本文選題：投資過度 + 投資不足�。� 參考：《東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：投資作為我國改革開放30年以來拉動(dòng)經(jīng)濟(jì)高速發(fā)展的“三駕馬車”之一,是我國經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的主要?jiǎng)恿�。宏觀投資是由微觀企業(yè)投資組成的,因此企業(yè)良好的投資對經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展起到舉足輕重的作用。投資效率是提升企業(yè)價(jià)值的重要因素,然而由于受委托代理、信息不對稱、公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)等因素的影響,企業(yè)管理者往往很難做出正確的投資決策,導(dǎo)致資源配置效率低下,造成非效率投資,即投資不足或投資過度。因此研究影響企業(yè)非效率投資行為的因素及其相關(guān)性,對于企業(yè)完善資源配置、增加企業(yè)價(jià)值、降低企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)都具有較強(qiáng)的理論和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。 國內(nèi)外關(guān)于影響企業(yè)投資效率因素的研究主要關(guān)注在委托代理、信息不對稱、公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)以及行為金融方面,本文在上述研究的基礎(chǔ)上,選取2007-2011年滬深兩市A股上市公司3861個(gè)樣本的經(jīng)驗(yàn)財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù),按著以下的思路對非效率投資行為進(jìn)行了研究：首先考察了樣本上市公司是否普遍存在非效率投資行為,按著殘差小于零或大于零將樣本上市公司非效率投資情況分為投資不足組或投資過度組,在此基礎(chǔ)上檢驗(yàn)企業(yè)債務(wù)利率對非效率投資具有怎樣的影響作用,具體考察債務(wù)利率是否能夠約束企業(yè)投資而造成投資不足,以及是否可以抑制投資過度,最后引入政府政策利率變量,考察政府政策利率與企業(yè)債務(wù)利率的相關(guān)關(guān)系,探究政府政策利率是如何影響企業(yè)非效率投資的。 通過實(shí)證研究我們發(fā)現(xiàn)：首先,在委托代理問題、信息不對稱、公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)不完善等因素的影響下,樣本上市公司普遍存在著非效率投資現(xiàn)象,即投資不足或投資過度,并且投資不足問題比投資過度問題更嚴(yán)重；其次,債務(wù)利率加劇投資不足的作用在統(tǒng)計(jì)上不顯著,但是債務(wù)利率可以很好地抑制投資過度行為；最后,企業(yè)債務(wù)利率隨政府政策利率的變化而變化,二者具有顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系。我們得出政府政策利率通過影響企業(yè)債務(wù)利率,進(jìn)而對非效率投資產(chǎn)生一定的影響作用,符合凱恩斯的投資利率理論。 針對本文根據(jù)理論分析和實(shí)證研究的結(jié)果,結(jié)合我國利率尚未完全市場化的國情,提高企業(yè)投資效率,提升企業(yè)價(jià)值,本文建議采取相關(guān)措施以解決上市公司非效率投資情況：第一,應(yīng)加快推進(jìn)利率市場化進(jìn)程,完善金融市場。第二,大力發(fā)展企業(yè)債券市場,拓寬企業(yè)融資渠道。第三,重視發(fā)揮負(fù)債的相機(jī)治理作用,實(shí)施約束與激勵(lì)相結(jié)合的經(jīng)理人政策。第四,企業(yè)本身也應(yīng)該建立完善的公司治理機(jī)制,良好有效的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)可以緩解委托代理問題和信息不對稱問題,改善股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu),有利于保護(hù)中小股東的利益。
[Abstract]:Investment, as one of the "troika" which has driven the rapid development of economy since the reform and opening up 30 years ago, is the main motive force of our country's economic growth. Macro-investment is composed of micro-enterprise investment, so good investment plays an important role in economic development. Investment efficiency is an important factor to improve enterprise value. However, due to the influence of agency, information asymmetry and corporate governance structure, it is difficult for managers to make correct investment decisions, which leads to low efficiency of resource allocation. Causes inefficient investment, that is, underinvestment or overinvestment. Therefore, it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study the factors that affect the inefficient investment behavior of enterprises and their correlation to improve the allocation of resources, increase the value of enterprises and reduce the risk of enterprises. The domestic and foreign research on the factors influencing the investment efficiency of enterprises is mainly focused on the aspects of principal-agent, information asymmetry, corporate governance structure and behavioral finance. Based on the empirical financial data of 3861 A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2007 to 2011, this paper studies the inefficient investment behavior of the listed companies in the following ways: first of all, it investigates whether the non-efficient investment behavior is common in the sample listed companies. According to the residual error of less than zero or greater than zero, the sample listed companies are divided into two groups: under-investment group or over-investment group. On this basis, we test how the interest rate of corporate debt affects the non-efficient investment. To investigate whether the debt interest rate can constrain the enterprise investment and cause the underinvestment, and whether the excessive investment can be restrained. Finally, the government policy interest rate variable is introduced to examine the relationship between the government policy interest rate and the enterprise debt interest rate. Explore how the government policy interest rate affects the inefficient investment of enterprises. Through empirical research, we find that, first of all, under the influence of principal-agent problem, asymmetric information, imperfect corporate governance and other factors, the sample listed companies generally have inefficient investment phenomenon, that is, underinvestment or overinvestment. And the problem of underinvestment is more serious than the problem of overinvestment. Secondly, the effect of debt interest rate on underinvestment is not statistically significant, but debt interest rate can well restrain excessive investment behavior. The interest rate of corporate debt varies with the change of government policy interest rate, and there is a significant positive correlation between them. We draw the conclusion that the government policy interest rate affects the enterprise debt interest rate, and then has certain influence on the inefficient investment, which accords with Keynes' investment interest rate theory. According to the results of theoretical analysis and empirical research, combining with the situation of our country's interest rate is not completely market-oriented, we can improve the efficiency of enterprise investment and enhance the value of enterprise. This paper proposes to take relevant measures to solve the situation of inefficient investment of listed companies: first, we should speed up the process of interest rate marketization and improve the financial market. Second, vigorously develop the corporate bond market and broaden corporate financing channels. Third, pay attention to the role of debt management camera, the implementation of the combination of constraints and incentives of the manager policy. Fourth, the enterprise itself should also establish a perfect corporate governance mechanism. A good and effective corporate governance structure can alleviate the principal-agent problem and information asymmetry problem, improve the ownership structure, and help to protect the interests of minority shareholders.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.51;F822.0;F224

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