本文選題：高管薪酬 + 信息披露��； 參考：《西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：2007年美國次貸危機(jī)引發(fā)全球金融海嘯,導(dǎo)致諸多金融企業(yè)紛紛倒閉,眾多跨國公司也受到沉重打擊,各國失業(yè)率激增。然而,與此形成鮮明對比的是,這些企業(yè)的高管們?nèi)匀豢梢垣@得十分可觀的薪酬。這一異�，F(xiàn)象引發(fā)了全球熱議,我國也針對這一問題展開廣泛討論。高管薪酬信息的披露意義重大,但目前我國已出臺文件大多針對國有及國有控股企業(yè)和金融行業(yè),而對上市公司的通用準(zhǔn)則并不多,目前可查的最新正式披露準(zhǔn)則是證監(jiān)會頒布的《公開發(fā)行證券的公司信息披露內(nèi)容與格式準(zhǔn)則第2號年度報(bào)告的內(nèi)容與格式》(2007年修訂),其中分別在第二章第五節(jié)第二十五條和第二章第八節(jié)第三十六條對上市公司高管薪酬信息披露內(nèi)容提出了要求。為了進(jìn)一步規(guī)范上市公司年度報(bào)告編制及信息披露行為,提高上市公司年度報(bào)告信息披露的針對性和有用性,2011年12月30日中國證監(jiān)會又再次發(fā)布了《公開發(fā)行證券的公司信息披露內(nèi)容與格式準(zhǔn)則第2號年度報(bào)告的內(nèi)容與格式》(2011年修訂)的征求意見稿,對薪酬相關(guān)部分也做了重要調(diào)整。 高管薪酬問題日益成為學(xué)者關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn),高管薪酬信息披露的監(jiān)管日益受到政府部門重視,對于高管薪酬信息披露的研究十分必要。目前看來,證監(jiān)會的披露準(zhǔn)則還在不斷完善,我國上市公司對于高管薪酬信息的披露也存在一些差異。對于高管薪酬的強(qiáng)制性披露項(xiàng)目,上市公司是詳細(xì)披露還是簡要披露,而對于高管薪酬的自愿性披露項(xiàng)目,上市公司是選擇披露還是不披露,這些都與上市公司自身特征,尤其是代理沖突問題有關(guān)。我國上市公司高管薪酬的披露存在怎樣的差異?影響上市公司信息披露質(zhì)量的因素也同樣影響上市公司高管薪酬信息的披露嗎?這些影響因素對我國上市公司高管薪酬信息的披露的質(zhì)量又會產(chǎn)生怎樣的影響?對上市公司高管薪酬信啟、披露的監(jiān)管具有怎樣的必要性?回答上述問題正是本文選題動機(jī)所在。 根據(jù)本文提出的高管薪酬信息披露質(zhì)量評價(jià)體系,本文對樣本上市公司高管薪酬信息披露質(zhì)量現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行統(tǒng)計(jì)。統(tǒng)計(jì)發(fā)現(xiàn)：第一,樣本上市公司高管薪酬信息披露各項(xiàng)目得分呈現(xiàn)逐年上升的趨勢,但各年具體得分均較低,披露質(zhì)量仍有待提升；第二,樣本公司薪酬信息披露質(zhì)量的改進(jìn)速度在樣本期間內(nèi)有所放緩;第三,樣本公司高管薪酬信息披露質(zhì)量優(yōu)劣差異明顯,分值相差較大；第四,中位數(shù)顯示,樣本總體及強(qiáng)制性項(xiàng)目分值存在差異的主要原因是部分上市公司對于高管薪酬信息披露明顯不夠重視。 同時(shí),本文從上市公司代理沖突問題入手,從代理成本、激勵(lì)水平和管理層權(quán)力三個(gè)角度解讀代理沖突與上市公司高管薪酬信啟、披露質(zhì)量的關(guān)系。以往學(xué)者對于上市公司信息披露的研究已經(jīng)證實(shí),代理成本、薪酬激勵(lì)水平會影響上市公司信息披露質(zhì)量,而管理層權(quán)力會影響上市公司高管薪酬的考核和發(fā)放,間接影響著上市公司高管薪酬信息的披露。作為上市公司披露信息的組成部分,高管薪酬信息的披露很可能會受到這些因素的影響。本文選取2008年至2010年深圳證券交易所355家合計(jì)1065組數(shù)據(jù)作為分析樣本,并采用多元回歸和Logistic回歸兩種方法對樣本進(jìn)行多層次多角度的綜合回歸分析。 分析結(jié)果顯示,對上市公司高管薪酬信息披露的監(jiān)管確實(shí)有助于改善公司內(nèi)部的代理沖突問題：代理成本對于上市公司高管薪酬信息披露質(zhì)量的影響表現(xiàn)出顯著的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,通過加強(qiáng)對上市公司高管薪酬信息披露的監(jiān)管,特別是對上市公司高管薪酬強(qiáng)制性信息披露的監(jiān)管,將有助于降低上市公司的代理成本；激勵(lì)水平對于上市公司高管薪酬信息披露質(zhì)量的影響表現(xiàn)出正相關(guān)關(guān)系,通過加強(qiáng)對上市公司高管薪酬信息披露的監(jiān)管,特別是對上市公司高管薪酬強(qiáng)制性信息披露的監(jiān)管,將有助于促進(jìn)激勵(lì)策略效用的充分發(fā)揮；管理層權(quán)力對于上市公司高管薪酬各項(xiàng)目披露質(zhì)量的影響雖未通過顯著性檢驗(yàn),但基本都表現(xiàn)出負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,加強(qiáng)上市公司高管薪酬信息披露的監(jiān)管確實(shí)在一定程度上有助于約束管理層的權(quán)力。 本文認(rèn)為,由于我國大部分上市公司在薪酬信息披露上不夠積極,且披露質(zhì)量有待提高,引導(dǎo)上市公司,特別是房地產(chǎn)等行業(yè)的上市公司主動披露高管薪酬信息十分必要。這需要各屆的共同努力：一方面,監(jiān)管部門應(yīng)盡快修訂并完善相關(guān)制度,為高管薪酬信息的披露提供政策性指引；另一方面,行業(yè)協(xié)會等相關(guān)部門應(yīng)當(dāng)積極引導(dǎo)我國上市公司的高管薪酬信息披露行為,提高披露的積極性。此外,上市公司所有者也應(yīng)根據(jù)公司自身實(shí)際情況,主動參與完善公司高管薪酬信息、披露的工作中來,鼓勵(lì)管理層對高管薪酬的積極披露,以改善公司治理環(huán)境,提高公司價(jià)值和股東財(cái)富。這將有助于促進(jìn)我國上市公司的成長,推進(jìn)我國資本市場的不斷發(fā)展和完善。 本文研究意義和貢獻(xiàn)主要體現(xiàn)在理論和監(jiān)管兩個(gè)層面。 理論層面：信息披露可以有效緩解信息不對稱問題,對資本市場的有效運(yùn)行具有促進(jìn)作用。然而現(xiàn)有學(xué)術(shù)研究基于上市公司信息披露質(zhì)量影響因素的研究很多,但對高管薪酬信息披露的研究不足,有效的高管薪酬信息披露質(zhì)量評價(jià)方法仍需不斷摸索,影響上市公司信息、披露質(zhì)量的因素是否同樣影響著高管薪酬信息的披露尚未被證實(shí)。本文基于我國深圳證券交易所A股上市公司的高管薪酬信息披露信息展開探討。通過研究,本文提出一種較為有效的高管薪酬信息披露質(zhì)量評價(jià)方法,揭示出上市公司代理沖突對我國上市公司高管薪酬信息披露質(zhì)量的影響,進(jìn)一步豐富上市公司信息披露行為的研究,并為以后的研究提供結(jié)論支持和方向參考。 監(jiān)管層面：目前我國對于上市公司高管薪酬信息披露的要求仍在不斷完善,但由于對影響上市公司高管薪酬信息披露質(zhì)量的各類因素尚需求證,使得對高管薪酬信息披露的監(jiān)管缺少針對性。雖然2011年底,證監(jiān)會再次公布了修訂后披露準(zhǔn)則的征求意見稿,對于高管薪酬相關(guān)信息披露的要求做了調(diào)整,但這些調(diào)整是否有助于改善上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)并緩解信息不對稱的情況也不甚明了。通過本文的研究,將目前影響我國上市公司高管薪酬信息披露的因素予以揭示,并指出了薪酬監(jiān)管的必要性和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義,從而為進(jìn)一步完善我國上市公司高管薪酬信息披露的監(jiān)管提供可行性建議。 本文研究的局限性主要體現(xiàn)在樣本構(gòu)成和高管薪酬信息、披露質(zhì)量的評價(jià)方法兩個(gè)方面。 樣本方面：由于受客觀因素制約,本文研究僅限于深圳證券交易所中A股主板公司,未涉及上海證券交易所的相關(guān)公司,也未涉及深圳證券交易所B股、中小板、創(chuàng)業(yè)板等特殊板塊,本文所獲得的研究結(jié)論對于上述上市公司是否同樣適用仍需探討。 高管薪酬信息披露質(zhì)量評價(jià)方法方面：雖然本文在賦分過程中盡可能保持中立,并通過仔細(xì)辨認(rèn)對上市公司高管薪酬信息披露的諸多項(xiàng)目進(jìn)行整理,但賦分方式可能仍需進(jìn)一步改進(jìn)。一方面,披露信息、質(zhì)量考核項(xiàng)目分類的合理性有待進(jìn)一步檢驗(yàn);另一方面,本文采用的“0-1”式賦分方法無法體現(xiàn)上市公司高管薪酬信息披露的具體細(xì)節(jié)。
[Abstract]:In 2007, the United States subprime crisis triggered the global financial tsunami, which led to the collapse of many financial enterprises, and many multinational companies were also heavily hit by a large number of countries. The disclosure of executive compensation information is of great significance. But at present, most of the documents have been published in China for state-owned and state-owned holding enterprises and the financial industry, but the general guidelines for listed companies are not much. The latest official disclosure criteria are the corporate letter of the securities issued by the SFC. Content and format of information disclosure content and format guidelines second annual report (revised in 2007), of which twenty-fifth and second chapters and eighth sections of the second chapter and eighth section of the listed company's executive compensation information disclosure requirements are put forward. In order to further regulate the annual report of listed companies and information disclosure line In order to improve the pertinence and usefulness of the information disclosure of the annual report of the listed companies, the CSRC reissued the draft of the content and format of the second annual report of the disclosure content and format of the publicly issued securities company in December 30, 2011, and also made important adjustments to the remuneration related parts.
