發(fā)布時間：2018-05-22 13:32

  本文選題：保薦制度 + 信息披露質(zhì)量　； 參考：《南京師范大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來我國首發(fā)上市公司信息披露造假問題頻出,每次造假事件曝光都造成市場劇烈波動,投資者由此遭受重大損失。事實上,信息披露質(zhì)量不佳只是問題的表象,其根本原因在于我國證券市場發(fā)行審核制度的不完善,未能通過法制手段對IPO公司提高其信息披露質(zhì)量提供有效激勵。與發(fā)達(dá)證券市場采用的注冊制不同,我國證券市場由于市場機制不夠完善、投資者欠成熟等原因,在目前階段仍采用核準(zhǔn)制。由于擬上市公司與監(jiān)管部門之間天然存在信息不對稱現(xiàn)象,為盡力緩解這種信息不對稱,于是推出了保薦制度,以期通過保薦人的聲譽機制約束IPO公司的信息披露質(zhì)量。盡管保薦制設(shè)立的初衷是良好的,但實施過程中仍出現(xiàn)一些IPO公司信息披露造假問題,保薦制遭到多方質(zhì)疑。究竟保薦制能否有效提高IPO公司的信息披露質(zhì)量?本文的主旨就在于此。 本文借鑒機制設(shè)計理論的思想,運用信息不對稱下委托代理關(guān)系的研究框架,研究擬上市公司、保薦人、監(jiān)管部門三者的委托代理關(guān)系。通過求解含參與人激勵相容約束的社會最優(yōu)效率目標(biāo)函數(shù),得出指定機制下擬上市公司的均衡信息披露質(zhì)量。再通過將不同機制下擬上市公司均衡信息披露質(zhì)量進(jìn)行比較,對各個機制的作用效果加以評價。而后運用實證分析檢驗在我國實際市場環(huán)境下保薦制對信息披露質(zhì)量的影響程度,并進(jìn)一步分析影響力的持續(xù)情況。文章發(fā)現(xiàn)保薦制對信息披露質(zhì)量的影響程度在年度之間不甚穩(wěn)定,因此隨后對保薦人聲譽機制的作用機理進(jìn)行了實證檢驗。通過檢驗發(fā)現(xiàn),保薦人聲譽機制目前在我國尚未充分發(fā)揮作用,保薦人經(jīng)營業(yè)績?nèi)灾饕芙?jīng)營能力影響,聲譽無法對保薦人的IPO項目信息披露質(zhì)量形成有效約束。 最后,本文根據(jù)理論結(jié)論及實證檢驗結(jié)果,提出了強化保薦制度對信息披露質(zhì)量的影響力的有關(guān)建議,包括全面提高監(jiān)管能力以及加強投資者培育等。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the problem of information disclosure and falsification of listed companies in our country is frequent. Every exposure of counterfeiting events causes the market to fluctuate violently, and the investors suffer great losses as a result. In fact, the poor quality of information disclosure is only the appearance of the problem. The fundamental reason lies in the imperfection of the issuing and auditing system in China's securities market, and the failure to provide an effective incentive for IPO Company to improve its information disclosure quality through legal means. Different from the registration system adopted in the developed securities market, the securities market in our country still adopts the approval system at the present stage because the market mechanism is not perfect and the investors are not mature. Because the information asymmetry exists naturally between the listed company and the regulatory department, in order to alleviate the information asymmetry, a recommendation system is put forward, which is expected to restrict the information disclosure quality of IPO Company through the reputation mechanism of sponsor. Although the original intention of setting up the recommendation system is good, there are still some problems of false information disclosure in IPO company during the implementation process, and the sponsor system has been questioned by many parties. Can the recommendation system effectively improve the quality of IPO information disclosure? This is the thrust of this paper. Based on the theory of mechanism design and the research framework of principal-agent relationship under asymmetric information, this paper studies the principal-agent relationship among listed companies, sponsors and regulators. By solving the objective function of social optimal efficiency with participant incentive compatibility constraints, the equilibrium information disclosure quality of listed companies is obtained under the specified mechanism. By comparing the quality of equilibrium information disclosure of listed companies under different mechanisms, the effect of each mechanism is evaluated. Then we use empirical analysis to test the impact of sponsorship system on the quality of information disclosure in China's actual market environment, and further analyze the impact of the continued situation. It is found that the degree of influence of sponsor system on the quality of information disclosure is not stable between years, so the mechanism of sponsor reputation mechanism is tested empirically. Through the test, it is found that the reputation mechanism of sponsor has not played a full role in our country at present, the sponsor's operating performance is still mainly affected by the management ability, and reputation can not form an effective constraint on the quality of the sponsor's IPO project information disclosure. Finally, according to the theoretical conclusions and empirical test results, this paper puts forward some suggestions to strengthen the influence of the recommendation system on the quality of information disclosure, including comprehensively improving the regulatory capacity and strengthening the investor cultivation.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F832.51

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本文編號：1922268