本文選題：創(chuàng)業(yè)板 + 獨(dú)立董事��； 參考：《石家莊經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著2009年中國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板開(kāi)啟，在不到兩年的時(shí)間里，我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)就伴隨著大量的業(yè)績(jī)下滑、虛假陳述、股票破發(fā)、超募嚴(yán)重、高管離職套現(xiàn)等現(xiàn)象，不單單是高管，董事、監(jiān)事也存在離職套現(xiàn)問(wèn)題，其中這些人的離職套現(xiàn)現(xiàn)象向外界釋放了公司股價(jià)可能被高估的信號(hào)。大量高管的離職套現(xiàn)現(xiàn)象反映了公司內(nèi)部治理狀況不良等一系列的問(wèn)題。有些公司的離職人員當(dāng)時(shí)未進(jìn)行套現(xiàn)，且在公司公告中大都是由于自身原因而辭去獨(dú)立董事職務(wù)。但大量研究表明，我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板的套現(xiàn)總體數(shù)額相當(dāng)大，增持少，一系列的問(wèn)題表明了我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)存在問(wèn)題，需要盡早解決。 獨(dú)立董事制度是公司治理機(jī)制的一部分。相關(guān)研究表明獨(dú)立董事制度具有正的制度效應(yīng)，這類研究基本上認(rèn)為獨(dú)立董事制度具有保護(hù)中小投資者股東權(quán)益、約束公司內(nèi)部人行為、減少代理成本、防止上市公司造假舞弊的作用，尤其是年度財(cái)務(wù)表報(bào)方面具有正的制度效應(yīng)。獨(dú)立董事制度的設(shè)立就是為了公司治理制度的完善，現(xiàn)在大多數(shù)國(guó)家都引進(jìn)了這一制度，相關(guān)研究表明這一制度在公司遵紀(jì)守法方面具有正的制度效應(yīng)達(dá)成共識(shí)。相關(guān)研究主要是以獨(dú)立董事所具有的特征入手進(jìn)行分析，例如獨(dú)立董事的政府關(guān)系、學(xué)歷高低、在董事會(huì)中的人數(shù)及比例，在不同的公司所表現(xiàn)出來(lái)的不盡相同。特征的不同對(duì)于獨(dú)立董事職能發(fā)揮具有直接影響作用，影響到公司的治理狀況，從而會(huì)間接的影響到公司員工離職套現(xiàn)的外在環(huán)境，，導(dǎo)致離職套現(xiàn)現(xiàn)象發(fā)生。本文選取2010年117家在創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市的公司的獨(dú)立董事作為樣本，針對(duì)獨(dú)立董事的不同特征，擬定十二個(gè)較為重要的研究假設(shè)，并對(duì)其定量化，與所在公司是否發(fā)生內(nèi)部人離職套現(xiàn)現(xiàn)象進(jìn)行相關(guān)分析，得出關(guān)于獨(dú)立董事制度設(shè)計(jì)方面的結(jié)論。另外，本文通過(guò)構(gòu)建判別回歸模型，根據(jù)公司的獨(dú)立董事特征判斷公司內(nèi)部人離職套現(xiàn)的可能性，這樣，就可以通過(guò)公司公告或財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表中的信息，對(duì)該公司的內(nèi)部人離職套現(xiàn)發(fā)生的概率進(jìn)行粗略判斷，方便投資者對(duì)該公司的公司治理情況或市場(chǎng)價(jià)值判斷時(shí)，運(yùn)用此類判斷依據(jù)。
[Abstract]:With the opening of China's gem in 2009, in less than two years, China's gem market has been accompanied by a large number of performance decline, false statements, stock break-up, overcapitalization, and other phenomena, such as execs, directors, etc. Supervisors also have the problem of cash out of their jobs, which send a signal to the outside world that the company's share price may be overvalued. A large number of executive turnover cash phenomenon reflects the poor corporate governance and a series of problems. Some companies did not cash in, and most of the company announcements resigned as independent directors for their own reasons. However, a large number of studies show that the total amount of cash in the gem is quite large and the increase in holdings is small. A series of problems indicate that there are problems in the gem market of our country, which need to be solved as soon as possible. The independent director system is a part of the corporate governance mechanism. Related studies show that the independent director system has a positive institutional effect. This kind of research basically thinks that the independent director system can protect the shareholders' rights and interests of the minority investors, restrain the behavior of the insiders of the company, and reduce the agency cost. The function of preventing fraud and fraud of listed companies, especially the annual financial statement has a positive institutional effect. The establishment of the independent director system is for the perfection of the corporate governance system. Now most countries have introduced this system. The related research is mainly based on the characteristics of independent directors, such as the independent director's government relationship, academic qualifications, the number and proportion of the board of directors, in different companies show different. The difference of characteristics has a direct impact on the function of independent directors and affects the corporate governance situation, which will indirectly affect the external environment of employee turnover cash, which leads to the phenomenon of cash out of the company. In this paper, 117 companies listed on the gem in 2010 are selected as samples. According to the different characteristics of independent directors, twelve important research hypotheses are proposed and quantified. This paper analyzes whether the insiders leave the company and draws a conclusion about the design of the independent director system. In addition, by constructing the discriminant regression model and judging the possibility of the company insiders leaving the company to cash out according to the characteristics of the independent directors of the company, we can use the information in the company announcement or financial statements. It is convenient for investors to judge the company's corporate governance or market value by making a rough judgment on the probability of the insiders leaving the company.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：石家莊經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F271;F272.92;F832.51

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