本文選題：大股東 + 增減持��； 參考：《合肥工業(yè)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：股權(quán)分置改革后，中國(guó)股市進(jìn)入全流通時(shí)代，，許多大股東開始在二級(jí)市場(chǎng)頻繁增減持股票。而各類投資者掌握的企業(yè)價(jià)值信息不同，對(duì)公司經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)的影響不同，也導(dǎo)致在市場(chǎng)變動(dòng)過程中，大股東可以憑借其信息優(yōu)勢(shì)和控制權(quán)優(yōu)勢(shì)等在二級(jí)市場(chǎng)套利。而交易規(guī)則對(duì)大股東的約束過于寬松，也使得大股東在二級(jí)套利現(xiàn)象不可避免，侵害了中小股東的利益。更為嚴(yán)重的是，一旦大股東賣出股票后，這些股票就會(huì)被許多毫無(wú)經(jīng)營(yíng)管理經(jīng)驗(yàn)、只能“搭便車”的散戶投資者持有，這不僅影響到一般投資者的短期市場(chǎng)利益和投資積極性，還影響到了公司長(zhǎng)期成長(zhǎng)。因此對(duì)大股東市場(chǎng)行為進(jìn)行研究，既關(guān)系到對(duì)中小投資者利益的保障，又關(guān)系到公司長(zhǎng)期成長(zhǎng)，這將成為公司治理研究的一個(gè)重要方向。 本文以2006年至2011年發(fā)生大股東增減持的上市公司為樣本，分別從動(dòng)態(tài)的增減持行為和靜態(tài)的持股比例方面考察大股東對(duì)公司成長(zhǎng)性的影響，并結(jié)合相關(guān)理論對(duì)其解釋。研究框架包括五部分：第一部分介紹了選題的背景、研究意義和研究目的，以及文章的主要結(jié)構(gòu)，并指出了研究的方法和創(chuàng)新之處。第二部分介紹了國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)者對(duì)大股東增減持股份和持股比例對(duì)成長(zhǎng)性影響的相關(guān)研究。第三部分主要討論了大股東持股比例以及增減持股份對(duì)公司成長(zhǎng)性影響的內(nèi)在機(jī)理，重點(diǎn)對(duì)公司治理理論、委托代理理論以及影響成長(zhǎng)性的因素進(jìn)行了分析，為后面的研究打下理論基礎(chǔ)。第四部分實(shí)證研究了大股東增減持以及持股比例對(duì)成長(zhǎng)性的影響，結(jié)論顯示大股東減持不利于公司成長(zhǎng)性提高，適當(dāng)?shù)墓蓹?quán)制衡有利于提升公司成長(zhǎng)性，國(guó)有股比例越高的公司成長(zhǎng)性越差。第五部分結(jié)合我國(guó)實(shí)際情況和實(shí)證研究結(jié)論，給出了有助于提升公司成長(zhǎng)性并且減少大股東利益侵害問題的對(duì)策建議。
[Abstract]:After the reform of split share structure, the Chinese stock market entered the era of full circulation, and many major shareholders began to increase and decrease their holdings frequently in the secondary market. Different kinds of investors hold different information of enterprise value, which has different influence on the company's operating performance, which also leads to arbitrage of large shareholders in the secondary market by virtue of their advantages of information and control in the course of market change. However, the restrictions of trading rules on large shareholders are too loose, which makes the phenomenon of arbitrage of large shareholders in the second level inevitable and infringes the interests of small and medium shareholders. What is more serious is that once the major shareholders have sold the shares, these stocks will be held by many retail investors who have no business management experience and can only "hitchhike". This will not only affect the short-term market interests and investment enthusiasm of retail investors. It also affects the company's long-term growth. Therefore, the research on the market behavior of large shareholders is not only related to the protection of the interests of small and medium-sized investors, but also to the long-term growth of the company, which will become an important direction of corporate governance research. Based on the sample of listed companies with large shareholders increasing or decreasing their holdings from 2006 to 2011, this paper examines the influence of large shareholders on the growth of the company from dynamic increase and decrease behavior and static shareholding ratio, and explains it with relevant theories. The research framework consists of five parts: the first part introduces the background, significance and purpose of the research, as well as the main structure of the article, and points out the research methods and innovations. The second part introduces the domestic and foreign scholars' research on the influence of the increase and decrease of the majority shareholder's share and the proportion of the shareholding on the growth. The third part mainly discusses the internal mechanism of the influence of the proportion of large shareholders' shareholding and the increase or decrease of holding shares on the growth of the company, focusing on the theory of corporate governance, the principal-agent theory and the factors affecting the growth. Lay a theoretical foundation for the following research. The fourth part empirically studies the influence of the increase and decrease of large shareholders' holding and the proportion of stock holding on the growth. The conclusion shows that the reduction of large shareholders' holding is not conducive to the improvement of the growth of the company, and the proper equity balance is conducive to the promotion of the growth of the company. The higher the proportion of state-owned shares, the worse the growth. The fifth part combines the actual situation of our country and the empirical research conclusion, has given the countermeasure suggestion which helps to promote the company growth and reduces the big shareholder interest encroachment.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：合肥工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51

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