創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司定向增發(fā)的股價(jià)行為研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-08-30 08:32
【摘要】：定向增發(fā)作為上市公司股權(quán)再融資的一個(gè)重要工具，不同于配股和公開(kāi)發(fā)行，定向增發(fā)面對(duì)少數(shù)特定的投資者，門(mén)檻相對(duì)于前兩者較低，操作也較前兩者簡(jiǎn)便，在近年來(lái)（尤其是股權(quán)分置改革完成以后）成為了上市公司再融資的首選。創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)作為中國(guó)的“納斯達(dá)克”，在中國(guó)的資本市場(chǎng)扮演者“二板市場(chǎng)”的角色，與主板市場(chǎng)和中小板市場(chǎng)共同構(gòu)成了多層次的中國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)。創(chuàng)業(yè)板的上市公司具有上市門(mén)檻較低、公司的成長(zhǎng)性較高、創(chuàng)新能力強(qiáng)、企業(yè)規(guī)模小和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)較大的特點(diǎn)。以上特點(diǎn)決定了創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的定向增發(fā)是不同于主板和中小板的，這也就是本文研究的重點(diǎn)。 國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)者對(duì)定向增發(fā)的研究，主要是從公司選擇定向增發(fā)的原因、定向增發(fā)的宣告效益和折扣率的研究和定向增發(fā)后股價(jià)的長(zhǎng)期表現(xiàn)研究這三個(gè)方面進(jìn)行的，形成了以赫澤、史密斯的信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)理論和烏瑞克的監(jiān)督效應(yīng)理論為代表的研究私募發(fā)行的兩個(gè)主流理論。由于研究的樣本數(shù)據(jù)有限（截至目前僅有六家創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司通過(guò)定向增發(fā)實(shí)現(xiàn)再融資），本文通過(guò)事件分析的方法和描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)，對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司定向增發(fā)的折扣率及宣告效應(yīng)進(jìn)行研究，然后選取在定向增發(fā)過(guò)程中具有典型代表的恒泰艾普作為案例進(jìn)行深入的剖析，發(fā)掘創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司在定向增發(fā)的過(guò)程中所面臨的問(wèn)題，最后給出政策上的建議。 本文主要包括以下幾個(gè)部分： 第一章為緒論，主要對(duì)本文的研究背景、方法等做簡(jiǎn)單的介紹；第二章介紹國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)者對(duì)定向增發(fā)的研究及定向增發(fā)的流程、相關(guān)政策；第三章通過(guò)事件研究及描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)的方法，，對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司定向增發(fā)的折扣率及宣告效應(yīng)進(jìn)行研究；第四章在前面研究的基礎(chǔ)上，對(duì)具有典型性的恒泰艾普公司定向增發(fā)進(jìn)行專(zhuān)題研究；第五章對(duì)本文的研究結(jié)論進(jìn)行總結(jié)，提出政策上的建議。 第一章是緒論，主要介紹了本文的研究背景、方法。創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司上市門(mén)檻較低、公司的成長(zhǎng)性較高、創(chuàng)新能力強(qiáng)、企業(yè)規(guī)模小和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)較大等特點(diǎn)決定了在分析創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司融資、投資、經(jīng)營(yíng)等行為的時(shí)候要區(qū)分于主板和中小板的上市公司。因此，創(chuàng)業(yè)板的定向增發(fā)也區(qū)別于主板和中小板。創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司定向增發(fā)的折扣率、宣告效應(yīng)和長(zhǎng)期表現(xiàn)又如何呢？哪些因素會(huì)影響創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司定向增發(fā)的市場(chǎng)表現(xiàn)呢？