The issue of executive compensation has increasingly become the focus of attention of scholars. The supervision of executive compensation information disclosure has been paid more and more attention by the government departments. It is necessary to study the disclosure of executive compensation information. At present, the disclosure standards of the CSRC are still constantly improved, and there are some differences in the disclosure of executive compensation information in China's listed companies. For the Mandatory Disclosure Project of executive compensation, the listed companies are detailed disclosure or brief disclosure, and for the Voluntary Disclosure Project of executive compensation, the listed companies are selected to disclose or not disclose them. These are all related to the characteristics of the listed companies, especially the problem of agency conflict. How does the disclosure of executive compensation of the listed companies in China exist The factors that affect the quality of the listed companies' information disclosure also affect the disclosure of the executive compensation information of the listed companies? What are the effects of these factors on the quality of the disclosure of the executive compensation information in the listed companies? The above question is the motive of this article.
According to the quality evaluation system of executive compensation information disclosure proposed in this paper, this paper makes a statistical analysis on the quality status of the executive compensation information disclosure of the listed companies in the sample listed companies. First, the scores of the listed companies' executive compensation information disclosure are increasing year by year, but the specific scores are low in each year, and the quality of disclosure remains to be found. Promotion; second, the improvement rate of the quality of the Sample Firms compensation information disclosure slowed down in the sample period; third, the difference of the quality of the Sample Firms executives' compensation information disclosure quality is obvious and the difference is large; fourth, the median shows that the main reasons for the difference between the total and the compulsory items of the sample are some listed companies. The disclosure of executive compensation information is obviously not paid enough attention.
At the same time, starting with the problem of agency conflict in listed companies, this paper analyzes the relationship between agency conflict and the quality of disclosure and disclosure of listed company executives from three angles of agency cost, incentive level and management power. As a part of the listed company's disclosure information, the disclosure of executive compensation information is likely to be affected by these factors. This paper selects the Shenzhen certificate from 2008 to 2010. 355 total 1065 groups of data from the voucher stock exchange were used as analysis samples, and multiple regression and multiple regression analysis were carried out by multiple regression and Logistic regression methods.
The results show that the supervision of the executive compensation information disclosure of the listed company does help to improve the agency conflict in the company: the agency cost has a significant negative correlation with the influence of the quality of the executive compensation information disclosure of the listed companies, and the supervision of the disclosure of the compensation information of the listed companies is strengthened, especially The supervision of the mandatory disclosure of executive compensation information of the listed companies will help to reduce the agency cost of listed companies, and the incentive level has a positive correlation with the influence of the quality of the executive compensation information disclosure of the listed companies, and the supervision of the disclosure of the executive compensation information of the listed companies, especially the executive compensation of the listed companies, is strengthened. The supervision of mandatory information disclosure will help to promote the full play of the effectiveness of the incentive strategy. Although the management authority has not passed the significant test on the quality of the disclosure quality of the executive compensation projects of the listed companies, the negative correlation is basically shown, and the supervision of the executive compensation information disclosure of the listed companies is indeed to a certain extent. It helps to constrain the power of the management.
