發(fā)布時間：2018-11-03 11:22

【摘要】：20世紀30年代，隨著股份公司股東股權(quán)的逐漸分散和管理技術(shù)的復(fù)雜多變，出現(xiàn)了所有者與經(jīng)營者分離的現(xiàn)象；到了60年代變得更為突出，由于信息不對稱，出現(xiàn)了股東不能夠?qū)芾碚哌M行有效監(jiān)督；80年代后期，世界各地的大多數(shù)公司開始采用股票期權(quán)作為對公司高管理人員的報酬激勵，以實現(xiàn)所有者與經(jīng)營者統(tǒng)一的目標；發(fā)展到90年代，股票期權(quán)激勵已成為美國上市公司高管理人員的主要報酬，西方國家如英國、加拿大、法國等也開始使用股票期權(quán)激勵公司的經(jīng)營者�？梢娫谖鞣絿�，股票期權(quán)激勵已經(jīng)成為了公司高管激勵所廣泛采用的方式。但是，20世紀90年代后期，美國安然公司、世通公司等國際知名企業(yè)和會計師事務(wù)所共謀的財務(wù)舞弊讓人們開始對股票期權(quán)產(chǎn)生質(zhì)疑。如何看待股票期權(quán)這一激勵手段，應(yīng)該辯證的看待，可以比做一把“雙刃劍”，既要關(guān)注其解決了委托代理關(guān)系的正面效應(yīng)，，也要看到起內(nèi)在的缺陷。 近年來，我國國有上市公司把深化改革放在各項工作的首要位置，圍繞公司發(fā)展，大力推進股份制改革，完善公司法人治理結(jié)構(gòu)，為公司發(fā)展提供了強大的動力。隨著國有企業(yè)改革的深入，國有的上市公司組織機構(gòu)和經(jīng)營機制也發(fā)生了重大變化，但國有企業(yè)的實際內(nèi)部人控制以及道德風險問題逐漸顯現(xiàn)出來，國企管理層利用手中的代理權(quán)與企業(yè)所有者的目標發(fā)生了偏離，由此造成國有資產(chǎn)嚴重流失，資產(chǎn)利用效率低下，企業(yè)發(fā)展缺乏活力，國有上市公司中存在著“激勵機制與約束機制同樣不足”的問題，并已經(jīng)制約我國國有上市公司持續(xù)發(fā)展。所以，在股票期權(quán)激勵機制進入我國以后，我國國有上市公司紛紛展開了積極的學習與實踐。 本文將以國有上市公司做為研究對象，依據(jù)股權(quán)激勵的理論，通過運用實證分析的研究方法，對我國國有上市公司在實施股票期權(quán)薪酬激勵的現(xiàn)狀、存在的一些實踐問題進行了分析，并借鑒了西方發(fā)達國家在實施股票期權(quán)這一薪酬激勵中的實踐經(jīng)驗，針對我國國有上市公司在運用股票期權(quán)激勵存在的問題，設(shè)計一個能夠適應(yīng)我國國有上市公司的股票期權(quán)激勵計劃框架。論文最后從宏觀與微觀兩個方面分析股票期權(quán)激勵制度在我國應(yīng)用存在的問題，并對完善我國國有上市公司股票期權(quán)激勵制度提出有效的解決措施。
[Abstract]:In the 1930s, with the gradual dispersion of shareholders' equity and the complexity of management technology, the separation of owners and managers appeared. In the 1960s, it became more prominent, because of the asymmetry of information, shareholders could not supervise the managers effectively; In the late 1980s, most companies around the world began to use stock options as a reward incentive to the company's high managers, in order to achieve the goal of the unity of owners and managers. In the 1990s, stock option incentive has become the main reward of American listed companies. Western countries such as Britain, Canada, France and so on have started to use stock options to motivate the managers of companies. Therefore, stock option incentive has been widely used in western countries. However, in the late 1990s, American Enron Corporation, WorldCom and other international well-known enterprises and accounting firms colluded in financial fraud to make people begin to question stock options. How to treat the stock option as an incentive means should be dialectically treated as a "double-edged sword", which not only solves the positive effect of the principal-agent relationship, but also sees the inherent defects. In recent years, the state-owned listed companies in our country put the deepening reform in the primary position of all kinds of work, around the company development, vigorously promotes the shareholding system reform, consummates the corporate governance structure, has provided the powerful motive force for the company development. With the deepening of the reform of state-owned enterprises, great changes have taken place in the organization and management mechanism of state-owned listed companies, but the actual insider control and moral hazard problems of state-owned enterprises have gradually emerged. The managers of state-owned enterprises have used their agency power to deviate from the objectives of the owners of the enterprises, resulting in serious loss of state-owned assets, inefficient utilization of assets, and lack of vitality in the development of enterprises. There exists the problem that the incentive mechanism and restraint mechanism are insufficient in the state-owned listed companies, and it has restricted the sustainable development of the state-owned listed companies in our country. Therefore, after the stock option incentive mechanism comes into our country, the state-owned listed companies in our country have carried out active study and practice one after another. This article will take the state-owned listed companies as the research object, according to the stock right incentive theory, through the use of the empirical analysis research method, to our country state-owned listed companies in the implementation stock option compensation incentive present situation. This paper analyzes some practical problems, and draws lessons from the practical experience of western developed countries in the implementation of stock option, aiming at the problems existing in the use of stock option in state-owned listed companies in China. To design a stock option incentive plan framework which can adapt to the state-owned listed companies in China. Finally, the paper analyzes the problems existing in the application of the stock option incentive system in China from the macro and micro aspects, and puts forward effective measures to improve the stock option incentive system of the state-owned listed companies in China.
【學位授予單位】：山西財經(jīng)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F276.1;F832.51;F224

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