我國(guó)制造業(yè)上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績(jī)效關(guān)系的研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-09-11 08:04
【摘要】：股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)作為公司治理體系的產(chǎn)權(quán)基礎(chǔ),是企業(yè)利益相關(guān)者權(quán)利和義務(wù)的集中反映,它在很大程度上影響甚至決定上市公司如何配置公司的控制權(quán),股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)還會(huì)通過(guò)公司治理機(jī)制來(lái)影響公司治理效率,并最終改變公司的經(jīng)營(yíng)效果。如果公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)合理,那么由于公司所有權(quán)和控制權(quán)分離產(chǎn)生的委托代理成本會(huì)降低,委托人對(duì)代理人的監(jiān)督和激勵(lì)就會(huì)越有效,公司的治理效率越高,公司經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效也就越好；相反,倘若公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)不合理就可能會(huì)產(chǎn)生相反的效果,代理成本增加、監(jiān)督和激勵(lì)無(wú)效,最終導(dǎo)致公司績(jī)效降低。 我國(guó)的資本市場(chǎng)成立于二十世紀(jì)九十年代,到目前為止已經(jīng)二十幾年的時(shí)間,國(guó)內(nèi)學(xué)者關(guān)于股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績(jī)效關(guān)系的研究一直沒(méi)有問(wèn)斷,但是由于研究的視角、研究的切入點(diǎn)以及研究變量等方面的差異,始終沒(méi)能得到一個(gè)統(tǒng)一的研究結(jié)論。通過(guò)以往學(xué)者的研究發(fā)現(xiàn),行業(yè)的差異對(duì)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績(jī)效的關(guān)系也會(huì)產(chǎn)生影響,本文又考慮到制造業(yè)在我國(guó)國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)中的重要作用,于是以制造業(yè)作為本文的研究對(duì)象進(jìn)行深入細(xì)致的研究。 本文采用實(shí)證研究的范式,以我國(guó)2007-2011年滬深A(yù)股462家制造業(yè)上市公司為研究樣本,提出五個(gè)研究假設(shè)并建立相應(yīng)的回歸模型。在解釋變量的選擇上,本文與前人的研究不同,選擇主營(yíng)業(yè)務(wù)凈資產(chǎn)收益率和凈資產(chǎn)收益率；被解釋變量則分股權(quán)集中度和股權(quán)屬性兩方面共七個(gè)變量,對(duì)公司的股權(quán)集中度、股權(quán)屬性與公司績(jī)效的關(guān)系首先進(jìn)行描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析、相關(guān)性分析,最后進(jìn)行實(shí)證設(shè)計(jì)和分析。 圍繞研究的內(nèi)容,本文主要分為六大部分： 第一部分主要介紹緒論。介紹本文的研究意義、選取我國(guó)制造業(yè)上市公司為研究對(duì)象的原因、研究?jī)?nèi)容和方法以及研究的優(yōu)勢(shì)和不足。 第二部分對(duì)相關(guān)的文獻(xiàn)綜述進(jìn)行回顧。本章對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)者的實(shí)證研究文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行細(xì)致的回顧和分析,最后進(jìn)行文獻(xiàn)評(píng)述。 第三部分主要介紹了股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績(jī)效的相關(guān)理論。這一章主要闡述了委托代理理論,然后介紹了我國(guó)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)公司績(jī)效的影響。 第四部分是制造業(yè)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績(jī)效的現(xiàn)狀分析。從股權(quán)集中度和股權(quán)屬性兩方面介紹了目前制造業(yè)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的狀況,分析股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的特點(diǎn),然后介紹公司經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效的現(xiàn)狀。 第五部分進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究分析。主要介紹了樣本選取、相關(guān)變量的選擇、研究假設(shè),并對(duì)模型構(gòu)建進(jìn)行描述。然后重點(diǎn)進(jìn)行了實(shí)證研究分析,對(duì)相關(guān)統(tǒng)計(jì)變量進(jìn)行描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析,然后分別就股權(quán)屬性變量、股權(quán)集中度變量與公司績(jī)效變量進(jìn)行回歸分析,并對(duì)回歸結(jié)果進(jìn)行解釋。 第六部分是研究結(jié)論和建議。首先對(duì)第五章的實(shí)證研究做總結(jié)性的結(jié)論,然后根據(jù)實(shí)證結(jié)果,再結(jié)合我國(guó)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的現(xiàn)狀,提出了一些建設(shè)性的建議。 本文實(shí)證結(jié)果表明：(1)制造業(yè)上市公司股權(quán)集中度與公司績(jī)效正相關(guān)；(2)制造業(yè)上市公司股權(quán)制衡程度與公司績(jī)效正相關(guān)；(3)公司國(guó)有股比例對(duì)公司績(jī)效影響不顯著；(4)制造業(yè)上市公司法人股比例的提高有利于公司績(jī)效的提升；(5)制造業(yè)上市公司流通股比例對(duì)于公司績(jī)效影響是負(fù)面的。
[Abstract]:Ownership structure, as the property right basis of corporate governance system, is the concentrated reflection of the rights and obligations of the stakeholders of an enterprise. To a great extent, it affects or even decides how the listed companies allocate the control rights of the company. Ownership structure also affects the efficiency of corporate governance through the corporate governance mechanism, and ultimately changes the operating effect of the company. If the ownership structure of the company is reasonable, then the principal-agent cost caused by the separation of ownership and control of the company will be reduced, the principal's supervision and incentive to the agent will be more effective, the higher the corporate governance efficiency, the better the company's operating performance; on the contrary, if the ownership structure of the company is unreasonable, it may produce the opposite. As a result, agency costs increase, supervision and incentives fail, resulting in lower corporate performance.
