理論和實(shí)證分析表明，從有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的公司中辭職可以成為獨(dú)立董事制度發(fā)揮作用的一種方式。獨(dú)立董事的薪酬體系越完善，則這種方式的作用就越明顯。本文的研究既有助于投資者更好的作出投資決策，也有助于獨(dú)立董事尋求更靈活有效的履行義務(wù)的方法，同時(shí)對(duì)于制定更合理的獨(dú)立董事法規(guī)和制度也有很好的參考價(jià)值。
[Abstract]:Independent director system is an important part of modern company's organizational structure, and is also one of the important ways to reduce agent cost in corporate governance. Since the introduction of the independent director system in the 1990s, the independent director plays an important role in improving the corporate governance level of our country, but its independence and effectiveness have been questioned. It is the main content of the independent director's research. The study of this paper also belongs to this field. This paper, taking the resignation behavior of independent director as the research object, analyzes and finds that the resignation behavior of the independent director can help to improve the information asymmetry in the company's governance, and put forward a new way for the independent director to play its own role. The main contents of this paper are as follows: First, the relevant theory of the independent director is reviewed, and the domestic and foreign literature on the resignation behavior of the independent director is introduced, which lays a theoretical foundation for the research of this paper. On the basis of the development of independent director system in our country, the author points out that the independent director plays a very limited role in corporate governance. The reason is that the information asymmetry between the investor, the independent director and the listed company is the starting point, and the reverse of the investor is analyzed. In addition, a signal transmission model is established to analyze the conditions and performance of the separation, equalisation and quasi-separation equilibrium that may occur in the game between the independent director and the investor The study of this paper is based on this. The theoretical assumption is then made by the case analysis and the case study in the empirical study. Verification. Finally, the conclusions of the study are summarized and relevant policies are put forward It is suggested that, under certain conditions, the independent director can move to the market with his own actions. The empirical study of this paper also confirms that the resignation behavior of the independent director is usually accompanied by the share price of the company The abnormal fall. This suggests that the independent director's resignation is indeed capable of delivering some kind of information to help investors Make the right decision. It's an independent director's role in corporate governance. A new approach is also found in this paper. The research of this paper also shows that the independent director's compensation from the company is the same as the negative fluctuation of the company's stock price after the resignation. The strength is positively related. This means that the independent director's compensation has a significant impact on his resignation The information content of the independent director system is the reasonable salary incentive system. The main innovation of this paper is that the first, the information is not the premise of the hypothesis, The signal transmission model is established. By analyzing the equilibrium state of the model, it is found that the resignation behavior of the independent director can be transferred to the public. The information on the operation status of the Division. The case analysis and the method of the empirical study are also used. The second, the research finds that the compensation condition can significantly affect the information content of the independent director's resignation, and the reasonable compensation is the independent director's system. Third, when analyzing the influence factors of the stock price fluctuation of the company after the resignation of the independent director, the resignation behavior of the non-limiting reason is eliminated, which is in agreement with the analysis premise of the information asymmetry in this paper, so that the research conclusion is more Compared with the existing literature, the main concern of this paper is not the original of the independent director's resignation. The theory and the empirical analysis show that the resignation from a risky company can become an independent director A way in which the system works. The more complete the remuneration system of the independent director, The more obvious the effect of this approach is, the study of this paper is helpful for investors to make investment decisions better and to help independent directors to seek a more flexible and effective way to perform their obligations, and at the same time to make more reasonable and independent directors' rules and regulations.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：河南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F276.6;F832.51
本文編號(hào)：2321458
