本文選題：管理層薪酬 + 股權(quán)激勵��； 參考：《云南財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著2005年上市公司股權(quán)分置改革的完成，資本市場快速而穩(wěn)定的發(fā)展，在發(fā)展的過程中也會產(chǎn)生一些問題，上市公司內(nèi)部普遍存在著盈余管理行為，且這些行為越來越受到股東，債權(quán)人等利益相關(guān)者的關(guān)注。2006年1月，我國證監(jiān)會才頒布了有關(guān)股權(quán)激勵政策的文件《上市公司股權(quán)激勵計劃的管理辦法》，2006年9月國資委和財政部共同頒發(fā)了《國有控股上市公司股權(quán)激勵試行辦法》，自此股權(quán)激勵政策才陸續(xù)在上市公司中實施，以往國內(nèi)外的理論研究認(rèn)為，股權(quán)激勵政策的實施不僅能能起到降低代理成本，，優(yōu)化改善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的作用，還能提高公司的管理效率。本文從管理契約的角度，不僅考慮上市公司內(nèi)部的股權(quán)激勵對盈余管理的影響，還從管理層薪酬的角度對盈余管理進(jìn)行分析，分別考察二者與盈余管理的相關(guān)性。 本文首先對管理層薪酬以及股權(quán)激勵的理論基礎(chǔ)進(jìn)行整理,然后對國內(nèi)外相關(guān)的文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行歸納總結(jié),在此基礎(chǔ)上,本文的后面章節(jié)對管理層薪酬、股權(quán)激勵與盈余管理的相關(guān)性進(jìn)行了實證分析檢驗。本文選取2008年至2010年深滬A股的所有上市公司作為初始樣本,剔除ST等連年虧損的股票,剔除同時發(fā)行B股H股的上市公司以及由于信息披露原因造成的數(shù)據(jù)缺失的上市公司等,再對其進(jìn)行隨機抽樣,最后得到600多個樣本數(shù)據(jù)。本文選用可操作性應(yīng)計利潤作為后面章節(jié)回歸模型的被解釋變量，本文對現(xiàn)有的計量可操作性應(yīng)計利潤的模型進(jìn)行了評述，最后選定修正的Jones模型來進(jìn)行計量，然后對得到的結(jié)果按行業(yè)進(jìn)行了統(tǒng)計劃分并進(jìn)行了T檢驗，發(fā)現(xiàn)2008年到2010年這三年都存在著嚴(yán)重的盈余管理行為。最后本文以管理層薪酬、股權(quán)激勵作為解釋變量，資產(chǎn)規(guī)模和資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率作為控制變量對樣本數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行了多元線性回歸分析，得出管理層薪酬、股權(quán)激勵與我國上市公司盈余管理的相關(guān)性分析結(jié)果。 通過最后的實證結(jié)果本文得出結(jié)論：其一，管理層薪酬的大小與上市公司盈余管理程度不存在顯著的相關(guān)關(guān)系，說明公司的管理層為了自身的利益增加自身薪酬而調(diào)整盈余的動機并不明顯。其二，股權(quán)激勵政策與盈余管理程度也不存在顯著相關(guān)關(guān)系，究其原因，可能是管理層持股數(shù)量占總數(shù)量的比例非常小，并不能起到預(yù)想的激勵管理層的效果。通過檢驗還發(fā)現(xiàn)：公司資產(chǎn)規(guī)模大小與盈余管理存在顯著的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系，即公司的規(guī)模越大，管理層進(jìn)行盈余管理的動機越��；公司的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率與盈余管理呈現(xiàn)非常顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系，即隨著資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率的上升，企業(yè)盈余管理的程度就越嚴(yán)重。最后對本文進(jìn)行了概括總結(jié)并對以后的研究進(jìn)行了展望。
[Abstract]:With the completion of the split share structure reform of listed companies in 2005, the capital market develops rapidly and steadily, and some problems will arise in the process of development. And these actions are getting more and more attention from shareholders, creditors and other stakeholders. In January 2006, The Securities Regulatory Commission of our country has just promulgated the document on the stock incentive policy < measures for the Management of the Equity incentive Plan of listed companies. In September 2006, SASAC and the Ministry of Finance jointly issued the pilot measures for Stock incentive of State-owned holding listed companies. Since then, the equity incentive policy has been implemented in the listed companies one after another. Previous theoretical studies at home and abroad believe that the implementation of equity incentive policy can not only reduce agency costs, optimize and improve the corporate governance structure, but also improve the management efficiency of the company. From the perspective of management contract, this paper not only considers the impact of equity incentive on earnings management in listed companies, but also analyzes earnings management from the perspective of management compensation, and investigates the correlation between them and earnings management. In this paper, the management compensation and equity incentive of the theoretical basis of collation, and then the relevant literature at home and abroad are summarized, on the basis of this, the later chapters of this article on the management pay, The correlation between equity incentive and earnings management is tested by empirical analysis. This paper selects all the listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai from 2008 to 2010 as the initial sample, excluding the stocks with annual losses such as St. After removing the listed companies that issue B shares H shares at the same time and the listed companies with missing data caused by information disclosure, the random sampling is carried out, and more than 600 sample data are obtained. In this paper, the operational accrual profit is chosen as the explained variable of the regression model in the following chapters. The existing models of the operational accrual profit are reviewed in this paper. Finally, the modified Jones model is selected to measure the accrual profit. Then, the results are divided by industry and T-test. It is found that there are serious earnings management behaviors in the three years from 2008 to 2010. Finally, this paper uses management compensation, equity incentive as explanatory variables, asset size and asset-liability ratio as control variables to carry out multiple linear regression analysis of sample data, and get management compensation. The results of correlation analysis between equity incentive and earnings management of listed companies in China. The conclusion is as follows: first, there is no significant correlation between the level of management compensation and earnings management degree of listed companies. It shows that the motivation of managers to adjust their earnings for their own benefit is not obvious. Second, there is no significant correlation between equity incentive policy and earnings management. The reason is that the proportion of management stock ownership is very small, which can not play the desired effect of encouraging management. It is also found that there is a significant negative correlation between the size of the company's assets and earnings management, that is, the larger the size of the company, the smaller the motivation of the management to carry out earnings management; There is a very significant positive correlation between the debt ratio of assets and earnings management, that is, with the increase of the ratio of assets and liabilities, the degree of earnings management becomes more serious. Finally, this paper is summarized and the future research is prospected.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：云南財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F275;F832.51;F224

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