這些因素與主板市場(chǎng)是否相同？定向增發(fā)的過(guò)程中是否存在侵害中小股民的現(xiàn)象呢？本文將對(duì)這些問(wèn)題進(jìn)行深入的研究；由于樣本數(shù)據(jù)有限，本文采用實(shí)證研究與案例研究相結(jié)合的方法來(lái)對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的定向增發(fā)進(jìn)行深入的研究。 第二章主要是介紹國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)者對(duì)定向增發(fā)的研究及定向增發(fā)的流程、相關(guān)政策。其中，赫澤、史密斯的信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)理論和烏瑞克的監(jiān)督效應(yīng)理論是國(guó)外研究私募發(fā)行的最重要的理論，除此以外Sheehan、Barclay and Holderness的研究發(fā)現(xiàn)定向增發(fā)的高溢價(jià)來(lái)源于參與增發(fā)的投資者對(duì)上市公司進(jìn)行監(jiān)督的補(bǔ)償，參與定向增發(fā)的投資者的重要職責(zé)是參與公司的監(jiān)督，無(wú)法像參與大宗交易那樣獲得私有的額外利得，所以要給予他們更高的補(bǔ)嘗，這也就解釋了為什么定向增發(fā)通常具體一定的折扣率。通常，不同的市場(chǎng)具有不同的折扣率，例如，通過(guò)研究，中國(guó)香港定向增發(fā)的平均折價(jià)為5.75%，美國(guó)則較高，達(dá)到20%。Marciukaityte、Szewczyk and Varma通過(guò)對(duì)美國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)1979-199618年間513家定向增發(fā)的公司進(jìn)行研究，發(fā)現(xiàn)定向增發(fā)前表現(xiàn)較好（超出市場(chǎng)平均收益率）的上市公司增發(fā)后短期內(nèi)具有較高的正的宣告效應(yīng)，而長(zhǎng)期的股價(jià)表現(xiàn)卻較差。除此之外，吳姚、Lee and Yeo、鄧路等人根據(jù)前面的理論，對(duì)包括中國(guó)在內(nèi)的其它國(guó)家的資本市場(chǎng)的定向增發(fā)進(jìn)行了研究，得出相關(guān)的結(jié)論。本文在這些結(jié)論的基礎(chǔ)上，對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)的定向增發(fā)行為進(jìn)行專(zhuān)項(xiàng)的研究。 《上市公司證券發(fā)行管理辦法》和《上市公司非公開(kāi)發(fā)行股票實(shí)施細(xì)則》規(guī)定了上市公司實(shí)行定向增發(fā)的條件，包括定向增發(fā)的人數(shù)、價(jià)格及轉(zhuǎn)讓等方面的限制。上市公司的定向增發(fā)通常分為集團(tuán)公司整體打包上市、為上市公司投資項(xiàng)目募集資金、引入戰(zhàn)略投資者、并購(gòu)重組、增強(qiáng)控股權(quán)這幾種類(lèi)型。目前，創(chuàng)業(yè)板僅有恒泰艾普（證券代碼：300157）、藍(lán)色光標(biāo)（證券代碼：300058）、梅泰諾（證券代碼：300038）、紅日藥業(yè)（證券代碼：300026）、立思辰（證券代碼：300010）和新大新材（證券代碼：300080）這六家公司通過(guò)定向增發(fā)實(shí)現(xiàn)了再融資。通過(guò)對(duì)這六家公司的初步研究，以上六家公司的定向增發(fā)都是為了并購(gòu)重組，這也在一定程度上說(shuō)明了創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司不同于主板（中小板）上市公司，定向增發(fā)的目的都是為了實(shí)現(xiàn)快速的擴(kuò)張，加速整合整個(gè)產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈。 第三章通過(guò)事件研究及描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)的方法，對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司定向增發(fā)的折扣率及宣告效應(yīng)進(jìn)行研究。關(guān)于折扣率，本文分為了發(fā)行折扣和市場(chǎng)折扣分別研究。創(chuàng)業(yè)板定向增發(fā)的這六家上市公司中，除新大新材溢價(jià)百分之十外，均沒(méi)有發(fā)行折扣，即發(fā)行價(jià)格等于定價(jià)基準(zhǔn)日前20個(gè)交易日股價(jià)的平均價(jià)。創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司定向增發(fā)市場(chǎng)折扣的平均值為5.19%，遠(yuǎn)低于一般上市公司32%水平。 