China's capital market was established in the 1990s, so far it has been more than 20 years, the domestic scholars on the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance has not been interrupted, but because of the research perspective, research entry point and research variables and other differences, has never been able to get a unified study. Conclusion. According to the previous studies, the industry differences also have an impact on the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance. Considering the important role of manufacturing industry in China's national economy, this paper takes manufacturing industry as the research object of this paper.
Based on the empirical research paradigm, this paper takes 462 listed manufacturing companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share market from 2007 to 2011 as the research sample, puts forward five research hypotheses and establishes corresponding regression model. Then, there are seven variables in the two aspects of ownership concentration and ownership attributes. First, descriptive statistical analysis and correlation analysis are made on the relationship between ownership concentration, ownership attributes and corporate performance.
Around the content of the study, this article is divided into six parts.
The first part mainly introduces the introduction. It introduces the significance of this study, the reasons for choosing listed manufacturing companies in China as the research object, the research contents and methods, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of the study.
The second part reviews the relevant literature. This chapter makes a detailed review and analysis of the empirical research literature of domestic and foreign scholars, and finally makes a literature review.
The third part mainly introduces the theory of ownership structure and corporate performance. This chapter mainly expounds the principal-agent theory, and then introduces the impact of ownership structure on corporate performance in China.
The fourth part is the analysis of the current situation of the ownership structure and corporate performance in manufacturing industry.This paper introduces the current situation of the ownership structure in manufacturing industry from the aspects of ownership concentration and ownership attributes,analyzes the characteristics of the ownership structure,and then introduces the current situation of the company's operating performance.
The fifth part carries on the empirical research analysis. It mainly introduces the sample selection, the choice of related variables, the research hypothesis, and describes the model construction. Then it emphatically carries on the empirical research analysis, carries on the descriptive statistical analysis to the correlation statistical variable, then separately carries on the stock right attribute variable, the stock right concentration variable and the company performance variable. Regression analysis was carried out and the regression results were explained.
The sixth part is the conclusion and suggestion of the study. Firstly, the conclusion of the empirical study in the fifth chapter is summarized. Then, according to the empirical results and the present situation of the ownership structure in China, some constructive suggestions are put forward.
