本文選題：定向增發(fā) + 資產(chǎn)注入��； 參考：《浙江工商大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：目前,定向增發(fā)已迅速超過(guò)配股和公開增發(fā)新股成為我國(guó)上市公司股權(quán)再融資市場(chǎng)上的主要手段,而資產(chǎn)注入類是定向增發(fā)中一個(gè)主要的類別。隨著全流通時(shí)代的到來(lái),大股東和流通股東的利益趨于一致,大股東的財(cái)富由其持有的股票價(jià)值決定,基于財(cái)富效應(yīng),大股東有通過(guò)注入資產(chǎn)使優(yōu)質(zhì)資產(chǎn)證券化,做大做強(qiáng)上市公司的動(dòng)力。實(shí)證研究表明,控股股東有通過(guò)定向增發(fā)新股向上市公司注入劣質(zhì)資產(chǎn)來(lái)進(jìn)行“掠奪”的現(xiàn)象,也可能存在控股股東虛增注入資產(chǎn)價(jià)值進(jìn)行利益輸送的現(xiàn)象。所以,資產(chǎn)注入類定向增發(fā)這一雙重關(guān)聯(lián)交易行為到底對(duì)如何影響上市公司績(jī)效是值得我們深入探討的問(wèn)題,本文的研究目的就是大股東實(shí)施這一行為到底是為了獲得控制權(quán)私有收益還是真心壯大上市公司。 本文采取規(guī)范研究和實(shí)證研究相結(jié)合的方法,以2006年1月1日至2009年8月31日滬深兩市A股已成功實(shí)施資產(chǎn)注入類定向增發(fā)的105家公司為樣本進(jìn)行研究。本文基于信息不對(duì)稱、代理理論、交易費(fèi)用與資產(chǎn)專用性、隧道挖掘與“支持”等理論,提出本文相應(yīng)的5個(gè)假設(shè)。再在理論分析及研究假設(shè)的基礎(chǔ)上,構(gòu)建多元回歸模型。然后,運(yùn)用EXCEL. SPSS、EVIEWS等軟件進(jìn)行數(shù)據(jù)處理,運(yùn)用事件研究法對(duì)樣本公司定向增發(fā)注入資產(chǎn)后兩年的時(shí)間窗里的市場(chǎng)表現(xiàn)(即股價(jià)效應(yīng))進(jìn)行研究,檢驗(yàn)這些公司在定向增發(fā)中注入的資產(chǎn)質(zhì)量是否優(yōu)質(zhì)以及資產(chǎn)的定價(jià)是否合理。本文是使用經(jīng)行業(yè)調(diào)整的持有超額收益(使用個(gè)股月收益率計(jì)算)作為市場(chǎng)績(jī)效的替代變量進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)的。同時(shí)考慮股權(quán)集中度變化、解決關(guān)聯(lián)交易程度等因素對(duì)市場(chǎng)績(jī)效的影響。考慮到結(jié)果的穩(wěn)健性,本文還擬采用CAR、凈資產(chǎn)收益率等指標(biāo)來(lái)替換長(zhǎng)期持有期超額收益率指標(biāo),對(duì)模型進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。最后,結(jié)合實(shí)證結(jié)果和我國(guó)的制度背景,從公司治理、證券監(jiān)管、信息披露等視角提出政策意見(jiàn)與建議。 實(shí)證結(jié)果表明：(1)增發(fā)后24個(gè)月的持有超額收益為正,說(shuō)明資產(chǎn)注入類定向增發(fā)在長(zhǎng)期表現(xiàn)出正的市場(chǎng)績(jī)效。(2)注入相關(guān)資產(chǎn)的定向增發(fā)持有超額收益顯著好于非相關(guān)資產(chǎn)。(3)持有超額收益率與增發(fā)對(duì)象是否僅包括大股東之間顯著正相關(guān),即增發(fā)對(duì)象僅包括大股東時(shí)的長(zhǎng)期市場(chǎng)績(jī)效要顯著優(yōu)于還包括其他方的定向增發(fā)。(4)持有超額收益率與最終控制人持股比例變化率顯著正相關(guān),說(shuō)明資產(chǎn)注入類定向增發(fā)中股權(quán)集中度的增加會(huì)提高持有超額收益率,提升公司股票價(jià)格,使市場(chǎng)出現(xiàn)一個(gè)良好的表現(xiàn)。(5)關(guān)聯(lián)交易的解決程度與資產(chǎn)注入類定向增發(fā)的長(zhǎng)期市場(chǎng)績(jī)效的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系并不明顯。
[Abstract]:At present, the main means of equity refinancing of listed companies in our country is to exceed the rights issue and public new issue quickly, and the asset injection is one of the main types in the directional issuance. With the arrival of the full circulation era, the interests of the major shareholders and the circulating shareholders tend to converge. The wealth of the majority shareholders is determined by the value of the shares they hold. Based on the wealth effect, the majority shareholders make the high-quality assets securitized through the injection of assets. Bigger and stronger listed company's motive force. The empirical study shows that the controlling shareholder has the phenomenon of "plunder" by injecting the inferior assets into the listed company through the directional new issue of new shares, and may also have the phenomenon of the controlling shareholder inflating the value of the assets to carry out the benefit transmission. Therefore, the dual related party transaction behavior of asset injection type directional issuance is a problem that we should discuss deeply how to affect the performance of listed companies. The purpose of this paper is whether the large shareholders implement this behavior in order to gain the private income of control or to strengthen the listed company. This paper adopts the method of combining normative research with empirical research, taking 105 companies which have successfully implemented the asset injection type directional issuance between January 1, 2006 and August 31, 2009, as a sample. Based on the theories of information asymmetry, agency theory, transaction cost and asset specificity, tunnel excavation and "support", this paper puts forward five hypotheses. On the basis of theoretical analysis and research hypothesis, a multivariate regression model is constructed. Then, use excel. SPSS EVIEWS and other software data processing, using the event research method to sample companies after the targeted issuance of assets into the time window of the market performance (that is, stock price effect). Test the quality and pricing of the assets they inject into the IPO. This paper uses the industry-adjusted holding excess return (using the monthly return on individual stocks) as an alternative variable to market performance for empirical testing. At the same time, we consider the change of equity concentration and resolve the influence of related transaction degree on market performance. Considering the robustness of the results, this paper also intends to use CAR, ROE and other indicators to replace the long-term excess return index, and make an empirical test of the model. Finally, based on the empirical results and the institutional background of our country, this paper puts forward some policy suggestions and suggestions from the perspectives of corporate governance, securities supervision and information disclosure. The empirical results show that the excess return held in 24 months after the increase is positive. It shows that the long-term positive market performance of the asset injection type of directional additional issuance. (2) the directional additional issuance of the relevant assets is significantly better than that of the non-related assets. 3) the excess return on holding and the object of issuance only include large stocks. There is a significant positive correlation between the east, That is to say, the long-term market performance is significantly better than that of other parties when only large shareholders are included.) there is a significant positive correlation between the excess return held and the change rate of the ultimate controlling person's shareholding ratio. It shows that the increase of equity concentration will increase the excess return on holding and increase the stock price of the company. There is no significant negative correlation between the degree of settlement of related party transactions and the long-term market performance of asset injection type directional placement.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江工商大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F224

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本文編號(hào)：1828043