使用事件研究的方法對(duì)上述六家創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的累計(jì)超額收益率CAR進(jìn)行研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司定向增發(fā)窗口期間CAR值顯著異于0，均值為0.031023，存在正的宣告效應(yīng)且創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司定向增發(fā)的宣告效應(yīng)要高于市場(chǎng)的總體水平。在上述六家創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司定向增發(fā)的過(guò)程中暴露出了對(duì)消息反應(yīng)不足/過(guò)度、注入劣質(zhì)資產(chǎn)、利益輸送、信息的提前泄露等問(wèn)題。 第四章在前面研究的基礎(chǔ)上，對(duì)具有典型性的恒泰艾普公司定向增發(fā)進(jìn)行專(zhuān)題研究。通過(guò)對(duì)新賽浦和恒泰艾普財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)的比對(duì)、定價(jià)的分析及高溢價(jià)理由的駁斥，得出了以下結(jié)論：恒泰艾普注入的新賽浦這塊資產(chǎn)并不是優(yōu)質(zhì)資產(chǎn)，存在著過(guò)高的估值。在這個(gè)過(guò)程中，大股東通過(guò)定向增發(fā)高溢價(jià)購(gòu)買(mǎi)劣質(zhì)資產(chǎn)，損害了中小股東的利益，而過(guò)高的估值卻保證了大股東的股權(quán)不會(huì)被過(guò)分的稀釋。 第五章是本文的研究結(jié)論、政策建議及局限性。通過(guò)前面幾章的分析，給出了關(guān)于創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的折扣率、宣告效應(yīng)、信息披露及定向增發(fā)類(lèi)型等方面的結(jié)論，并給出了以下的政策建議： 1、加大機(jī)構(gòu)投資者培育的力度； 2、減少對(duì)上市公司定向增發(fā)價(jià)格的行政管制，充分發(fā)揮市場(chǎng)的作用，更多的讓市場(chǎng)去發(fā)現(xiàn)價(jià)格； 3、為了形成公允的定向增發(fā)發(fā)行價(jià)格，建議參照首次公開(kāi)發(fā)行股票的詢價(jià)程序，引入機(jī)構(gòu)投資者，通過(guò)初步詢價(jià)、詢價(jià)、簿記建檔等形式來(lái)形成定向增發(fā)的發(fā)行價(jià)格； 4、完善我國(guó)資產(chǎn)評(píng)估方面的法律法規(guī)及制度建設(shè)，對(duì)資產(chǎn)評(píng)估機(jī)構(gòu)進(jìn)行嚴(yán)格監(jiān)管和建立誠(chéng)信檔案，嚴(yán)厲打擊資產(chǎn)評(píng)估的違法、犯罪事件，從制度上保障資產(chǎn)合理的估值、定價(jià)； 5、完善上市公司信息披露的法律法規(guī)及制度建設(shè)，讓上市公司及時(shí)、準(zhǔn)確、公平的把影響股價(jià)的相關(guān)信息傳遞給各類(lèi)投資者，嚴(yán)厲打擊利用上市公司信息進(jìn)行內(nèi)幕交易、利益輸送的行為，切實(shí)保護(hù)中小投資者的利益。 最后，本文的局限性在于樣本數(shù)據(jù)的不足，但是隨著越來(lái)越多的創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司通過(guò)定向增發(fā)的形式實(shí)現(xiàn)再融資，關(guān)于創(chuàng)業(yè)板定向增發(fā)的研究會(huì)隨著樣本數(shù)據(jù)的增多而不斷深入，能得出更加有價(jià)值的結(jié)論。
[Abstract]:As an important tool for equity refinancing of listed companies, private placement is different from allotment and public offering. The threshold of private placement is lower than the former two and the operation is simpler than the former two. In recent years, especially after the reform of non-tradable shares has been completed, private placement has become the preferred refinancing of listed companies. As China's "Nasdaq", the board market plays the role of "second board market" in China's capital market, and forms a multi-level Chinese capital market together with the main board market and the small and medium board market. The above characteristics determine that the private placement of GEM listed companies is different from the main board and small and medium-sized board, which is the focus of this paper.
