【摘要】：經(jīng)過(guò)十年的孕育,我國(guó)的創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)終于于2009年10月誕生,截止到2012年3月1日,有291家企業(yè)先后在創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市,開(kāi)始成為中國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)上的一支新生力量,創(chuàng)業(yè)板的快速發(fā)展使得創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司成為多方關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn)。企業(yè)在創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市以后,股權(quán)會(huì)逐漸分散,所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)開(kāi)始分離,股東與管理層的代理關(guān)系也突顯,代理問(wèn)題也隨之產(chǎn)生,因此對(duì)企業(yè)的經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效進(jìn)行合理的評(píng)價(jià)就顯得越來(lái)越為重要。了解到這些上市公司經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效的同時(shí),也有越來(lái)越多的人也開(kāi)始關(guān)注哪些因素對(duì)這些創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司績(jī)效產(chǎn)生影響,根據(jù)以往的研究經(jīng)驗(yàn),企業(yè)的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)是研究公司績(jī)效影響因素的一個(gè)熱點(diǎn)研究問(wèn)題。 關(guān)于股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績(jī)效的關(guān)系的研究,國(guó)內(nèi)學(xué)者主要針對(duì)的是主板市場(chǎng)上市公司或者中小板上市公司,專(zhuān)門(mén)針對(duì)我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績(jī)效的關(guān)系進(jìn)行研究的文章非常地少。相對(duì)于主板市場(chǎng)的上公司,創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)有其特殊性,創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司在股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)上和主板市場(chǎng)的最大區(qū)別就是企業(yè)高級(jí)管理人員的持股比例很高,第一大股東都是自然人股東或者最終由自然人控股的法人股東,且這些自然人均在企業(yè)擔(dān)任高級(jí)管理人員,企業(yè)的大股東與企業(yè)的高級(jí)管理人員的利益是一致的。 本文將選取深圳證券交易所創(chuàng)業(yè)板塊2010年底前上市的153家公司作為研究樣本。整篇文章分為兩大部分：文章的前半部分,首先對(duì)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)問(wèn)題的理論基礎(chǔ)-委托代理理論以及利益相關(guān)者理論進(jìn)行了闡述,闡明了股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)如何通過(guò)企業(yè)的治理結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)企業(yè)的經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效發(fā)揮影響作用,并找到國(guó)外和國(guó)內(nèi)相關(guān)的文獻(xiàn),從股權(quán)的性質(zhì)和股權(quán)集中度的角度分別評(píng)述了這些已有的研究文獻(xiàn)。接著,介紹了創(chuàng)業(yè)板及其創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的特點(diǎn),以及與主板和中小板企業(yè)的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的異同；文章的后半部分采用實(shí)證分析的方法,選取股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的替代指標(biāo)作為自變量,選取公司經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效的替代變量作為因變量,收集樣本公司的數(shù)據(jù),通過(guò)構(gòu)建模型進(jìn)行描述性分析、相關(guān)性分析和回歸分析,指出了創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)特點(diǎn)與創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效之間有著怎么樣的因果關(guān)系,并在文章最后提出相關(guān)的政策建議,指出本文存在的不足之處。 本文通過(guò)實(shí)證研究得出以下的研究結(jié)論： 1.國(guó)有股與創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司的經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效成微弱的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,但是系數(shù)并沒(méi)有通過(guò)顯著性檢驗(yàn)：理論上國(guó)有股參與公司治理的低效率使國(guó)有股的持股比例與公司績(jī)效成負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,在創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司中,由于國(guó)有股本身所占的比重非常少,并不對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的公司績(jī)效構(gòu)成顯著的影響。 2.