本文選題：現(xiàn)金股利 + 代理理論　； 參考：《南京財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：上市公司的現(xiàn)金股利政策是一項(xiàng)十分重要的財(cái)務(wù)決策，合理的股利政策不僅可以為公司創(chuàng)造較好的口碑，激發(fā)投資者購(gòu)買公司股票的熱情，而且還能降低公司內(nèi)部的代理成本，提高公司價(jià)值，保證企業(yè)的健康發(fā)展。 本文首先回顧了國(guó)外和國(guó)內(nèi)學(xué)者對(duì)現(xiàn)金股利政策和公司治理關(guān)系的研究，在此基礎(chǔ)上得出本文的研究重點(diǎn)，即我國(guó)上市公司的現(xiàn)金股利政策治理作用問題。然后，本文立足我國(guó)實(shí)際，分析1992年以來，尤其是股權(quán)分置改革以后(2005年以后)現(xiàn)金股利政策的分配特點(diǎn)及變化趨勢(shì)。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，現(xiàn)金股利政策已成為我國(guó)上市公司分配股利的主要形式，但是不分配股利的上市公司家數(shù)依然不少。在定性分析之后，從理論上分析了代理理論在解釋現(xiàn)金股利政策方面的可行性，并比較了現(xiàn)金股利政策對(duì)國(guó)有和非國(guó)有兩類不同性質(zhì)上市公司治理作用的差異。 在定性分析和理論分析的基礎(chǔ)上，，本文運(yùn)用多元線性回歸模型對(duì)2005年-2009年的A股上市公司數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行非平衡面板的實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。結(jié)果表明：上市公司發(fā)放現(xiàn)金股利確實(shí)能夠降低其代理成本，提高公司價(jià)值，它具有明顯的公司治理作用�？傎Y產(chǎn)收益率(Roa)對(duì)公司價(jià)值有顯著的促進(jìn)作用。公司負(fù)債水平(Debt)對(duì)公司價(jià)值有負(fù)面影響，公司負(fù)債水平越高，公司價(jià)值越低；反之亦然。凈利潤(rùn)增長(zhǎng)率(Grow)對(duì)公司價(jià)值的影響為正。公司規(guī)模(Lnasset)與公司價(jià)值是反向關(guān)系，企業(yè)的規(guī)模越大發(fā)展空間越小，市場(chǎng)給予的溢價(jià)越低，企業(yè)規(guī)模越小公司發(fā)展空間越大，市場(chǎng)給予的溢價(jià)越高。國(guó)有股比例與公司價(jià)值呈現(xiàn)顯著的U型關(guān)系。 在此基礎(chǔ)上，本文將研究樣本分為國(guó)有控股上市公司和非國(guó)有控股上市公司再進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。結(jié)果表明：相對(duì)于非國(guó)有控股上市公司而言，現(xiàn)金股利政策對(duì)國(guó)有控股上市公司的治理作用更顯著。 最后，本文對(duì)我國(guó)上市公司的現(xiàn)金股利政策提出了一些具體的政策建議。
[Abstract]:The cash dividend policy of the listed company is a very important financial decision. Reasonable dividend policy can not only create a better reputation for the company, stimulate the enthusiasm of investors to buy the shares of the company, but also reduce the agency cost within the company. Improve the value of the company to ensure the healthy development of the enterprise. Firstly, this paper reviews the research on the relationship between cash dividend policy and corporate governance by foreign and domestic scholars. On this basis, the key point of this paper is the governance role of cash dividend policy of listed companies in China. Then, based on the reality of our country, this paper analyzes the distribution characteristics and trend of cash dividend policy since 1992, especially after the reform of split share structure (after 2005). It is found that cash dividend policy has become the main form of dividend distribution of listed companies in China, but the number of listed companies that do not distribute dividends is still quite large. After qualitative analysis, this paper theoretically analyzes the feasibility of agency theory in explaining cash dividend policy, and compares the difference of cash dividend policy between state-owned and non-state-owned listed companies. On the basis of qualitative analysis and theoretical analysis, this paper uses the multiple linear regression model to test the data of A-share listed companies from 2005 to 2009. The results show that the cash dividend can reduce the agency cost and improve the value of the company, and it has obvious corporate governance function. Total return on assets (Roa) has a significant impact on the value of the company. The higher the debt level, the lower the corporate value, and vice versa. The growth rate of net profit has a positive effect on the value of the company. The larger the enterprise size, the smaller the development space, the lower the market premium, and the bigger the development space is, the higher the market premium is. The proportion of state-owned shares and the value of the company show a significant U-shaped relationship. On this basis, the research samples are divided into state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed companies to conduct empirical tests. The results show that the cash dividend policy has a more significant effect on the governance of state-owned listed companies than that of non-state holding listed companies. Finally, this paper puts forward some specific policy suggestions on the cash dividend policy of listed companies in China.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51;F224

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