本文選題：虛假信息 + 股價(jià)操縱�。� 參考：《浙江財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：自證券市場(chǎng)產(chǎn)生以來，虛假信息問題一直是各方關(guān)注和研究的重點(diǎn)。前人多從上市公司信息披露的角度，去研究如何防范其虛假信息披露的問題，并從法律法規(guī)和監(jiān)管制度上給出了建議措施，且取得了一定的成效。但對(duì)于上市公司之外，來自于證券市場(chǎng)上的信息，由于其來源的多樣性、背后動(dòng)機(jī)的復(fù)雜性、影響力度的不可控性、消息真?zhèn)蔚牟灰妆鎰e性，特別是市場(chǎng)上那些有實(shí)力的投資者，比如莊家、持股較多的股東等，基于自身利益需求，試圖操縱股價(jià)而編制和散播的虛假信息，難以做到更為有效的監(jiān)管和治理。 就中國(guó)現(xiàn)在的證券市場(chǎng)而言，虛假信息在一些主流報(bào)刊和網(wǎng)絡(luò)媒體上廣為傳播，而且虛假信息量、傳播速度、影響范圍和影響力度等都有增強(qiáng)的趨勢(shì)，特別是那些能對(duì)股票價(jià)格產(chǎn)生重大影響的新聞字眼，如“重組”、“資金注入”、“業(yè)績(jī)大增”、“借殼上市”等在虛假信息中大行其道。這些現(xiàn)象直接表明了當(dāng)今對(duì)虛假信息問題的監(jiān)管和治理還不到位，編制和發(fā)布虛假信息能讓背后的利益主體獲取超額收益，上市公司的澄清公告對(duì)這些虛假信息的澄清效果還有一定的不足，而其他投資者特別是處于信息劣勢(shì)和喜歡跟風(fēng)炒作的中小投資者深受其害。 因此，本文正是基于以上現(xiàn)實(shí)問題出發(fā)，，運(yùn)用多種方法去研究我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)上的虛假信息問題。首先，利用事件研究法對(duì)來自于市場(chǎng)本身的數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析，研究虛假信息對(duì)證券市場(chǎng)價(jià)格的影響，揭示虛假信息背后的股價(jià)操縱行為；其次，我們運(yùn)用現(xiàn)階段較為流行的行為金融學(xué)，分析虛假信息股價(jià)操縱行為的產(chǎn)生及作用機(jī)理，找出深層次的原因；再次，我們研究虛假信息的應(yīng)對(duì)機(jī)制，借用博弈論的模型，探討社會(huì)監(jiān)督機(jī)構(gòu)、政府監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)和上市公司澄清機(jī)制等應(yīng)對(duì)證券市場(chǎng)虛假信息的最佳策略；最后，我們得出結(jié)論并給出政策建議。
[Abstract]:Since the emergence of the securities market, the issue of false information has been the focus of attention and research. From the perspective of information disclosure of listed companies, predecessors have studied how to prevent their false information disclosure, and proposed measures from the laws, regulations and regulatory system, and achieved certain results. But for listed companies, information from the securities market, due to its diversity of sources, complexity of motive behind it, uncontrollability of influence intensity, difficulty in distinguishing true and false information, Especially those powerful investors in the market, such as makers, shareholders holding more shares, based on their own interests, trying to manipulate the stock price and disseminate false information, it is difficult to achieve more effective regulation and governance. As far as China's current securities market is concerned, false information is widely disseminated in some mainstream newspapers and online media, and the amount of false information, the speed of transmission, the scope of influence and the intensity of influence are all increasing. In particular, news words that can have a significant impact on stock prices, such as "restructuring", "capital injection", "performance gain", "backdoor listing", and so on, are popular in false information. These phenomena directly indicate that the supervision and management of the problem of false information are still not in place, and the compilation and publication of false information can make the stakeholders behind the false information obtain excess profits. The clarification announcement of listed companies still has some deficiencies in clarifying the false information, but other investors, especially the small and medium-sized investors who are in the information disadvantage and like to follow the trend of speculation, suffer greatly. Therefore, this paper is based on the above practical problems, using a variety of methods to study the problem of false information in China's securities market. Firstly, the empirical analysis of the data from the market itself is carried out by using the event research method to study the influence of false information on the stock market price and reveal the manipulation behavior of stock price behind the false information. We use behavioral finance, which is popular at the present stage, to analyze the production and mechanism of manipulation of stock price of false information, and find out the deep reasons. Thirdly, we study the coping mechanism of false information and borrow the model of game theory. This paper probes into the best strategies to deal with false information in the securities market such as social supervision agencies, government regulatory bodies and clarifying mechanisms of listed companies. Finally, we draw a conclusion and give some policy recommendations.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51

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