Because most listed companies in our country are not active in the disclosure of compensation information and the quality of disclosure needs to be improved, it is necessary to guide the listed companies of listed companies, especially in real estate industry, to disclose the executive compensation information actively. On the other hand, the industry association and other related departments should actively guide the disclosure behavior of the executive compensation of the listed companies in China, and improve the enthusiasm of the disclosure. In addition, the owners of the listed companies should also take the initiative to improve the salary of the company's executives according to the actual situation of the company. It will help to improve the corporate governance environment, improve the value of the company and the wealth of shareholders. This will help to promote the growth of our listed companies and promote the continuous development and improvement of the capital market in China.
The significance and contribution of this study are mainly embodied in two aspects: Theory and supervision.
Theoretical level: information disclosure can effectively alleviate the problem of information asymmetry and promote the effective operation of the capital market. However, there are many studies based on the factors affecting the quality of information disclosure of listed companies, but the research on the disclosure of executive compensation information is insufficient, and the effective quality evaluation of executive compensation information disclosure is effective. The law still needs to be explored continuously. Whether the factors that affect the information of the listed companies and the factors that disclose the quality of the company have not yet been confirmed. This paper is based on the information disclosure information of the executive compensation of the A stock listed companies of the Shenzhen stock exchange in China. The disclosure of quality evaluation method reveals the influence of the agency conflict on the quality of executive compensation information disclosure of Listed Companies in China, further enriches the research on information disclosure behavior of listed companies, and provides conclusion support and direction reference for future research.
Regulatory level: at present, the requirements for the disclosure of executive compensation information in listed companies are still being perfected. However, because of the various factors that affect the quality of the disclosure of executive compensation information of the listed companies, the supervision of the executive compensation information disclosure is lack of pertinence. Although the Securities Regulatory Commission published the revised disclosure again at the end of 2011 The draft of the guidelines has been adjusted to the requirements of executive compensation related information disclosure, but it is not clear whether these adjustments help to improve the governance structure of the listed companies and alleviate the information asymmetry. The necessity and practical significance of salary supervision are put forward, so as to provide feasible suggestions for further improving the supervision of information disclosure of executive pay in China's listed companies.
The limitations of this study are mainly reflected in two aspects: sample composition and executive compensation information, and the evaluation method of disclosure quality.
As for the sample, the study is restricted by the objective factors. This study is limited to the A shares of the Shenzhen stock exchange, not related to the related companies of the Shanghai stock exchange, nor on the special plates of the Shenzhen stock exchange B shares, small and medium board, and the GEM board. The conclusions obtained in this paper are still applicable to the listed companies. It needs to be discussed.
The quality evaluation method of executive compensation information disclosure: Although this article maintains the neutrality as much as possible in the process of assigning, and through carefully identifying many items of the listed company executives' compensation information disclosure, it may still need to be further improved. On the one hand, the rationality of the classification of the quality assessment items is needed. Further examination; on the other hand, the "0-1" method used in this paper can not reflect the details of the disclosure of executive pay information of listed companies.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F272.92;F832.51;F224

