本文選題：管理防御 + 信息披露質(zhì)量　； 參考：《新疆財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：自從20世紀(jì)90年代上海、深圳兩個(gè)證券交易所相繼成立之后，我國上市公司就開始對外正式披露會(huì)計(jì)信息。上市公司會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量的披露，在很大程度上影響著證券市場的運(yùn)行效率，而當(dāng)前阻礙我國證券市場發(fā)展的一個(gè)重要因素就是我國上市公司會(huì)計(jì)信息披露中存在的質(zhì)量問題。它已嚴(yán)重影響到我國證券市場功能的發(fā)揮，導(dǎo)致投資者信心不足，甚至是資源配置低效和不合理。 在信息不對稱和契約不完備的情況下，管理者固守職位并最大化自身效用的管理防御行為由自利管理者與股東之間的利益沖突引起。管理防御作為一種假說,最初起源于有關(guān)內(nèi)部人所有權(quán)與公司業(yè)績之間關(guān)系的研究。這一假說認(rèn)為,經(jīng)理人為了滿足個(gè)人利益并防止被更換，經(jīng)理人持股會(huì)使其追求非公司價(jià)值最大化決策。由于管理防御的存在，經(jīng)理人可能會(huì)做出與股東利益不一致的決策與行為。公司內(nèi)部人--以管理者和掌握控制權(quán)的大股東為代表--具有隱瞞其剝奪行為的動(dòng)機(jī)和能力，內(nèi)部人掩蓋其利益侵占的主要方式是對信息及其披露的管理和操縱。雖然與以往代理文獻(xiàn)所強(qiáng)調(diào)的動(dòng)機(jī)有很大差別,但影響卻一樣廣泛,同樣會(huì)造成經(jīng)理人與股東之間的沖突,產(chǎn)生代理成本。近年來，信息披露問題也日益受到關(guān)注。國內(nèi)外學(xué)者從公司治理、外部監(jiān)管和治理環(huán)境等方面對信息披露質(zhì)量進(jìn)行了研究，雖然許多學(xué)者從公司治理角度分析影響信息披露質(zhì)量的因素，但是鮮有人將管理防御與信息披露質(zhì)量聯(lián)系起來進(jìn)行分析。 本研究從這些理論基礎(chǔ)出發(fā)，選取2008--2010年深市A股上市公司的2285個(gè)數(shù)據(jù)為樣本，運(yùn)用spss19.0統(tǒng)計(jì)軟件進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析，結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)：經(jīng)理管理防御水平逐年遞增，，表明管理者為了使自己的職位更穩(wěn)固，采取了防御措施。管理防御水平與信息披露質(zhì)量負(fù)相關(guān)，這表明管理防御水平越高，信息披露質(zhì)量越低。管理層持股比例與信息披露質(zhì)量正相關(guān)，說明公司允許管理者持有一定數(shù)量的股票可以緩解股東與管理者的利益沖突，提高信息披露質(zhì)量，進(jìn)一步說明了管理者持股作為一種激勵(lì)手段能發(fā)揮較好的作用。
[Abstract]:Since the establishment of two stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 1990's, listed companies in China have begun to disclose accounting information. The disclosure of accounting information quality of listed companies, to a large extent, affects the efficiency of the securities market. However, the quality problems existing in the disclosure of accounting information of listed companies in China are an important factor that hinders the development of the securities market in China at present. It has seriously affected the exertion of the function of the securities market in our country, resulting in the lack of investor confidence, and even the inefficient and unreasonable allocation of resources. In the case of asymmetric information and incomplete contracts, the defensive behavior of managers who cling to their positions and maximize their own utility is caused by the conflict of interests between self-interested managers and shareholders. As a hypothesis, management defense originates from the study of the relationship between insider ownership and firm performance. The hypothesis is that managers' shareholding in order to satisfy their personal interests and prevent them from being replaced will enable them to pursue non-corporate value maximization decisions. Because of the existence of management defense, managers may make decisions and behaviors inconsistent with shareholders' interests. Corporate insiders-represented by managers and major shareholders in control-have the motive and ability to conceal their deprivation. The main way for insiders to conceal their interests is to manage and manipulate information and its disclosure. Although there is a great difference from the motivation emphasized in the previous agency literature, the influence is as extensive as that between managers and shareholders, which will cause the conflict between managers and shareholders and lead to agency costs. In recent years, the problem of information disclosure has been paid more and more attention. Scholars at home and abroad have studied the quality of information disclosure from the aspects of corporate governance, external supervision and governance environment, although many scholars have analyzed the factors affecting the quality of information disclosure from the perspective of corporate governance. But few people analyze the relationship between defense management and the quality of information disclosure. On the basis of these theories, this study selects 2285 data of A-share listed companies in Shenzhen Stock Market from 2008 to 2010 as samples, and carries out empirical analysis by using spss19.0 statistical software. The results show that the level of management defense is increasing year by year. Shows that managers have taken defensive measures to make their positions more secure. The level of management defense is negatively related to the quality of information disclosure, which indicates that the higher the level of management defense, the lower the quality of information disclosure. The proportion of management holding shares is positively related to the quality of information disclosure, which indicates that allowing managers to hold a certain number of shares can alleviate the conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers, and improve the quality of information disclosure. Further explained that the manager holding as an incentive means can play a better role.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：新疆財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51;F224

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