Domestic and foreign scholars'research on directed offering is mainly carried out from three aspects: the reason why companies choose directed offering, the announcement benefit and discount rate of directed offering, and the long-term performance of stock price after directed offering. They are represented by Hezer, Smith's information asymmetry theory and Uric's supervisory effect theory. Because of the limited sample data (up to now only six GEM listed companies have refinanced through directional offering), this paper studies the discount rate and announcement effect of private placement through event analysis and descriptive statistics. Hengtai Epp, which is a typical case in the process of directional offering, makes a thorough analysis, discovers the problems faced by the listed companies in the GEM during the process of directional offering, and finally gives some policy recommendations.
This article mainly includes the following sections:
Chapter 1 is the introduction, which mainly introduces the research background and methods of this paper; Chapter 2 introduces the domestic and foreign scholars'research on directed placement and the process and relevant policies of directed placement; Chapter 3 conducts the discount rate and announcement effect of directed placement of listed companies on GEM through event study and descriptive statistics. Research; Chapter 4, on the basis of the previous research, carries out a special research on the typical Hengtai Epp company's directional additional issuance; Chapter 5 summarizes the conclusions of this study and puts forward policy recommendations.
The first chapter is the introduction, mainly introduces the research background and methods of this paper. Therefore, the directional placement of GEM is also different from the main board and the small and medium board. What about the discount rate, announcement effect and long-term performance of the directional placement of GEM? Which factors will affect the market performance of the directional placement of GEM? Are these factors the same as the main board market? Are there any violations in the process of directional placement? What about the phenomena of small and medium-sized shareholders? This paper will make an in-depth study of these problems. Due to the limited sample data, this paper uses empirical research and case study methods to conduct in-depth study on the targeted placement of listed companies on the GEM.
The second chapter mainly introduces domestic and foreign scholars'research on private placement and the process and relevant policies of private placement. Among them, Hetzer, Smith's information asymmetry theory and Uric's supervisory effect theory are the most important foreign theories on private placement. In addition, Sheehan, Barclay and Holderness's research finds that private placement is the most important one. The high premium comes from the compensation of investors who participate in the issuance to supervise the listed companies. The important responsibility of investors who participate in the private placement is to participate in the supervision of the company. They can not get the private extra profit as they do in the bulk transaction. So they should be given a higher premium, which explains why the private placement usually takes place. Generally, different markets have different discounts. For example, through research, the average discount of directed offerings in Hong Kong, China, is 5.75%, while that in the United States is higher, reaching 20%. Marciukaityte, Szewczyk and Varma studied 513 firms in the U.S. capital market between 1979 and 618, and found that the average discount was 5.75%. In addition, Wu Yao, Lee and Yeo, Deng Lu and others have studied the directional issuance of capital markets in other countries, including China, based on the previous theory. On the basis of these conclusions, this paper makes a special study on the private placement of GEM.
The Regulations for the Administration of Securities Issuance of Listed Companies and the Rules for the Implementation of Private Issuance of Stocks of Listed Companies stipulate the conditions for the implementation of private placement of listed companies, including the number of private placements, the price and the transfer of private placements. At present, GEM only has Hengtai Epp (Securities Code: 300157), Blue Cursor (Securities Code: 300058), Maytano (Securities Code: 300038), Hongri Pharmaceutical (Securities Code: 300026), Lischen (Securities Code: 300010) and Xinda New Materials (Securities Code). Through the preliminary study of these six companies, the above six companies'private placements are all for mergers and acquisitions, which to some extent shows that the GEM listed companies are different from the main board (small and medium board) listed companies, the purpose of private placement is to achieve rapid. Expansion, accelerate the integration of the entire industry chain.