法人股與創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司的經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效的關(guān)系不明顯：一方面,與國(guó)有股相比,法人股使用的是自己的資本,這些法人股東為了謀求自己所投資資本的增值,有動(dòng)力去監(jiān)督企業(yè)的管理者的行為,與自然人股東進(jìn)行比較,法人股股東更為理性,這些法人股東自身具有豐富的管理經(jīng)驗(yàn),會(huì)幫助所投資的公司進(jìn)行更好的運(yùn)作；另一方面,這些法人股東仍然謀求的是自身利益的最大化而非上市公司利益的最大化,所以法人股東可能從事有利于自己但損害上市公司利益的活動(dòng),從而會(huì)給上市公司帶來(lái)負(fù)面效應(yīng),沖抵法人股東對(duì)公司績(jī)效的正面效應(yīng),由于法人股東正反兩個(gè)方面的作用,從而導(dǎo)致檢驗(yàn)結(jié)果不顯著。 3.高管股與創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司的經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效成顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系：企業(yè)的高級(jí)管理人員是企業(yè)發(fā)展的重要力量,高級(jí)管理人員是否努力工作關(guān)系到企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)效益的好壞,上市公司讓高級(jí)管理人員持股就把高管的個(gè)人利益同企業(yè)的整體利益、與股東的利益捆綁到了一起,采取這種股權(quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)制的方法能夠促使他們關(guān)注企業(yè)的長(zhǎng)期發(fā)展,有利于企業(yè)的業(yè)績(jī)的提高；再者,創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的股權(quán)控制人很多都擔(dān)任著企業(yè)的高級(jí)管理人員,這些控股股東的利益是與企業(yè)的利益一致的,當(dāng)然愿意盡自己最大的努力提高公司的經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效。 4.流通股與創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司的經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效成顯著的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系： 流通股的持有者多為個(gè)人股東,分布極為零散,這些流通股東存在“搭便車(chē)”的現(xiàn)象,他們既沒(méi)有積極性也沒(méi)有能力參與企業(yè)的治理,企業(yè)的流通股比例的提高,意味著企業(yè)的股權(quán)的分散程度變得越大,而分散的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)安排下會(huì)產(chǎn)生兩種問(wèn)題：一是股東對(duì)企業(yè)的管理者的監(jiān)督能力就會(huì)減弱,二是股東對(duì)企業(yè)的管理者的監(jiān)督的積極性也很弱,因此對(duì)企業(yè)的經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效產(chǎn)生負(fù)面的影響。 5.股權(quán)集中度與創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司的經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效成正相關(guān)關(guān)系： 一方面當(dāng)大股東持股比例上升時(shí),大股東自身的利益與公司的利益結(jié)合的緊密度就增加,公司經(jīng)營(yíng)的好與不好會(huì)對(duì)公司的大股東發(fā)揮很大的作用,這個(gè)時(shí)候由于大股東利益與公司利益的趨同,大股東就更有動(dòng)力去監(jiān)督管理層,有效解決委托代理問(wèn)題,盡自己最大的努力來(lái)提升公司的經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效；另一方面,在我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板企業(yè)中,第一大股東往往會(huì)自己擔(dān)當(dāng)起企業(yè)的經(jīng)營(yíng)管理者的角色,主持企業(yè)的日常事務(wù),由于自己親自擔(dān)當(dāng)管理者會(huì)大大地降低因?yàn)楣蓶|和管理者分離而帶來(lái)的委托代理鏈的長(zhǎng)度,避免了委托代理的問(wèn)題,由于此時(shí)的管理者就是企業(yè)的所有者,兩者在本質(zhì)上是統(tǒng)一的,因此兩者此時(shí)此刻追求的目標(biāo)是一致的,這種情況下,企業(yè)的股東不需要刻意去監(jiān)督管理者的各種行為,因?yàn)樵诠餐娴尿?qū)使下管理者都會(huì)自覺(jué)地追求股東利益的最大化,從而有利于提高企業(yè)的績(jī)效。 縱觀上述研究,本文主要在以下幾個(gè)方面具有自己的特點(diǎn)： 1.文章選擇的視角比較新穎,由于創(chuàng)業(yè)板剛剛在我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)成立不久時(shí)間,是我國(guó)的資本市場(chǎng)的新興板塊,截止到現(xiàn)在,對(duì)于股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績(jī)效兩者關(guān)系的研究,國(guó)內(nèi)很多學(xué)者還沒(méi)有研究到創(chuàng)業(yè)板塊來(lái),大多數(shù)學(xué)者都是針對(duì)滬深主板和深圳中小板上市公司來(lái)進(jìn)行研究(王燕和許小年(1997),張紅軍(2000),陳曉、江東(2000),陳小悅和徐曉東(2001)等),本文的研究是在國(guó)內(nèi)外很多已有文獻(xiàn)的基礎(chǔ)上,選擇創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司作為研究的視角,研究創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu),研究創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)效率和業(yè)績(jī)之間關(guān)系,一方面作為以往研究的補(bǔ)充,另一方面也為創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的優(yōu)化提供一定的經(jīng)驗(yàn)數(shù)據(jù)。