【摘要】：國(guó)內(nèi)外諸多研究表明，預(yù)算軟約束是新興和轉(zhuǎn)型經(jīng)濟(jì)體制度環(huán)境的典型特征之一，它的存在會(huì)扭曲企業(yè)的微觀行為。中國(guó)的資本市場(chǎng)是“新興加轉(zhuǎn)軌”的市場(chǎng)，它恰好為研究預(yù)算軟約束下公司投融資行為提供了一個(gè)難得的機(jī)會(huì)：在銀行債務(wù)是我國(guó)上市公司資本投資主要資金來(lái)源、銀行貸款決策和企業(yè)投資決策都可能受到政府行為影響這一背景下，銀行作為債權(quán)人的監(jiān)督職能還能否得到發(fā)揮，并通過(guò)債務(wù)的治理作用抑制上市公司的過(guò)度投資行為呢？為此，本文采用規(guī)范分析與實(shí)證分析相結(jié)合的方法，探討了預(yù)算軟約束下我國(guó)制造業(yè)上市公司銀行債務(wù)對(duì)公司資本投資的影響。 在理論研究部分，以委托代理理論、信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)理論為基礎(chǔ)，分析了負(fù)債融資影響公司資本投資的作用機(jī)理；并進(jìn)一步結(jié)合預(yù)算軟約束理論和我國(guó)相關(guān)制度背景，分析了預(yù)算軟約束對(duì)公司負(fù)債和投資之間關(guān)系的影響；在實(shí)證研究部分，針對(duì)負(fù)債對(duì)資本投資影響的“兩面性”，在區(qū)分公司成長(zhǎng)性的基礎(chǔ)上，分組檢驗(yàn)我國(guó)上市公司銀行債務(wù)對(duì)其資本投資的影響，并分析了背后不同的影響機(jī)制；同時(shí)引入不同產(chǎn)權(quán)控制人虛擬變量，以考察不同預(yù)算軟約束預(yù)期下銀行債務(wù)治理程度的不同。結(jié)果表明，總體上我國(guó)上市公司銀行債務(wù)對(duì)資本投資起到一定治理作用；但國(guó)有控股上市公司因具有更強(qiáng)的預(yù)算軟約束預(yù)期，因而相對(duì)非國(guó)有控股上市公司而言其銀行債務(wù)對(duì)投資擴(kuò)張的抑制作用較弱；而相對(duì)于中央政府控制的國(guó)有上市公司，地方政府控制的國(guó)有上市公司銀行債務(wù)對(duì)投資擴(kuò)張的抑制作用更弱。 最后，針對(duì)研究結(jié)果提出了以下政策建議：政府適度減輕對(duì)金融領(lǐng)域的干預(yù)；強(qiáng)化銀行改革，鼓勵(lì)多元化競(jìng)爭(zhēng)；硬化企業(yè)預(yù)算約束，提高國(guó)企改革成效；發(fā)展債券市場(chǎng)，，拓寬負(fù)債融資渠道。
[Abstract]:Many studies at home and abroad show that soft budget constraint is one of the typical characteristics of institutional environment in emerging and transition economies, and its existence will distort the microcosmic behavior of enterprises. China's capital market is a "burgeoning plus transition" market, which provides a rare opportunity to study the investment and financing behavior of companies under soft budget constraints: bank debt is the main source of capital investment for listed companies in China. Under the background that bank loan decision and enterprise investment decision may be influenced by government behavior, can the supervision function of bank as creditor be brought into play, and the excessive investment behavior of listed company can be restrained through the governance function of debt? Therefore, this paper uses the method of normative analysis and empirical analysis to discuss the impact of bank debt on the capital investment of listed manufacturing companies in China under soft budget constraints. In the theoretical research part, based on the principal-agent theory and information asymmetry theory, this paper analyzes the mechanism of debt financing affecting the capital investment of companies, and further combines the theory of soft budgetary constraints and the relevant institutional background of our country. This paper analyzes the impact of soft budgetary constraints on the relationship between corporate debt and investment, and in the empirical study, on the basis of the growth of regional branch, aiming at the "dual character" of the impact of debt on capital investment, The paper examines the impact of bank debt on capital investment of listed companies in China, analyzes the different influencing mechanisms behind it, and introduces virtual variables of different property rights controllers. In order to investigate the different degree of bank debt governance under different budget soft constraint expectations. The results show that, on the whole, the bank debt of listed companies in China has a certain governance effect on capital investment, but the state-owned holding listed companies are expected to have stronger budget soft constraints. As a result, the bank debt of the non-state-controlled listed companies has a weaker inhibitory effect on investment expansion, while that of the state-owned listed companies controlled by the central government is weaker than that of the state-owned listed companies controlled by the central government. Local government-controlled state-owned listed companies' bank debt has a weaker effect on investment expansion. Finally, the paper puts forward the following policy recommendations: the government should moderate the intervention in the financial field; strengthen the banking reform to encourage diversified competition; harden the enterprise budget constraints, improve the effectiveness of state-owned enterprise reform; and develop the bond market. Broaden the financing channels for debt.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F275;F832.51

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