本文選題：創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司 + 內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)��； 參考：《河北農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：經(jīng)歷十年的風(fēng)雨歷程之后,創(chuàng)業(yè)板終于于2009年10月23日正式開板,標(biāo)志著中國創(chuàng)業(yè)板正式成立。創(chuàng)業(yè)板成立的主要目的不僅僅是完善我國資本市場結(jié)構(gòu),更重要的是為中小、高新技術(shù)企業(yè)提供融資渠道,促進(jìn)知識(shí)與資本的結(jié)合,為風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資提供出口。到目前為止,我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板已經(jīng)運(yùn)行兩年多,在此期間頻頻出現(xiàn)“四高現(xiàn)象”,大量高管辭職套現(xiàn),高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)低增長,超募資金使用不當(dāng)?shù)葐栴}。雖然我國資本市場發(fā)展不成熟以及創(chuàng)業(yè)板運(yùn)行機(jī)制存在嚴(yán)重缺陷等外部原因在一定程度上助推了上述問題的發(fā)生,但引起上述問題的最根本原因在于創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司內(nèi)部治理存在問題,包括內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)不合理,內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制不完善等。所以本文將創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司自身具有的規(guī)模小、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)高、成長性高、處于初創(chuàng)期、經(jīng)營業(yè)績不穩(wěn)定、家族色彩濃厚、重?zé)o形資產(chǎn)等特點(diǎn)作為切入點(diǎn),找出我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司內(nèi)部治理現(xiàn)狀,分析內(nèi)部治理存在的問題以及影響因素,同時(shí)將樣本公司的內(nèi)部治理指標(biāo)與公司業(yè)績做回歸分析,為我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司內(nèi)部治理提供借鑒。 第一部分,我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司內(nèi)部治理理論基礎(chǔ)。 通過對(duì)公司內(nèi)部治理、創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司、創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司內(nèi)部治理相關(guān)概念界定,以及對(duì)代理理論和現(xiàn)代產(chǎn)權(quán)理論的闡述和分析,找出創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司內(nèi)部治理特點(diǎn),為描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析和回歸分析的選取指標(biāo)、提出假設(shè)、構(gòu)建模型提供理論依據(jù)。 第二部分,我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司內(nèi)部治理現(xiàn)狀的描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析。 從不同行業(yè)板塊中隨機(jī)抽取105家創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司,以其2011年半年度報(bào)告為數(shù)據(jù)來源,并結(jié)合創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司不同于主板、中小板上市公司的特點(diǎn)來研究我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司內(nèi)部治理現(xiàn)狀,主要包括內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)現(xiàn)狀和內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制現(xiàn)狀兩方面。內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)現(xiàn)狀又包括股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、董事會(huì)治理結(jié)構(gòu)、監(jiān)事會(huì)治理、高管層治理的現(xiàn)狀;公司治理機(jī)制現(xiàn)狀具體是從內(nèi)部決策機(jī)制、內(nèi)部監(jiān)督機(jī)制、內(nèi)部激勵(lì)機(jī)制三方面進(jìn)行分析。 根據(jù)治理現(xiàn)狀探索我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司內(nèi)部治理存在的主要問題。主要問題有:一股獨(dú)大現(xiàn)象嚴(yán)重;機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股比例較低,參與公司治理效果不顯著;家族色彩濃厚,內(nèi)部持股現(xiàn)象嚴(yán)重;董事會(huì)規(guī)模存在一致性,領(lǐng)導(dǎo)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)存在合一性;監(jiān)督機(jī)制以事后監(jiān)管為主,以事前監(jiān)管為輔強(qiáng)調(diào)物質(zhì)激勵(lì),忽視非物質(zhì)激勵(lì)等。在此基礎(chǔ)上從創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場、創(chuàng)業(yè)板自身以及配套建設(shè)三方面進(jìn)行了原因分析,為回歸分析中變量選擇和政策建議提供參考依據(jù)。 第三部分,我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司內(nèi)部治理與公司績效的回歸分析。 從股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、董事會(huì)治理結(jié)構(gòu)、經(jīng)理層激勵(lì)等主要方面選取出創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司內(nèi)部治理的自變量,公司規(guī)模和資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率作為控制變量,公司績效指標(biāo)作為因變量,以創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司2011年半年度報(bào)告為數(shù)據(jù)來源做實(shí)證分析,找出內(nèi)部治理與公司業(yè)績的相關(guān)性。結(jié)論顯示:股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、董事會(huì)治理、經(jīng)理層激勵(lì)等指標(biāo)的組合對(duì)公司績效的影響具有一定的溢出效應(yīng);我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司內(nèi)部治理與公司績效存在一定的相關(guān)性,尤其股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績效的相關(guān)性表現(xiàn)的較為突出;董事會(huì)治理與公司績效的相關(guān)性不大;公司所采取的控制形式與公司績效相關(guān)性較大;是否采取股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)公司的績效影響顯著。 第四部分,完善我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司內(nèi)部治理的對(duì)策建議。 根據(jù)理論闡述、描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析和回歸分析結(jié)論,從公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)、內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制以及與公司內(nèi)部治理相關(guān)的配套建設(shè)三方面提出對(duì)策建議,為我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司內(nèi)部治理的構(gòu)建提供借鑒。內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)方面包括增加第二至第五股東持股比例,增加機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股,適當(dāng)增加國有股比例,增強(qiáng)董事會(huì)獨(dú)立性,強(qiáng)化監(jiān)事會(huì)職能等內(nèi)容。公司治理機(jī)制方面主要有加大核心技術(shù)人員薪酬激勵(lì),謹(jǐn)慎實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì),發(fā)揮非物質(zhì)激勵(lì)作用,調(diào)整監(jiān)管理念等。與公司內(nèi)部治理相關(guān)的配套建設(shè)主要是從信息披露制度、保健制度、退市制度三方面的建設(shè)提出相應(yīng)對(duì)策建議。
[Abstract]:After ten years of rain and rain, the gem was officially opened in October 23, 2009, marking the formal establishment of the Chinese gem. The main purpose of the gem is not only to improve the capital market structure of our country, but also to provide financing channels for small and medium-sized enterprises, to promote the combination of knowledge and capital, to invest in risk. So far, China's GEM has been running for more than two years. During this period, the "four high phenomenon" has appeared frequently, a large number of senior executives resign, high risk and low growth, improper use of funds and other problems. Although the development of the capital market in China is not mature and the operation mechanism of the gem has serious defects, the external reasons are certain. The fundamental reason for the above problems lies in the internal governance of the GEM listed companies, including the irrational internal governance structure and the imperfect internal governance mechanism. Therefore, this paper has the small scale, high risk and high growth of the GEM listed companies. The characteristics of the business performance are unstable, the family color is strong, and the intangible assets are used as the breakthrough point to find out the internal governance status of the GEM listed companies in China, analyze the existing problems and influence factors of internal governance, and analyze the internal governance indexes of the Sample Firms and the company's performance, so as to manage the internal governance of the GEM listed companies in our country. Provide reference.