2.在實(shí)證研究部分,本文沒(méi)有采用托賓Q值作為考察公司績(jī)效的衡量指標(biāo),因?yàn)橥匈eQ值的使用必須具備一個(gè)前提條件,即資本市場(chǎng)是有效的,資產(chǎn)的價(jià)格能夠完全反映各種信息,所以使用托賓Q值作為企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效的衡量指標(biāo)的外國(guó)文獻(xiàn)居多,如：Morek、shleifer和Vishmy(1988)、McConnell和Servae (1990)等。國(guó)內(nèi)有些學(xué)者也使用了托賓Q值作為研究的變量(孫永祥、黃祖輝(1999)、張紅軍(2000)、俞曉明(2003)),但是本文認(rèn)為我國(guó)的資本市場(chǎng)發(fā)展還不健全,使用托賓Q值來(lái)衡量企業(yè)的績(jī)效顯得有些不合適,本文采用的是財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)指標(biāo),國(guó)內(nèi)很多學(xué)者使用都是財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)指標(biāo),陳曉、江東(2000)使用了凈資產(chǎn)收益率和主營(yíng)業(yè)務(wù)利潤(rùn)率來(lái)代表企業(yè)的經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效,吳淑琨(2002)使用總資產(chǎn)利潤(rùn)率來(lái)衡量企業(yè)的經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效,魏樂(lè)(2010年)使用的是主營(yíng)業(yè)務(wù)利潤(rùn)率指標(biāo),王玲(2010)使用的是凈資產(chǎn)收益率(ROE)、核心業(yè)務(wù)資產(chǎn)收益率(CROA)和每股收益(EPS)三個(gè)指標(biāo)綜合考慮中小板企業(yè)的經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效。本文的研究立足于創(chuàng)業(yè)板這個(gè)視角,在用反映企業(yè)整體盈利能力的每股收益(EPS)作為公司經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效的基礎(chǔ)上,從財(cái)務(wù)管理的角度出發(fā),用企業(yè)的每股經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)凈現(xiàn)金流量(CPPS)來(lái)作為公司績(jī)效的另外一個(gè)替代指標(biāo),至于為什么要選擇這個(gè)指標(biāo)很大程度上是因?yàn)槊抗山?jīng)營(yíng)凈現(xiàn)金流能夠反映企業(yè)賺取現(xiàn)金流的能力,同時(shí)在模型中適度引入資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率、公司規(guī)模等作為控制變變量。 3.在股權(quán)性質(zhì)的劃分上本文考慮到創(chuàng)業(yè)板上上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的特殊性,并沒(méi)有像以往學(xué)者(陳曉、江東(2000)等)一樣將股權(quán)性質(zhì)直接劃分為國(guó)有股、法人股和流通股,由后面的統(tǒng)計(jì)分析我們可以看出主板市場(chǎng)高管持股比例僅為0.74%,中小板上市公司的高管持股比例為12.83%,但是創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的高管持股比例卻高達(dá)32.07%,高管持股比例對(duì)公司的績(jī)效有非常顯著的相關(guān)性關(guān)系,因此特意加入了高管持持股比例這一指標(biāo),和其他三個(gè)指標(biāo)一起作為股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的替代變量,更具全面性。在股權(quán)集中度的指標(biāo)選擇上,本文也并沒(méi)有像以往學(xué)者一樣把Z指數(shù)單獨(dú)做為股權(quán)制衡度的指標(biāo)(樊麗紅(2007),陳德萍、陳永圣(2011)等),而是和CR1指標(biāo)和H5指一起作為股權(quán)集中度的替代變量,并且得出Z指數(shù)與創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的績(jī)效成微弱的正相關(guān)關(guān)系。
[Abstract]:After ten years of gestation, China's GEM market was finally born in October 2009. By March 1, 2012, 291 enterprises had listed on the GEM, and began to become a new force in China's capital market. The rapid development of GEM has made the listed companies on GEM become the focus of attention. After that, the ownership will be gradually dispersed, the ownership and management rights will begin to separate, the agency relationship between shareholders and management will be highlighted, and the agency problem will also arise. Therefore, it is more and more important to evaluate the performance of the enterprise rationally. Note which factors have an impact on the performance of these GEM listed companies. According to previous research experience, the ownership structure of enterprises is a hot issue in the study of influencing factors of corporate performance.