Chapter 3 studies the discount rate and announcement effect of private placement of listed companies on GEM through event study and descriptive statistics. As for the discount rate, this paper divides it into issuance discount and market discount respectively. Issuance discount, i.e. the issuance price is equal to the average price of the 20 trading days prior to the benchmark date. The average discount in the private placement market of listed companies on GEM is 5.19%, which is much lower than the 32% level of the general listed companies.
Using the method of event study, we find that the CAR of the six listed companies on GEM is significantly different from 0, the mean value is 0.031023, and there is a positive announcement effect. The announcement effect of the listed companies on GEM is higher than the overall level of the market. In the process of directional placement of the six listed companies on the GEM, problems such as insufficient/excessive response to news, injection of inferior assets, benefit delivery, and premature disclosure of information were exposed.
Chapter 4, on the basis of the previous research, makes a special research on the typical Hengtai Epp company's directional additional issue. Through the comparison of financial data between the new Cyp and Hengtai Epp, the analysis of pricing and the refutation of high premium reasons, the following conclusions are drawn: Hengtai Epp injected into the new Cyp is not a high-quality asset, there exists. In this process, the large shareholders purchase inferior assets through a high premium through the targeted issuance, which damages the interests of small and medium shareholders, while the high valuation ensures that the large shareholders'equity will not be too diluted.
Chapter five is the conclusion, policy suggestions and limitations of this paper. Through the analysis of the previous chapters, the paper gives the conclusions on discount rate, announcement effect, information disclosure and types of directional placement of GEM listed companies, and gives the following policy recommendations:
1, increase institutional investors' efforts.
2. Reduce the administrative control over the price of the private placement of listed companies, give full play to the role of the market, and let the market find the price more;
3. In order to form a fair IPO price, it is suggested to refer to the inquiry procedure of initial public offering and introduce institutional investors to form the IPO price through preliminary inquiry, inquiry, bookkeeping and archiving.
4. Perfect the laws, regulations and system construction of asset appraisal in our country, strictly supervise and set up honest and trustworthy files for asset appraisal institutions, severely crack down on the illegal and criminal events of asset appraisal, and guarantee the reasonable valuation and pricing of assets from the system.
5. Perfect the laws and regulations and system construction of information disclosure of listed companies so that listed companies can transmit relevant information affecting stock prices to all kinds of investors in a timely, accurate and fair manner, and severely crack down on the use of information of listed companies for insider trading and benefit transmission, so as to effectively protect the interests of small and medium investors.
Finally, the limitation of this paper lies in the insufficiency of sample data, but with more and more GEM listed companies refinancing through the form of directional placement, the research on directional placement of GEM will continue to deepen with the increase of sample data, and can draw more valuable conclusions.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：電子科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F832.51
本文編號(hào)：2212541
[Abstract]:As an important tool for equity refinancing of listed companies, private placement is different from allotment and public offering. The threshold of private placement is lower than the former two and the operation is simpler than the former two. In recent years, especially after the reform of non-tradable shares has been completed, private placement has become the preferred refinancing of listed companies. As China's "Nasdaq", the board market plays the role of "second board market" in China's capital market, and forms a multi-level Chinese capital market together with the main board market and the small and medium board market. The above characteristics determine that the private placement of GEM listed companies is different from the main board and small and medium-sized board, which is the focus of this paper.
Domestic and foreign scholars'research on directed offering is mainly carried out from three aspects: the reason why companies choose directed offering, the announcement benefit and discount rate of directed offering, and the long-term performance of stock price after directed offering. They are represented by Hezer, Smith's information asymmetry theory and Uric's supervisory effect theory. Because of the limited sample data (up to now only six GEM listed companies have refinanced through directional offering), this paper studies the discount rate and announcement effect of private placement through event analysis and descriptive statistics. Hengtai Epp, which is a typical case in the process of directional offering, makes a thorough analysis, discovers the problems faced by the listed companies in the GEM during the process of directional offering, and finally gives some policy recommendations.
