本文選題：行為金融 + 管理者過(guò)度自信��； 參考：《河北經(jīng)貿(mào)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：管理者過(guò)度自信是一種主觀情緒。適度的自信可以給公司帶來(lái)好處,但是過(guò)度的自信會(huì)影響公司的金融決策,尤其是管理者過(guò)度自信很有可能引起非理性融資行為,損害公司的長(zhǎng)期利益和價(jià)值。本文試圖研究,我國(guó)上市公司管理者過(guò)度自信對(duì)融資決策的影響及在我國(guó)制度安排和股權(quán)背景下,公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)管理者過(guò)度自信引起的非理性融資的影響。 本文首先梳理和評(píng)述了國(guó)內(nèi)外管理者過(guò)度自信對(duì)上市公司融資決策影響的相關(guān)研究,界定了管理者過(guò)度自信和融資的概念,從優(yōu)序融資和控制權(quán)角度分析我國(guó)上市公司存在管理者過(guò)度自信偏向于債務(wù)融資的可能。本文用盈余預(yù)告水平高于實(shí)際收益水平或是樂(lè)觀預(yù)測(cè)事后不一致作為管理者過(guò)度自信的衡量指標(biāo),選取2008～2010年滬深兩市A股主板披露第三季度盈余報(bào)告且報(bào)告類(lèi)型為預(yù)增的上市公司為研究對(duì)象,剔除金融行業(yè)、ST、*ST、資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率大于100%和數(shù)據(jù)不全的樣本,得到645家上市公司作為研究樣本,主要采取描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析和線性回歸分析等方法。本文將公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的兩個(gè)變量：第一大股東持股比例和董事會(huì)規(guī)模作為主要變量引入到模型中,分析了管理者過(guò)度自信公司的治理結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)融資決策的影響,以此來(lái)觀察我國(guó)公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)是否能抑制管理者過(guò)度自信引發(fā)的非理性融資。 本文研究結(jié)論表明,我國(guó)上市公司中確實(shí)存在管理者過(guò)度自信的現(xiàn)象,管理者過(guò)度自信與資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率正相關(guān),且管理者過(guò)度自信公司的第一大股東持股比例與資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率負(fù)相關(guān),董事會(huì)規(guī)模與資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率正相關(guān)。即管理者過(guò)度自信的公司中第一大股東持股比例越高,董事會(huì)規(guī)模越小,管理者越不傾向于債務(wù)融資�？梢�(jiàn),改善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)可以抑制管理者過(guò)度自信引發(fā)的高負(fù)債融資決策。
[Abstract]:Manager overconfidence is a subjective emotion. Moderate confidence can bring benefits to the company, but overconfidence will affect the financial decision of the company, especially the manager overconfidence may lead to irrational financing behavior, and damage the long-term interests and value of the company. This paper attempts to study the influence of overconfidence of managers on financing decisions and the influence of corporate governance structure on irrational financing caused by overconfidence of managers under the background of institutional arrangements and equity rights in China. Firstly, this paper reviews the research on the influence of manager overconfidence on the financing decision of listed companies at home and abroad, and defines the concepts of manager overconfidence and financing. This paper analyzes the possibility of overconfidence of managers in China's listed companies from the perspective of priority financing and control rights. In this paper, the level of earnings forecast is higher than the actual income level or the optimistic forecast is inconsistent afterwards as a measure of overconfidence of managers. In this paper, we select the listed companies whose earnings report of the third quarter of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares are disclosed by the main Board of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2008 to 2010 and the report type is a pre-increase. The sample with assets and liabilities ratio greater than 100% and incomplete data is excluded from the financial industry. A total of 645 listed companies were selected as research samples, mainly by descriptive statistical analysis and linear regression analysis. This paper introduces two variables of corporate governance structure: first, the proportion of shareholders holding shares and the size of board of directors as the main variables in the model, and analyzes the influence of corporate governance structure on financing decision. In order to observe whether the corporate governance structure of our country can restrain the irrational financing caused by manager overconfidence. The conclusion of this paper shows that there is a phenomenon of overconfidence of managers in Chinese listed companies, and there is a positive correlation between the overconfidence of managers and the ratio of assets and liabilities. Moreover, the proportion of the largest shareholder is negatively correlated with the asset-liability ratio, and the size of the board of directors is positively correlated with the asset-liability ratio. That is, the higher the holding ratio of the largest shareholder in the overconfident company, the smaller the board size, and the less inclined the manager is to debt financing. Therefore, the improvement of corporate governance structure can restrain the high debt financing decision caused by overconfidence of managers.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：河北經(jīng)貿(mào)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F272;F832.51;F224

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