本文選題：定向增發(fā) + 發(fā)行對象　； 參考：《浙江工商大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：我國上市公司股權(quán)再融資中的盈余管理行為,一直是學(xué)術(shù)界所關(guān)注的熱點(diǎn)問題。大股東“一股獨(dú)大”的局面,使得上市公司表現(xiàn)出強(qiáng)烈的股權(quán)融資偏好。自2006年以來,在股權(quán)再融資過程中,定向增發(fā)獲得越來越多的上市公司的青睞,成為股權(quán)再融資的主要方式。全流通時(shí)代的來臨并沒有伴隨著完善的公司治理和相應(yīng)約束大股東權(quán)利保護(hù)中小股東利益的機(jī)制。因此,定向增發(fā)有可能成為大股東進(jìn)行盈余管理,獲取控制權(quán)私利的新工具。本文的研究目的就是通過對上市公司實(shí)施定向增發(fā)前以及定向增發(fā)后解鎖前不同增發(fā)對象的可操縱應(yīng)計(jì)利潤的變化、影響因素的研究,以探明不同定向增發(fā)對象與盈余管理行為之間的關(guān)系。 本文介紹了我國定向增發(fā)的概況,用委托代理理論、信息不對稱理論和契約理論分析了大股東在定向增發(fā)中實(shí)施盈余管理的動(dòng)機(jī)和影響,認(rèn)為大股東為了在定向增發(fā)發(fā)行時(shí)獲取低價(jià)增發(fā)的私人利益或者為了在定向增發(fā)股票解鎖前為減持做準(zhǔn)備并實(shí)現(xiàn)對機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的投資收益承諾,進(jìn)行盈余管理的行為。本文以我國2006年、2007年已實(shí)施定向增發(fā)的上市公司為樣本,按增發(fā)對象分為三類：僅對大股東及關(guān)聯(lián)方增發(fā)、僅對機(jī)構(gòu)投資者增發(fā)、同時(shí)對兩者增發(fā),通過修正的瓊斯模型,用樣本與控制樣本可操縱應(yīng)計(jì)利潤差異來衡量其各自的盈余管理程度,并通過可操縱應(yīng)計(jì)利潤與其影響因素的回歸,以檢驗(yàn)對不同定向增發(fā)對象與盈余管理關(guān)系。研究結(jié)果表明：在定向增發(fā)前,定向增發(fā)對象為大股東及關(guān)聯(lián)方時(shí),上市公司會(huì)進(jìn)行負(fù)的盈余管理；當(dāng)定向增發(fā)對象為機(jī)構(gòu)投資者時(shí),上市公司會(huì)進(jìn)行正的盈余管理；在鎖定期結(jié)束前,當(dāng)定向增發(fā)對象為大股東時(shí),沒有明顯證據(jù)證明上市公司存在盈余管理行為；當(dāng)定向增發(fā)對象為機(jī)構(gòu)投資者時(shí),上市公司有明顯的正的盈余管理行為；大股東持股比例與盈余管理程度正相關(guān)。針對上述結(jié)論,本文最后一部分提出了相關(guān)啟示和建議。 本文的研究加深了對股權(quán)再融資的認(rèn)識(shí),從定向增發(fā)融資到解鎖期研究盈余管理,具有一定的創(chuàng)新意義。為加強(qiáng)對中國上市公司定向增發(fā)再融資行為、完善上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)提供了理論依據(jù)。
[Abstract]:Earnings management in equity refinancing of listed companies in China has always been a hot issue in academic circles. Large shareholders "one-share" situation, so that listed companies show a strong preference for equity financing. Since 2006, in the process of equity refinancing, more and more listed companies have received the favor of directional additional issuance, which has become the main way of equity refinancing. The coming of the whole circulation age is not accompanied by perfect corporate governance and the mechanism of restricting the rights of large shareholders to protect the interests of minority shareholders. Therefore, targeted placement may become a new tool for large shareholders to manage earnings and gain control rights. The purpose of this paper is to study the influence factors on the change of the manipulable accrual profit of different additional issuers before and after the issuance of the listed companies. The purpose of this paper is to find out the relationship between different directional placement objects and earnings management behavior. This paper introduces the general situation of directional placement in China, and analyzes the motivation and influence of earnings management of large shareholders in private placement by means of principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory and contract theory. In order to obtain the private benefit of low price additional issue or to prepare for the reduction and realize the promise of investment income to institutional investors, the behavior of earnings management is considered by the major shareholders in order to obtain the private benefit of the low price additional issue or to prepare for the reduction of the stock before the release of the shares. This paper takes the listed companies that have implemented the directional additional issuance in 2006 and 2007 as the samples, and divides them into three categories according to the issuing objects: only for the large shareholders and related parties, only for the institutional investors, but also for both, through the modified Jones model. The differences between sample and control sample can be used to measure the degree of earnings management, and the relationship between the object of different directional additional issuance and earnings management can be tested by regression of maneuverable accrual profit and its influencing factors. The results show that the listed company will carry out negative earnings management when the main shareholder and related party is the object of the directional additional offering, and the listed company will carry out positive earnings management when the target is institutional investor. Before the end of the lock-up period, there is no obvious evidence to prove that the listed company has earnings management behavior, and when the targeted placement is institutional investor, the listed company has obvious positive earnings management behavior. The proportion of major shareholders holding shares is positively related to the degree of earnings management. In view of the above conclusion, the last part of this paper puts forward the relevant enlightenment and suggestion. The research of this paper deepens the understanding of equity refinancing, and it is of great significance to study earnings management from directional additional financing to unlocking period. It provides a theoretical basis for strengthening the refinancing behavior of China's listed companies and improving the governance structure of listed companies.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江工商大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51;F224

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