本文選題：“運(yùn)氣”薪酬 + 公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)�。� 參考：《福州大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：長期以來,我國企業(yè)的高管薪酬與業(yè)績掛鉤程度一直受到質(zhì)疑。隨著全球經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)的爆發(fā),高管異常薪酬、收入差距過大和“窮廟富方丈”等現(xiàn)象愈加“吸睛”,民眾對社會不公平現(xiàn)象的負(fù)面情緒升級。為了避免引起“公憤”而影響自身聲譽(yù),高管具有強(qiáng)烈的動機(jī)為自己的高薪或漲薪進(jìn)行辯護(hù),希望提供讓社會大眾信服的充分正當(dāng)理由�！斑\(yùn)氣”是指行業(yè)沖擊帶來的超出高管控制之外的公司業(yè)績影響因素。即“運(yùn)氣”業(yè)績并非管理層付出努力得到的公司業(yè)績增長。高管獲得“運(yùn)氣”薪酬是一種抽租行為,系公司治理機(jī)制弱化和管理層權(quán)力膨脹的后果,不符合主流代理理論的預(yù)期,偏離了最優(yōu)契約理論所能解釋的范圍。由于委托代理關(guān)系的存在,管理層極有可能利用權(quán)力對董事或薪酬委員會委員施壓,并根據(jù)行業(yè)整體變化趨勢巧妙地應(yīng)用“運(yùn)氣”為自己進(jìn)行薪酬辯護(hù)。“運(yùn)氣”薪酬問題,本質(zhì)上是公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)存在缺陷所導(dǎo)致的。本論文選取2007～2011年滬深兩所A股上市公司為研究對象。首先,將公司業(yè)績分離成“運(yùn)氣”和管理者技能兩個部分,再構(gòu)建OLS模型估計CEO薪酬與“運(yùn)氣”業(yè)績之間的相關(guān)性及其顯著性,發(fā)現(xiàn)我國國有上市公司中存在明顯的高管“運(yùn)氣”薪酬現(xiàn)象,而非國有上市公司中并不明顯。然后,進(jìn)一步檢驗(yàn)我國公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的具體要素能否有效抑制“運(yùn)氣”薪酬現(xiàn)象,研究結(jié)果顯示獨(dú)立董事比例和薪酬委員會獨(dú)立性的提高都不能對高管“運(yùn)氣”薪酬現(xiàn)象起到明顯的約束作用；但是,前五大股東持股比例之和提高能夠?qū)Α斑\(yùn)氣”薪酬現(xiàn)象起到一定控制作用,且國有企業(yè)的獨(dú)立董事提高履行職能的積極性能夠顯著抑制“運(yùn)氣”薪酬現(xiàn)象；同時,第一大股東持股比例提高在一定程度上有助于高管獲得“運(yùn)氣”薪酬,且國有企業(yè)CEO兼任提名委員會委員對“運(yùn)氣”薪酬現(xiàn)象具有明顯的鼓勵作用,但CEO兩職合一與“運(yùn)氣”薪酬沒有顯著相關(guān)性。最后,根據(jù)研究結(jié)果,結(jié)合我國實(shí)際情況,提出以下健全和完善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的相關(guān)對策建議：①健全獨(dú)立董事制度,包括提高獨(dú)立董事選聘制度的客觀性和制定良好的獨(dú)立董事激勵機(jī)制；②加強(qiáng)董事會實(shí)質(zhì)上的獨(dú)立性；③改善股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu),提高股權(quán)集中度；④完善外部治理機(jī)制。
[Abstract]:For a long time, the executive compensation and performance of Chinese enterprises have been questioned. With the onset of the global economic crisis, such phenomena as abnormal executive pay, excessive income gap and "poor temple rich abbot" and other phenomena are increasingly "aspiration", people's negative feelings about social injustice escalated. To avoid "public outrage" and damage to their reputation, executives have a strong incentive to defend their high pay or pay hikes, in the hope of providing sufficient justification to convince the public. Luck refers to factors that affect the performance of companies beyond the control of executives as a result of industry shocks. That is, "luck" performance is not a management effort to achieve corporate performance growth. Executive's "luck" compensation is a kind of rent-drawing behavior, which is the consequence of the weakening of corporate governance mechanism and the expansion of management power. It does not accord with the expectation of mainstream agency theory and deviates from the scope of the optimal contract theory. Because of the principal-agent relationship, management is likely to use its power to put pressure on directors or compensation committee members, and skillfully apply "luck" to defend their pay in the light of the overall changing trend in the industry. The problem of "luck" compensation is essentially caused by the defect of corporate governance structure. In this paper, two A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2011 are selected as research objects. Firstly, the company's performance is divided into two parts: "luck" and "manager's skill", and then the OLS model is constructed to estimate the correlation between CEO compensation and "luck" performance and its significance. It is found that there is an obvious phenomenon of executive "luck" compensation in the state-owned listed companies, but not in the non-state-owned listed companies. Then, to further test whether the specific elements of corporate governance structure in China can effectively curb the "luck" pay phenomenon, The results show that neither the proportion of independent directors nor the increase in the independence of compensation committees can significantly constrain executive "luck" pay; however, The increase of the proportion of the top five shareholders can control the phenomenon of "luck" compensation, and the independent directors of state-owned enterprises can significantly restrain the phenomenon of "luck" compensation by improving the enthusiasm of the independent directors to perform their functions. The increase in the shareholding ratio of the first largest shareholder has helped executives get "luck" pay to some extent, and the fact that state-owned CEO is also a member of the nominating committee has a clear incentive for "luck" pay. But there is no significant correlation between CEO and luck pay. Finally, according to the research results, combined with the actual situation in China, this paper puts forward the following relevant countermeasures to improve and perfect the corporate governance structure: 1 to improve the independent director system, It includes improving the objectivity of the system of selecting and appointing independent directors and establishing a good incentive mechanism for independent directors. (2) strengthening the independence of the board of directors in essence and improving the ownership structure, improving the degree of ownership concentration and perfecting the external governance mechanism.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：福州大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F272.92;F832.51

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