The empirical results show that: (1) Equity concentration of listed manufacturing companies is positively correlated with corporate performance; (2) Equity checks and balances of listed manufacturing companies are positively correlated with corporate performance; (3) The proportion of state-owned shares has no significant impact on corporate performance; (4) Increasing the proportion of corporate shares of listed manufacturing companies is conducive to improving corporate performance. (5) the proportion of tradable shares of Listed Companies in manufacturing industry has negative impact on company performance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F406.72;F832.51;F224
本文編號(hào)：2236103
[Abstract]:Ownership structure, as the property right basis of corporate governance system, is the concentrated reflection of the rights and obligations of the stakeholders of an enterprise. To a great extent, it affects or even decides how the listed companies allocate the control rights of the company. Ownership structure also affects the efficiency of corporate governance through the corporate governance mechanism, and ultimately changes the operating effect of the company. If the ownership structure of the company is reasonable, then the principal-agent cost caused by the separation of ownership and control of the company will be reduced, the principal's supervision and incentive to the agent will be more effective, the higher the corporate governance efficiency, the better the company's operating performance; on the contrary, if the ownership structure of the company is unreasonable, it may produce the opposite. As a result, agency costs increase, supervision and incentives fail, resulting in lower corporate performance.
China's capital market was established in the 1990s, so far it has been more than 20 years, the domestic scholars on the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance has not been interrupted, but because of the research perspective, research entry point and research variables and other differences, has never been able to get a unified study. Conclusion. According to the previous studies, the industry differences also have an impact on the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance. Considering the important role of manufacturing industry in China's national economy, this paper takes manufacturing industry as the research object of this paper.
Based on the empirical research paradigm, this paper takes 462 listed manufacturing companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share market from 2007 to 2011 as the research sample, puts forward five research hypotheses and establishes corresponding regression model. Then, there are seven variables in the two aspects of ownership concentration and ownership attributes. First, descriptive statistical analysis and correlation analysis are made on the relationship between ownership concentration, ownership attributes and corporate performance.
Around the content of the study, this article is divided into six parts.
The first part mainly introduces the introduction. It introduces the significance of this study, the reasons for choosing listed manufacturing companies in China as the research object, the research contents and methods, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of the study.
The second part reviews the relevant literature. This chapter makes a detailed review and analysis of the empirical research literature of domestic and foreign scholars, and finally makes a literature review.
The third part mainly introduces the theory of ownership structure and corporate performance. This chapter mainly expounds the principal-agent theory, and then introduces the impact of ownership structure on corporate performance in China.
The fourth part is the analysis of the current situation of the ownership structure and corporate performance in manufacturing industry.This paper introduces the current situation of the ownership structure in manufacturing industry from the aspects of ownership concentration and ownership attributes,analyzes the characteristics of the ownership structure,and then introduces the current situation of the company's operating performance.
The fifth part carries on the empirical research analysis. It mainly introduces the sample selection, the choice of related variables, the research hypothesis, and describes the model construction. Then it emphatically carries on the empirical research analysis, carries on the descriptive statistical analysis to the correlation statistical variable, then separately carries on the stock right attribute variable, the stock right concentration variable and the company performance variable. Regression analysis was carried out and the regression results were explained.
The sixth part is the conclusion and suggestion of the study. Firstly, the conclusion of the empirical study in the fifth chapter is summarized. Then, according to the empirical results and the present situation of the ownership structure in China, some constructive suggestions are put forward.
The empirical results show that: (1) Equity concentration of listed manufacturing companies is positively correlated with corporate performance; (2) Equity checks and balances of listed manufacturing companies are positively correlated with corporate performance; (3) The proportion of state-owned shares has no significant impact on corporate performance; (4) Increasing the proportion of corporate shares of listed manufacturing companies is conducive to improving corporate performance. (5) the proportion of tradable shares of Listed Companies in manufacturing industry has negative impact on company performance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F406.72;F832.51;F224
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，本文編號(hào)：2236103
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