創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司高管辭職問題研究
[Abstract]:With the deepening of reform and opening up and the rapid development of China's economy, the stock market, as a barometer of the national economy, is booming, especially the establishment of the gem market in 2009, which is born against the background of the world financial crisis and the adjustment of China's macro market. With the enthusiasm of investors in the early stage of the market, there has been a steady stream of companies issuing and listing in the gem market in the past two years, forming a market ecological view of sustainable development. The growth Enterprise Market (gem) is a new opportunity to raise money for high-growth start-ups, especially high-tech companies, that cannot be listed on the main market. However, since the second anniversary of the gem, there has also been a sharp fall in new shares, a wave of resignation of executives, and only issuance and non-listing. Whether executives choose to resign for financial reasons or run away because of poor corporate performance, and what factors affect the proportion of senior executives' resignations, are becoming the focus of attention in the case of frequent resignations. Based on the domestic and foreign research on executive turnover and executive resignation, combined with the system background and theoretical analysis of gem listed companies, this paper focuses on the factors that affect the resignation of gem listed companies from two aspects: management characteristics and corporate performance. In this paper, the gem listed companies in 2010 as a study sample, select the executive age, compensation, shareholding ratio to measure the characteristics of managers, net profit growth rate and net cash flow per share to measure the performance of the company. Through the establishment of regression model, it is proved that the average executive compensation, the net profit growth rate representing the performance of the company and the net cash flow per share significantly affect the resignation of the executives in the gem listed companies, and the average executive compensation. Net cash flow per share and asset-liability ratio significantly affect the proportion of the resignation of executives in gem listed companies.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:安徽工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2012
【分類號】:F272.92;F832.51
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