The first part is the theoretical basis of the internal governance of China's GEM listed companies.
Through the internal governance of the company, the GEM listed companies, the internal governance related concepts of the GEM listed companies, and the exposition and analysis of the agency theory and the modern property rights theory, the internal governance characteristics of the GEM listed companies are found out, and the selection indexes of descriptive statistical analysis and regression analysis are put forward, and the models are provided. On the basis.
The second part is a descriptive statistical analysis of the internal governance status of China's GEM listed companies.
In this paper, 105 GEM listed companies are randomly selected from different industries, taking the 2011 semi annual report as the data source, and combining the characteristics of the GEM listed companies different from the main board and the small and medium board listed companies to study the internal governance status of the GEM listed companies in China, mainly including the internal governance structure and internal governance mechanism. Two aspects. The present situation of internal governance includes the ownership structure, the governing structure of the board of directors, the governance of the board of supervisors, and the management of top management. The present situation of the corporate governance mechanism is analyzed from three aspects: internal decision-making mechanism, internal supervision mechanism, and internal incentive mechanism.
According to the status quo of governance, the main problems of internal governance of Chinese GEM listed companies are explored. The main problems are: one big phenomenon is serious, the proportion of institutional investors is low, and the effect of corporate governance is not significant; family color is strong and the internal shareholding is serious; the size of the board is in consistency, and the structure of leadership has the consistency. The supervision mechanism is based on post supervision, emphasizing material incentives and ignoring non material incentives, supplemented by pre supervision, and on this basis, the reasons are analyzed from three aspects: the GEM market, the gem itself and the supporting construction, so as to provide reference for the selection of variables and policy suggestions in the regression analysis.
The third part is the regression analysis of the internal governance and corporate performance of China's gem.
From the ownership structure, the board governance structure, the manager layer incentive and other main aspects, we choose the independent variables of the internal governance of the GEM listed companies, the company size and the asset liability ratio as the control variables, the company performance indicators as the dependent variables, and take the 2011 half year report of the GEM listed companies as the data sources for the empirical analysis, and find out the internal governance. The conclusion shows that the combination of stock ownership structure, board governance, managers' incentive and so on has a certain spillover effect on the impact of corporate performance; there is a certain correlation between the internal governance of the GEM listed companies in China and the company performance, especially the correlation between the ownership structure and the company performance. The relationship between board governance and corporate performance is not very relevant; the control form adopted by the company is related to the company performance, and whether the equity incentive has a significant impact on the performance of the company.
The fourth part, the countermeasures to improve our gem's internal governance.
According to the theory, descriptive statistical analysis and regression analysis, we put forward three countermeasures and suggestions from the internal governance structure of the company, the internal governance mechanism and the supporting construction related to the internal governance of the company. It provides a reference for the construction of internal governance of the GEM listed companies in China. The internal governance structure includes an increase of second to fifth. The proportion of shareholders, increasing the shareholding of institutional investors, increasing the proportion of the state-owned shares, strengthening the independence of the board of directors and strengthening the function of the board of supervisors. The main part of the corporate governance mechanism is to increase the salary incentive of the core technicians, carry out the equity incentive carefully, play the non material incentive effect, adjust the supervision idea and so on. And the internal governance of the company. Related supporting construction is mainly from the three aspects of information disclosure system, health care system and delisting system, and puts forward corresponding countermeasures and suggestions.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：河北農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F276.6;F832.51

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