Domestic scholars mainly study the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance of Listed Companies in the main board market or listed companies on the small and medium-sized board. The biggest difference between GEM listed companies and the main board market is that the proportion of senior managers is very high. The first largest shareholders are natural shareholders or legal shareholders ultimately controlled by natural persons, and these natural individuals are senior managers in the enterprise, enterprises. The interests of large shareholders are consistent with those of senior managers.
This article will select 153 companies listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange before the end of 2010 as the research sample. The whole article is divided into two parts: the first half of the article, first of all, the theoretical basis of the ownership structure - principal-agent theory and stakeholder theory are expounded, expounding how the ownership structure through the enterprise. The governance structure plays an important role in the performance of enterprises, and finds relevant literature both at home and abroad. This paper reviews the existing research literature from the perspective of equity nature and equity concentration. Then, it introduces the characteristics of equity structure of GEM and listed companies on GEM, as well as the stocks of main board and small and medium-sized board enterprises. In the second half of the article, we use the empirical analysis method, select the substitution index of the ownership structure as the independent variable, select the substitution variable of the company's operating performance as the dependent variable, collect the data of the sample companies, and through the construction of a model for descriptive analysis, correlation analysis and regression analysis, point out the listing of GEM. What is the causal relationship between the characteristics of the equity structure and the operating performance of the listed companies on the GEM? At the end of the paper, the author puts forward relevant policy recommendations and points out the shortcomings of this paper.
This paper draws the following conclusions through empirical study.
1. There is a weak negative correlation between state-owned shares and the performance of GEM companies, but the coefficient has not passed the significant test: theoretically, the inefficiency of state-owned shares participating in corporate governance makes the proportion of state-owned shares negatively correlated with corporate performance. In GEM listed companies, because the proportion of state-owned shares is very small, the proportion of state-owned shares is very small. It does not have a significant impact on the company performance of the GEM listed companies.
2. The relationship between corporate shares and the performance of GEM is not obvious. On the one hand, compared with state-owned shares, corporate shares use their own capital. In order to increase the value of their investment capital, these corporate shareholders have the motivation to supervise the behavior of managers of enterprises. Compared with natural shareholders, corporate shareholders are more rational. On the other hand, these corporate shareholders still seek to maximize their own interests rather than the interests of listed companies, so corporate shareholders may engage in activities beneficial to themselves but harmful to the interests of listed companies. However, it will bring negative effects to listed companies and offset the positive effects of corporate shareholders on corporate performance. Because of the positive and negative effects of corporate shareholders, the test results are not significant.
3. There is a significant positive correlation between the executive stock and the performance of GEM: the senior managers are an important force for the development of the enterprise, whether the senior managers work hard or not is related to the performance of the enterprise. Shareholders'interests are bundled together, and the adoption of this equity incentive mechanism can make them pay attention to the long-term development of the enterprise, which is conducive to the improvement of the performance of the enterprise; moreover, many of the shareholders of the listed companies on the GEM are senior managers of the enterprise, and the interests of these controlling shareholders are one of the interests of the enterprise. Of course, of course, we are willing to do our best to improve the company's performance.
4. there is a significant negative correlation between circulating shares and operating performance of GEM companies.
Most of the holders of tradable shares are individual shareholders, and their distribution is extremely scattered. These tradable shareholders have the phenomenon of "hitchhiking". They have neither enthusiasm nor ability to participate in the governance of enterprises. The increase of the proportion of tradable shares in enterprises means that the degree of decentralization of the enterprise's equity becomes greater, and the decentralized ownership structure arrangement will produce. There are two problems: one is that the shareholders'supervisory ability to the managers of the enterprise will be weakened, the other is that the shareholders' enthusiasm to supervise the managers of the enterprise is also weak, so it has a negative impact on the business performance of the enterprise.
