內(nèi)部控制信息披露與盈余管理的相關(guān)性研究
發(fā)布時間:2018-08-27 20:16
【摘要】:近年來,內(nèi)部控制信息披露問題受到了廣泛的關(guān)注,一方面是因?yàn)閮?nèi)部控制信息作為一種反映上市公司管理方式和經(jīng)營情況的重要非財(cái)務(wù)信息,不僅反映企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制設(shè)計(jì)及運(yùn)行情況而且影響著外部信息使用者的投資決策;另一方面監(jiān)管部門加強(qiáng)了對企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制的重視,繼2008年五部委頒布《企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制基本規(guī)范》后,2010年五部委又發(fā)布了《企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制配套指引》。這一系列法律法規(guī)、標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的頒布和實(shí)施,有效地推進(jìn)了我國內(nèi)部控制理論研究的發(fā)展,也大大加快了我國上市公司內(nèi)部控制建設(shè)的步伐。我國大規(guī)模出臺內(nèi)部控制標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的同時,也大幅度提高了對內(nèi)部控制信息披露的要求。因此,,內(nèi)部控制信息披露研究極具現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。內(nèi)部控制作為保證財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告及相關(guān)信息真實(shí)完整的一項(xiàng)重要制度安排,在我國當(dāng)前制度背景下是否能有效提高財(cái)務(wù)信息的可靠性、制約盈余管理行為,本文采用實(shí)證研究的方法,對內(nèi)部控制信息披露與盈余管理的相關(guān)性進(jìn)行研究。 本文首先介紹了內(nèi)部控制信息披露的內(nèi)涵及意義、我國內(nèi)部控制信息披露的相關(guān)法規(guī),接著分別從有效市場理論、委托代理理論和信號傳遞理論分析了內(nèi)部控制信息披露與盈余質(zhì)量之間的關(guān)系。在相關(guān)理論的基礎(chǔ)上提出了本文的假設(shè),選取2007-2010年間披露內(nèi)部控制缺陷的公司分年度與沒有披露內(nèi)部控制缺陷的公司按照資產(chǎn)規(guī)模進(jìn)行配對,并將披露內(nèi)部缺陷公司與配對公司一并作為總樣本,從內(nèi)部控制信息披露程度和披露的內(nèi)部控制缺陷信息兩個角度檢驗(yàn)內(nèi)部控制信息披露與盈余管理之間的關(guān)系。設(shè)計(jì)內(nèi)部控制信息披露程度指數(shù)來量化信息披露的程度并將是否披露內(nèi)部控制缺陷信息作為啞變量,將這兩個變量帶入模型檢驗(yàn)內(nèi)部控制信息披露與盈余管理之間的相關(guān)性。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):(1)上市公司對內(nèi)部控制信息披露的越充分,則其盈余管理行為就越少;(2)上市公司內(nèi)部控制缺陷信息與盈余管理行為的影響并不明顯。根據(jù)研究過程中發(fā)現(xiàn)的問題提出了完善我國上市公司內(nèi)部控制信息披露的建議。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the issue of internal control information disclosure has received extensive attention, on the one hand, because internal control information is an important non-financial information that reflects the management and management of listed companies. It not only reflects the design and operation of internal control of enterprises, but also affects the investment decisions of external information users. Following the promulgation of the basic norms of Enterprise Internal Control by the five ministries in 2008, the five ministries and commissions issued the supporting guidelines for Enterprise Internal Control in 2010. The promulgation and implementation of this series of laws and regulations and standards have effectively promoted the development of theoretical research on internal control in China, and also greatly accelerated the pace of internal control construction of listed companies in China. With the introduction of internal control standards on a large scale in China, the requirements for disclosure of internal control information have also been greatly raised. Therefore, the study of internal control information disclosure is of great practical significance. As an important institutional arrangement to ensure the integrity of financial report and related information, internal control can effectively improve the reliability of financial information and restrict the behavior of earnings management under the current system background of our country. This paper studies the correlation between internal control information disclosure and earnings management by means of empirical research. This paper first introduces the connotation and significance of internal control information disclosure, the relevant laws and regulations of internal control information disclosure in China, and then respectively from the efficient market theory, The principal-agent theory and signal transfer theory analyze the relationship between internal control information disclosure and earnings quality. On the basis of relevant theories, this paper proposes the hypothesis that companies that disclose internal control defects in 2007-2010 are matched according to asset size with companies that do not disclose internal control defects. The disclosure of internal defect companies and matching companies are taken as the total samples to test the relationship between the disclosure of internal control information and earnings management from the perspective of the degree of disclosure of internal control information and the disclosure of internal control defect information. The degree index of internal control information disclosure is designed to quantify the degree of information disclosure and the disclosure of internal control defect information is regarded as a dummy variable. The two variables are brought into the model to test the correlation between internal control information disclosure and earnings management. It is found that: (1) the more adequate disclosure of internal control information, the less earnings management behavior of listed companies; (2) the impact of internal control defect information and earnings management behavior of listed companies is not obvious. According to the problems found in the course of research, the paper puts forward some suggestions to improve the disclosure of internal control information of listed companies in China.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:河南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2012
【分類號】:F233;F832.51;F224
[Abstract]:In recent years, the issue of internal control information disclosure has received extensive attention, on the one hand, because internal control information is an important non-financial information that reflects the management and management of listed companies. It not only reflects the design and operation of internal control of enterprises, but also affects the investment decisions of external information users. Following the promulgation of the basic norms of Enterprise Internal Control by the five ministries in 2008, the five ministries and commissions issued the supporting guidelines for Enterprise Internal Control in 2010. The promulgation and implementation of this series of laws and regulations and standards have effectively promoted the development of theoretical research on internal control in China, and also greatly accelerated the pace of internal control construction of listed companies in China. With the introduction of internal control standards on a large scale in China, the requirements for disclosure of internal control information have also been greatly raised. Therefore, the study of internal control information disclosure is of great practical significance. As an important institutional arrangement to ensure the integrity of financial report and related information, internal control can effectively improve the reliability of financial information and restrict the behavior of earnings management under the current system background of our country. This paper studies the correlation between internal control information disclosure and earnings management by means of empirical research. This paper first introduces the connotation and significance of internal control information disclosure, the relevant laws and regulations of internal control information disclosure in China, and then respectively from the efficient market theory, The principal-agent theory and signal transfer theory analyze the relationship between internal control information disclosure and earnings quality. On the basis of relevant theories, this paper proposes the hypothesis that companies that disclose internal control defects in 2007-2010 are matched according to asset size with companies that do not disclose internal control defects. The disclosure of internal defect companies and matching companies are taken as the total samples to test the relationship between the disclosure of internal control information and earnings management from the perspective of the degree of disclosure of internal control information and the disclosure of internal control defect information. The degree index of internal control information disclosure is designed to quantify the degree of information disclosure and the disclosure of internal control defect information is regarded as a dummy variable. The two variables are brought into the model to test the correlation between internal control information disclosure and earnings management. It is found that: (1) the more adequate disclosure of internal control information, the less earnings management behavior of listed companies; (2) the impact of internal control defect information and earnings management behavior of listed companies is not obvious. According to the problems found in the course of research, the paper puts forward some suggestions to improve the disclosure of internal control information of listed companies in China.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:河南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2012
【分類號】:F233;F832.51;F224
【參考文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條
1 方紅星;孫
本文編號:2208339
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