This article mainly includes the following sections:
Chapter 1 is the introduction, which mainly introduces the research background and methods of this paper; Chapter 2 introduces the domestic and foreign scholars'research on directed placement and the process and relevant policies of directed placement; Chapter 3 conducts the discount rate and announcement effect of directed placement of listed companies on GEM through event study and descriptive statistics. Research; Chapter 4, on the basis of the previous research, carries out a special research on the typical Hengtai Epp company's directional additional issuance; Chapter 5 summarizes the conclusions of this study and puts forward policy recommendations.
The first chapter is the introduction, mainly introduces the research background and methods of this paper. Therefore, the directional placement of GEM is also different from the main board and the small and medium board. What about the discount rate, announcement effect and long-term performance of the directional placement of GEM? Which factors will affect the market performance of the directional placement of GEM? Are these factors the same as the main board market? Are there any violations in the process of directional placement? What about the phenomena of small and medium-sized shareholders? This paper will make an in-depth study of these problems. Due to the limited sample data, this paper uses empirical research and case study methods to conduct in-depth study on the targeted placement of listed companies on the GEM.
The second chapter mainly introduces domestic and foreign scholars'research on private placement and the process and relevant policies of private placement. Among them, Hetzer, Smith's information asymmetry theory and Uric's supervisory effect theory are the most important foreign theories on private placement. In addition, Sheehan, Barclay and Holderness's research finds that private placement is the most important one. The high premium comes from the compensation of investors who participate in the issuance to supervise the listed companies. The important responsibility of investors who participate in the private placement is to participate in the supervision of the company. They can not get the private extra profit as they do in the bulk transaction. So they should be given a higher premium, which explains why the private placement usually takes place. Generally, different markets have different discounts. For example, through research, the average discount of directed offerings in Hong Kong, China, is 5.75%, while that in the United States is higher, reaching 20%. Marciukaityte, Szewczyk and Varma studied 513 firms in the U.S. capital market between 1979 and 618, and found that the average discount was 5.75%. In addition, Wu Yao, Lee and Yeo, Deng Lu and others have studied the directional issuance of capital markets in other countries, including China, based on the previous theory. On the basis of these conclusions, this paper makes a special study on the private placement of GEM.
The Regulations for the Administration of Securities Issuance of Listed Companies and the Rules for the Implementation of Private Issuance of Stocks of Listed Companies stipulate the conditions for the implementation of private placement of listed companies, including the number of private placements, the price and the transfer of private placements. At present, GEM only has Hengtai Epp (Securities Code: 300157), Blue Cursor (Securities Code: 300058), Maytano (Securities Code: 300038), Hongri Pharmaceutical (Securities Code: 300026), Lischen (Securities Code: 300010) and Xinda New Materials (Securities Code). Through the preliminary study of these six companies, the above six companies'private placements are all for mergers and acquisitions, which to some extent shows that the GEM listed companies are different from the main board (small and medium board) listed companies, the purpose of private placement is to achieve rapid. Expansion, accelerate the integration of the entire industry chain.
Chapter 3 studies the discount rate and announcement effect of private placement of listed companies on GEM through event study and descriptive statistics. As for the discount rate, this paper divides it into issuance discount and market discount respectively. Issuance discount, i.e. the issuance price is equal to the average price of the 20 trading days prior to the benchmark date. The average discount in the private placement market of listed companies on GEM is 5.19%, which is much lower than the 32% level of the general listed companies.
Using the method of event study, we find that the CAR of the six listed companies on GEM is significantly different from 0, the mean value is 0.031023, and there is a positive announcement effect. The announcement effect of the listed companies on GEM is higher than the overall level of the market. In the process of directional placement of the six listed companies on the GEM, problems such as insufficient/excessive response to news, injection of inferior assets, benefit delivery, and premature disclosure of information were exposed.