5. ownership concentration is positively related to the operating performance of GEM companies.
On the one hand, when the proportion of major shareholders increases, the tightness of the combination of the interests of the major shareholders and the interests of the company will increase, and the good and bad management of the company will play a great role to the major shareholders of the company. At this time, because of the convergence of the interests of the major shareholders and the interests of the company, the major shareholders will have more incentive to supervise and manage and effectively solve the problem. On the other hand, in our GEM enterprises, the first largest shareholder often plays the role of manager and presides over the daily affairs of the enterprise, because he personally assumes the role of manager will be greatly reduced because of the separation of shareholders and managers. And the length of the principal-agent chain avoids the problem of principal-agent. Because the manager is the owner of the enterprise at this time, the two are essentially unified, so the goal they are pursuing at this moment is the same. In this case, the shareholders of the enterprise do not need to deliberately supervise the various acts of the supervisor, because of common interests. Driven by profit, managers will consciously pursue the maximization of shareholders'interests, which is conducive to improving the performance of enterprises.
Looking at the above research, this article has its own characteristics in the following aspects:
1. The paper chooses a new angle of view. As the GEM has just been established in China's capital market for a short time, it is an emerging sector of China's capital market. Up to now, many domestic scholars have not studied the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance, and most of them have focused on the Shanghai and Shenzhen main board. This study is based on many existing literatures at home and abroad, choosing the listed companies on the GEM as the research perspective, studying the ownership structure of the listed companies on the GEM. The relationship between ownership structure and operating efficiency and performance of GEM listed companies, on the one hand, is a supplement to previous studies, on the other hand, it also provides some empirical data for the optimization of ownership structure of GEM listed companies. Because the use of Tobin Q must have a prerequisite, that is, the capital market is effective, the price of assets can fully reflect all kinds of information, so the use of Tobin Q as a business performance measurement index of foreign literature, such as: Morek, Shleifer and Vishmy (1988), McConnell and Servae (1990), and so on. Some domestic scholars are also Tobin Q value is used as the research variable (Sun Yongxiang, Huang Zuhui (1999), Zhang Hongjun (2000), Yu Xiaoming (2003). However, this paper argues that the development of China's capital market is not sound, the use of Tobin Q value to measure the performance of enterprises seems inappropriate, this paper uses financial accounting indicators, many domestic scholars are using financial accounting. Chen Xiao, Jiangdong (2000) used the return on net assets and the profit margin of the main business to represent the business performance of enterprises, Wu Shukun (2002) used the total asset profit margin to measure the business performance of enterprises, Wei Le (2010) used the main business profit margin index, Wang Ling (2010) used the return on net assets (ROE), core business assets. Based on the GEM perspective, this paper uses the earnings per share (EPS), which reflects the overall profitability of the enterprise, as the company's operating performance, and from the perspective of financial management, uses the net cash per share of the enterprise's operating activities. Flow (CPPS) is another alternative indicator of company performance. The reason why we choose this indicator is that the net operating cash flow per share can reflect the ability of enterprise to earn cash flow. At the same time, asset-liability ratio and company size are moderately introduced into the model as control variables.
3. Considering the particularity of the ownership structure of the listed companies on the GEM, this paper does not divide the ownership into state-owned shares, legal person shares and circulating shares directly as previous scholars (Chen Xiao, Jiangdong (2000)). From the latter statistical analysis, we can see that the proportion of senior executives in the main board market is only 0.74%, small and medium-sized. The proportion of senior managers holding shares is 12.83% in the listed companies on the board, but the proportion of senior managers holding shares in the listed companies on the GEM is as high as 32.07%. The proportion of senior managers holding shares has a very significant correlation with the company's performance. Therefore, the index of senior managers holding shares is added to the board, and the other three indicators are used as an alternative variable of ownership structure. As for the index selection of ownership concentration degree, this paper does not regard Z index as the index of ownership checks and balances (Fan Lihong (2007), Chen Deping, Chen Yongsheng (2011), but as the substitute variable of ownership concentration degree together with CR1 index and H5 index, and draws the conclusion that Z index and GEM listed companies. Performance has a weak positive correlation.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F832.51;F276.6;F224

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