本文選題：控制權(quán)私人收益 + 股權(quán)集中度��； 參考：《安徽大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：保護(hù)中小股東的權(quán)益是我國證券市場發(fā)展的基礎(chǔ),也是我國證券市場發(fā)揮投融資功能的根本保證,而目前,我國上市公司中小股東的權(quán)益保護(hù)卻面臨各種問題。 我國資本市場上上市公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)是一個(gè)流通股與非流通股并存的二元結(jié)構(gòu),單個(gè)股東占支配地位和國有控股是非常普遍的現(xiàn)象,非流通股往往占據(jù)支配地位。股權(quán)高度集中和非流通股獨(dú)大導(dǎo)致嚴(yán)重的內(nèi)部人控制,控股股東和大股東通過各種形式侵占中小股東的權(quán)益,嚴(yán)重?fù)p害了資本市場公平原則,妨礙了我國資本市場的發(fā)展。 本文以第二、第三章為第一個(gè)部分,先對(duì)相關(guān)概念進(jìn)行了界定,詳細(xì)介紹了控制權(quán)私人收益等概念,并結(jié)合我國當(dāng)前情況,對(duì)相關(guān)概念定義。隨后,具體闡述了關(guān)于投資者保護(hù)的幾大理論。第三章研究股權(quán)分置改革后我國證券市場中小股東保護(hù)的現(xiàn)狀,指出在股份全流通的情況下,我國中小股東利益仍然面臨被侵害的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。 第四章為本文的第二大部分,是實(shí)證研究的部分,也是本文的核心內(nèi)容。筆者對(duì)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與中小股東利益保護(hù)之間的關(guān)系進(jìn)行分析,通過對(duì)2009年-2011年三年的數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究,得出第一大股東比例(股權(quán)集中度),股權(quán)制衡度、流通股比例對(duì)控制權(quán)私有收益的影響。實(shí)證證明,在全流通時(shí)代,我國的證券市場的中小股東利益保護(hù)受多種因素影響,其中,股權(quán)集中度越高,中小股東利益受損越大,而股權(quán)制衡度與流通股比例對(duì)于中小股東利益保護(hù)沒有顯著影響。 第五章是政策建議部分,筆者在第二部分結(jié)論的基礎(chǔ)上,從我國證券市場外部環(huán)境的建設(shè)、上市公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)的完善等兩個(gè)方面提出建議,以構(gòu)建合理的中小股東保護(hù)制度。
[Abstract]:The protection of the rights and interests of minority shareholders is the basis of the development of China's securities market and the fundamental guarantee for the securities market to play a role in investment and financing. At present, the protection of the rights and interests of minority shareholders of listed companies in China is faced with various problems. The equity structure of listed companies in our country's capital market is a dual structure of circulating shares and non-tradable shares. It is a very common phenomenon that individual shareholders occupy dominant position and state-owned holding shares, and non-tradable shares often occupy dominant position. High concentration of equity and non-tradable shares lead to serious insider control. Controlling shareholders and large shareholders encroach on the rights and interests of minority shareholders through various forms, which seriously damages the principle of equity in the capital market and hinders the development of the capital market in China. The first part is the second and third chapter, which defines the related concepts, introduces the private income of control in detail, and defines the relevant concepts in combination with the current situation in our country. Subsequently, elaborated on the investor protection of several theories. The third chapter studies the current situation of minority shareholders' protection in China's securities market after the reform of split share structure, and points out that the interests of minority shareholders in China are still at risk of being infringed under the situation of full circulation of shares. The fourth chapter is the second part of this paper, is the part of empirical research, is also the core of this paper. The author analyzes the relationship between the ownership structure and the protection of the interests of minority shareholders, and through empirical research on the data of the three years from 2009 to 2011, obtains the largest proportion of shareholders (equity concentration ratio, equity balance degree). The effect of the proportion of circulating shares on the private income of control. Empirical evidence shows that in the era of full circulation, the protection of minority shareholders' interests in China's securities market is affected by many factors, among which, the higher the degree of ownership concentration, the greater the damage to the interests of minority shareholders. However, the degree of equity balance and the proportion of tradable shares have no significant effect on the protection of minority shareholders' interests. The fifth chapter is the policy suggestion part. Based on the conclusion of the second part, the author puts forward the suggestions from two aspects: the construction of the external environment of China's securities market, the improvement of the internal governance structure of listed companies, and so on. In order to build a reasonable protection system for minority shareholders.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：安徽大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F276.6

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