[Abstract]:Independent director system is an important part of modern company's organizational structure, and is also one of the important ways to reduce agent cost in corporate governance. Since the introduction of the independent director system in the 1990s, the independent director plays an important role in improving the corporate governance level of our country, but its independence and effectiveness have been questioned. It is the main content of the independent director's research. The study of this paper also belongs to this field. This paper, taking the resignation behavior of independent director as the research object, analyzes and finds that the resignation behavior of the independent director can help to improve the information asymmetry in the company's governance, and put forward a new way for the independent director to play its own role. The main contents of this paper are as follows: First, the relevant theory of the independent director is reviewed, and the domestic and foreign literature on the resignation behavior of the independent director is introduced, which lays a theoretical foundation for the research of this paper. On the basis of the development of independent director system in our country, the author points out that the independent director plays a very limited role in corporate governance. The reason is that the information asymmetry between the investor, the independent director and the listed company is the starting point, and the reverse of the investor is analyzed. In addition, a signal transmission model is established to analyze the conditions and performance of the separation, equalisation and quasi-separation equilibrium that may occur in the game between the independent director and the investor The study of this paper is based on this. The theoretical assumption is then made by the case analysis and the case study in the empirical study. Verification. Finally, the conclusions of the study are summarized and relevant policies are put forward It is suggested that, under certain conditions, the independent director can move to the market with his own actions. The empirical study of this paper also confirms that the resignation behavior of the independent director is usually accompanied by the share price of the company The abnormal fall. This suggests that the independent director's resignation is indeed capable of delivering some kind of information to help investors Make the right decision. It's an independent director's role in corporate governance. A new approach is also found in this paper. The research of this paper also shows that the independent director's compensation from the company is the same as the negative fluctuation of the company's stock price after the resignation. The strength is positively related. This means that the independent director's compensation has a significant impact on his resignation The information content of the independent director system is the reasonable salary incentive system. The main innovation of this paper is that the first, the information is not the premise of the hypothesis, The signal transmission model is established. By analyzing the equilibrium state of the model, it is found that the resignation behavior of the independent director can be transferred to the public. The information on the operation status of the Division. The case analysis and the method of the empirical study are also used. The second, the research finds that the compensation condition can significantly affect the information content of the independent director's resignation, and the reasonable compensation is the independent director's system. Third, when analyzing the influence factors of the stock price fluctuation of the company after the resignation of the independent director, the resignation behavior of the non-limiting reason is eliminated, which is in agreement with the analysis premise of the information asymmetry in this paper, so that the research conclusion is more Compared with the existing literature, the main concern of this paper is not the original of the independent director's resignation. The theory and the empirical analysis show that the resignation from a risky company can become an independent director A way in which the system works. The more complete the remuneration system of the independent director, The more obvious the effect of this approach is, the study of this paper is helpful for investors to make investment decisions better and to help independent directors to seek a more flexible and effective way to perform their obligations, and at the same time to make more reasonable and independent directors' rules and regulations.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：河南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F276.6;F832.51
【參考文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條
1 俞春江;“花瓶”的吶喊——從樂山電力事件看我國獨(dú)立董事制度[J];財(cái)會(huì)通訊;2004年13期
2 李焰;秦義虎;;媒體監(jiān)督、聲譽(yù)機(jī)制與獨(dú)立董事辭職行為[J];財(cái)貿(mào)經(jīng)濟(jì);2011年03期
3 張立君;比較公司治理:一個(gè)新的視角[J];當(dāng)代財(cái)經(jīng);2002年06期
4 李海艦;魏恒;;重構(gòu)獨(dú)立董事制度[J];中國工業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì);2006年04期
5 酈金梁;廖理;沈紅波;;股權(quán)分置改革與股票需求價(jià)格彈性——基于供給需求的理論框架和經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)[J];中國工業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì);2010年02期
6 管征;卞志村;范從來;;增發(fā)還是配股? 上市公司股權(quán)再融資方式選擇研究[J];管理世界;2008年01期
7 蔣海;羅瑤;;基于信號(hào)傳遞模型的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本退出的并購定價(jià)分析[J];管理學(xué)報(bào);2010年06期
8 張俊生;曾亞敏;;獨(dú)立董事辭職行為的信息含量[J];金融研究;2010年08期
9 唐清泉;羅黨論;王莉;;上市公司獨(dú)立董事辭職行為研究——基于前景理論的分析[J];南開管理評(píng)論;2006年01期
10 魯桐;獨(dú)立董事制度的發(fā)展及其在中國的實(shí)踐[J];世界經(jīng)濟(jì);2002年06期
本文編號(hào)：2321458
本文鏈接：http://sikaile.net/guanlilunwen/zhqtouz/2321458.html
最近更新
教材專著
