發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-06-21 04:10

  本文選題：上市公司 + 股權(quán)激勵(lì)　； 參考：《首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度從1953年開(kāi)始建立到現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)歷了近60年的實(shí)踐，在現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度不斷完善的今天，其已經(jīng)成為一種重要的長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)方式。在我國(guó)，，隨著市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展、資本市場(chǎng)以及現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度的完善，從國(guó)外泊來(lái)的股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度日益被廣大上市公司所認(rèn)可和接受。從1993年深圳萬(wàn)科第一家推出股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案以來(lái)，經(jīng)過(guò)十幾年的發(fā)展，尤其是2006年股權(quán)分置改革以來(lái)，我國(guó)上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度的實(shí)施初步具備了企業(yè)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)以及法律法規(guī)的條件，我國(guó)實(shí)行股權(quán)激勵(lì)的公司逐年增加。近兩年，推出股權(quán)激勵(lì)的公司就高達(dá)到上百家。在此背景下，本文對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)的實(shí)施效果及影響因素進(jìn)行分析研究將有很大的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。 本文首先對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)相關(guān)領(lǐng)域國(guó)內(nèi)外的研究成果進(jìn)行了回顧，并得出自己的理解。接下來(lái)本文對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)基本概念、特點(diǎn)進(jìn)行了講解，并介紹了股權(quán)激勵(lì)的激勵(lì)模式，詳細(xì)闡述了股權(quán)激勵(lì)的理論基礎(chǔ)，諸如委托代理理論、人力資本理論、產(chǎn)權(quán)理論等。在總結(jié)理論的基礎(chǔ)上,本文進(jìn)一步分析了國(guó)內(nèi)外股權(quán)激勵(lì)的實(shí)施現(xiàn)狀。 在實(shí)證分析過(guò)程中，本文首先對(duì)2007年至2010年期間我國(guó)實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的特點(diǎn)進(jìn)行的統(tǒng)計(jì)性描述分析，為后來(lái)研究打下基礎(chǔ)。股權(quán)激勵(lì)作為一種激勵(lì)方式，最終的作用應(yīng)當(dāng)表現(xiàn)在提高上市公司的業(yè)績(jī)上來(lái)。在對(duì)前人文獻(xiàn)成果的研究基礎(chǔ)上，本文選取了已實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的139家上市公司作為樣本，選取10項(xiàng)財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)通過(guò)主成分分析法得出企業(yè)的綜合績(jī)效，并把管理者持股比例作為股權(quán)激勵(lì)水平的解釋變量，建立模型，以揭示股權(quán)激勵(lì)是否確實(shí)能夠提高上市公司的業(yè)績(jī)。最終得出以下主要結(jié)論:管理層持股比例與公司業(yè)績(jī)不存在線性相關(guān)關(guān)系，所以股權(quán)激勵(lì)效果不明朗。本文接下來(lái)從宏觀方面和微觀方面分析了影響股權(quán)激勵(lì)效果的因素，并在此基礎(chǔ)上提出建議。
[Abstract]:The equity incentive system has been established from 1953 to now has experienced nearly 60 years of practice, in the modern enterprise system is constantly improving today, it has become an important long-term incentive. In our country, with the development of market economy, the perfection of capital market and modern enterprise system, the stock right incentive system coming from abroad has been accepted and accepted by the majority of listed companies day by day. Since Shenzhen Vanke first launched its equity incentive scheme in 1993, it has been developing for more than ten years, especially since the split share structure reform in 2006. The implementation of the equity incentive system of listed companies in China has preliminarily met the requirements of the ownership structure of enterprises and laws and regulations, and the number of companies implementing equity incentive in China has increased year by year. In the past two years, the introduction of equity incentives on the company as high as hundreds. Under this background, it is of great practical significance to analyze the effect of equity incentive and its influencing factors. Firstly, this paper reviews the research results of equity incentive at home and abroad, and draws its own understanding. Then, this paper explains the basic concept and characteristics of equity incentive, introduces the incentive mode of equity incentive, and elaborates the theoretical basis of equity incentive, such as principal-agent theory, human capital theory, property right theory and so on. On the basis of summing up the theory, this paper further analyzes the actualization status of equity incentive at home and abroad. In the process of empirical analysis, this paper firstly analyzes the characteristics of equity incentive in China from 2007 to 2010, which lays a foundation for the later research. As an incentive method, the ultimate function of equity incentive should be to improve the performance of listed companies. Based on the research of previous literature, this paper selects 139 listed companies that have implemented equity incentive as samples, and 10 financial indicators to get the comprehensive performance of enterprises through principal component analysis. Taking the proportion of managers' shareholding as the explanatory variable of the level of equity incentive, a model is established to reveal whether equity incentive can really improve the performance of listed companies. Finally, the main conclusions are as follows: there is no linear correlation between managerial shareholding ratio and corporate performance, so the effect of equity incentive is not clear. Then, this paper analyzes the factors that affect the effect of equity incentive from macro and micro aspects, and puts forward some suggestions on this basis.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F832.51;F224.32

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本文編號(hào)：2047157