本文選題：投資者法律保護(hù) + 企業(yè)價值　； 參考：《華南理工大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：投資者是資本市場發(fā)展的基石，公司治理的核心在于對投資者的保護(hù)。隨著中國資本市場發(fā)展到全流通時代，上市公司控股股東、高級管理人員、機(jī)構(gòu)投資者等依然擁有明顯的股份優(yōu)勢、資金優(yōu)勢和信息優(yōu)勢，將使中國資本市場的信息不對稱矛盾更加突出。資本市場是一個信息化程度高、資金度強(qiáng)、參與廣泛的市場，投資者受到良好的法律保護(hù)對于實現(xiàn)資本市場的穩(wěn)定持續(xù)發(fā)展至關(guān)重要。對于處于新興加轉(zhuǎn)軌期的中國資本市場來說，投資者法律保護(hù)特別是投資者法律保護(hù)與企業(yè)價值間的關(guān)系日漸成為一個重要的研究課題。 本文利用規(guī)范研究與實證研究相結(jié)合的方法，對中國投資者法律保護(hù)與企業(yè)價值的關(guān)系進(jìn)行了研究。在文獻(xiàn)綜述的基礎(chǔ)上，本文首先從理論分析入手，將“法與金融學(xué)”作為切入點，結(jié)合中國投資者法律保護(hù)的制度背景展開分析，利用五個相關(guān)理論對投資者法律保護(hù)的原因和意義進(jìn)行了深入探討。在實證研究方面，本文對于深滬兩市于1995年前上市的236家上市公司進(jìn)行了跟蹤考察，選取其16年間數(shù)據(jù)（1995-2010）為研究樣本，通過構(gòu)造投資者法律保護(hù)指標(biāo)，提出研究假設(shè)和模型，然后利用描述性統(tǒng)計和線性回歸分析的方法對假設(shè)進(jìn)行檢驗。 本文的研究結(jié)果表明，在信息不對稱的非完美市場中，由于“代理問題”及分散的中小股東“搭便車”動機(jī)的存在，使得中小股東難以約束和監(jiān)督控股股東的行為，，控股股東傾向于利用其信息優(yōu)勢地位來進(jìn)行“隧道行為”攫取中小股東的利益。法律保護(hù)可以有效抑制大股東利益掠奪的行為，有利于資本市場價格發(fā)現(xiàn)功能及資源優(yōu)化功能的發(fā)揮，投資者法律保護(hù)水平的提高有助于企業(yè)價值的提高，二者之間存在著顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系。
[Abstract]:Investors are the cornerstone of capital market development, the core of corporate governance lies in the protection of investors. With the development of China's capital market into an era of full circulation, the controlling shareholders, senior management personnel, and institutional investors of listed companies still have obvious advantages in shares, capital and information. Will make the information asymmetry contradiction of Chinese capital market more prominent. The capital market is a high degree of information, a strong degree of capital, participate in a wide range of markets, investors receive good legal protection for the realization of stable and sustainable development of the capital market is essential. For the Chinese capital market in the period of emerging and transition, the relationship between the legal protection of investors, especially the legal protection of investors and the value of enterprises has become an important research topic. In this paper, the relationship between the legal protection of Chinese investors and the value of enterprises is studied by means of the combination of normative research and empirical research. On the basis of literature review, this paper begins with the theoretical analysis, taking "Law and Finance" as the starting point, combining with the institutional background of the legal protection of Chinese investors. This paper discusses the reasons and significance of investor legal protection by using five relevant theories. In the aspect of empirical research, this paper makes a follow-up investigation on 236 listed companies listed in Shenzhen and Shanghai stock markets before 1995, selects the data of 16 years as the research sample, and puts forward the research hypotheses and models by constructing the index of investor legal protection. Then the hypothesis is tested by descriptive statistics and linear regression analysis. The results of this paper show that in the imperfect market with asymmetric information, it is difficult for minority shareholders to restrain and supervise the behavior of controlling shareholders because of the existence of "agency problem" and "hitchhiking" motivation of dispersed minority shareholders. Controlling shareholders tend to take advantage of their information advantage to "tunnel behavior" to seize the interests of minority shareholders. The legal protection can effectively restrain the behavior of the large shareholders' interest plundering, and is beneficial to the capital market price discovery function and the resource optimization function. The improvement of the investor's legal protection level is helpful to the enterprise value enhancement. There is a significant positive correlation between the two.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華南理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：D922.28;F832.51

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