Chapter 4, on the basis of the previous research, makes a special research on the typical Hengtai Epp company's directional additional issue. Through the comparison of financial data between the new Cyp and Hengtai Epp, the analysis of pricing and the refutation of high premium reasons, the following conclusions are drawn: Hengtai Epp injected into the new Cyp is not a high-quality asset, there exists. In this process, the large shareholders purchase inferior assets through a high premium through the targeted issuance, which damages the interests of small and medium shareholders, while the high valuation ensures that the large shareholders'equity will not be too diluted.
Chapter five is the conclusion, policy suggestions and limitations of this paper. Through the analysis of the previous chapters, the paper gives the conclusions on discount rate, announcement effect, information disclosure and types of directional placement of GEM listed companies, and gives the following policy recommendations:
1, increase institutional investors' efforts.
2. Reduce the administrative control over the price of the private placement of listed companies, give full play to the role of the market, and let the market find the price more;
3. In order to form a fair IPO price, it is suggested to refer to the inquiry procedure of initial public offering and introduce institutional investors to form the IPO price through preliminary inquiry, inquiry, bookkeeping and archiving.
4. Perfect the laws, regulations and system construction of asset appraisal in our country, strictly supervise and set up honest and trustworthy files for asset appraisal institutions, severely crack down on the illegal and criminal events of asset appraisal, and guarantee the reasonable valuation and pricing of assets from the system.
5. Perfect the laws and regulations and system construction of information disclosure of listed companies so that listed companies can transmit relevant information affecting stock prices to all kinds of investors in a timely, accurate and fair manner, and severely crack down on the use of information of listed companies for insider trading and benefit transmission, so as to effectively protect the interests of small and medium investors.
Finally, the limitation of this paper lies in the insufficiency of sample data, but with more and more GEM listed companies refinancing through the form of directional placement, the research on directional placement of GEM will continue to deepen with the increase of sample data, and can draw more valuable conclusions.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：電子科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F832.51
【參考文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條
1 何麗梅;蔡寧;;我國(guó)上市公司定向增發(fā)長(zhǎng)期股價(jià)效應(yīng)的實(shí)證研究[J];北京工商大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(社會(huì)科學(xué)版);2009年06期
2 劉宏;景舒婷;國(guó)超;;上市公司定向增發(fā)新股對(duì)股價(jià)的影響[J];財(cái)會(huì)通訊;2012年12期
3 鄧路;王珊珊;;中美兩國(guó)非公開(kāi)發(fā)行制度對(duì)比研究[J];財(cái)政研究;2010年03期
4 管征;卞志村;范從來(lái);;增發(fā)還是配股? 上市公司股權(quán)再融資方式選擇研究[J];管理世界;2008年01期
5 原紅旗;股權(quán)再融資之“謎”及其理論解釋[J];會(huì)計(jì)研究;2003年05期
6 楊丹;林茂;;我國(guó)IPO長(zhǎng)期市場(chǎng)表現(xiàn)的實(shí)證研究——基于超常收益率不同測(cè)度方法的比較分析[J];會(huì)計(jì)研究;2006年11期
7 章衛(wèi)東;;定向增發(fā)新股、整體上市與股票價(jià)格短期市場(chǎng)表現(xiàn)的實(shí)證研究[J];會(huì)計(jì)研究;2007年12期
8 黃建中;;上市公司非公開(kāi)發(fā)行的定價(jià)基準(zhǔn)日問(wèn)題探討[J];證券市場(chǎng)導(dǎo)報(bào);2007年03期
9 黃建歡;尹筑嘉;;非公開(kāi)發(fā)行、資產(chǎn)注入和股東利益均衡:理論與實(shí)證[J];證券市場(chǎng)導(dǎo)報(bào);2008年05期
10 陳相;;飛龍?jiān)谔臁闾┌崭叱砷L(zhǎng)探秘[J];中國(guó)中小企業(yè);2010年10期
本文編號(hào)：2212541
本文鏈接：http://sikaile.net/guanlilunwen/zhqtouz/2212541.html
最近更新
教材專(zhuān)著