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 劉慧鳳;楊揚(yáng);;高管報(bào)酬與會計(jì)信息質(zhì)量的相關(guān)性實(shí)證研究[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)管理;2009年11期

2 汪煒,蔣高峰;信息披露、透明度與資本成本[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2004年07期

3 曾穎;陸正飛;;信息披露質(zhì)量與股權(quán)融資成本[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2006年02期

4 李壽喜;;產(chǎn)權(quán)、代理成本和代理效率[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2007年01期

5 羅煒;朱春艷;;代理成本與公司自愿性披露[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2010年10期

6 權(quán)小鋒;吳世農(nóng);文芳;;管理層權(quán)力、私有收益與薪酬操縱[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2010年11期

7 饒曉秋;;第三類代理成本與企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制制度[J];中國注冊會計(jì)師;2009年04期

8 馬忠;吳翔宇;;金字塔結(jié)構(gòu)對自愿性信息披露程度的影響:來自家族控股上市公司的經(jīng)驗(yàn)驗(yàn)證[J];會計(jì)研究;2007年01期

9 張宗新;楊飛;袁慶海;;上市公司信息披露質(zhì)量提升能否改進(jìn)公司績效?——基于2002—2005年深市上市公司的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)[J];會計(jì)研究;2007年10期

10 盧銳;;管理層權(quán)力、薪酬差距與績效[J];南方經(jīng)濟(jì);2007年07期

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 邢廣彥;控股股東性質(zhì)與掏空行為[D];西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2010年

，

本文編號：1992251