發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-04-17 11:01

  本文選題：公司治理結(jié)構(gòu) + 盈余管理��； 參考：《西安建筑科技大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來隨著我國(guó)市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)及證券市場(chǎng)的不斷發(fā)展，，上市公司往往會(huì)出于對(duì)自身利益的考慮而進(jìn)行一定程度的盈余管理。這一問題成為我國(guó)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)術(shù)界關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn)之一。在兩權(quán)分離的現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度下，股東和管理者之間不免會(huì)產(chǎn)生利益沖突，而公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)正是解決這一利益沖突的機(jī)制。由于我國(guó)公司治理的結(jié)構(gòu)還不夠完善，給盈余管理的產(chǎn)生創(chuàng)造了條件。那么，公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)中的各要素究竟對(duì)盈余管理產(chǎn)生了怎樣的影響，對(duì)于這個(gè)問題的研究也就具有十分重要的意義。 本文首先對(duì)近期國(guó)內(nèi)外有關(guān)公司治理和盈余管理研究的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)做了梳理和總結(jié)，并且通過對(duì)公司治理及盈余管理相關(guān)理論的闡述，分析了我國(guó)上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)與盈余管理的特征和關(guān)系。其次，以2008~2010年A股制造業(yè)類上市公司為樣本，在擴(kuò)展瓊斯模型的基礎(chǔ)上引入主營(yíng)業(yè)務(wù)成本這一變量估算出盈余管理程度，通過比較發(fā)現(xiàn)此模型更具解釋性。最后對(duì)公司治理各變量和盈余管理相關(guān)性進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析。將盈余管理程度作為因變量，從股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、董事會(huì)特征、監(jiān)事會(huì)特征和管理層特征四個(gè)方面選擇公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的重要指標(biāo)作為自變量，同時(shí)將公司規(guī)模和資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率作為控制變量，建立多元回歸模型。通過描述統(tǒng)計(jì)分析和回歸分析得出結(jié)論：獨(dú)立董事比例與盈余管理負(fù)相關(guān)；兩職合一與盈余管理正相關(guān)；第一大股東持股比例與盈余管理正相關(guān)；第二至第五大股東占第一大股東比例與盈余管理負(fù)相關(guān)；監(jiān)事會(huì)開會(huì)次數(shù)與盈余管理相關(guān)性不顯著；高管持股比例與盈余管理的相關(guān)性不顯著；公司規(guī)模與盈余管理程度負(fù)相關(guān)；資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率與盈余管理程度正相關(guān)。通過對(duì)2008~2010的盈余管理相關(guān)性研究比較發(fā)現(xiàn)：2010年相比較與2008和2009年，第一大股東持股比例，獨(dú)立董事比例和高管持股比例三方面與盈余管理的關(guān)系更為顯著，說明隨著我國(guó)上市公司制度的逐步完善，公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)變量對(duì)盈余管理發(fā)揮了更好的抑制作用。 根據(jù)實(shí)證性分析得出的結(jié)論，本文對(duì)上市公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)和外部治理結(jié)構(gòu)的完善提出了針對(duì)性的建議，以進(jìn)一步完善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)，減少盈余管理行為的產(chǎn)生，促進(jìn)資本市場(chǎng)的健康發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the continuous development of market economy and securities market in China, listed companies tend to carry out earnings management to a certain extent out of the consideration of their own interests.This problem has become one of the focal points of Chinese accounting academia.Under the modern enterprise system with the separation of two rights, the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers is inevitable, and the corporate governance structure is the mechanism to resolve this conflict of interest.As the structure of corporate governance in China is not perfect enough, it creates conditions for the emergence of earnings management.So, it is of great significance to study how the factors of corporate governance influence earnings management.At first, this paper summarizes the relevant literatures about corporate governance and earnings management at home and abroad, and expounds the related theories of corporate governance and earnings management.This paper analyzes the characteristics and relationship between the governance structure and earnings management of listed companies in China.Secondly, based on the sample of A share manufacturing listed companies from 2008 to 2010, this paper introduces the main business cost variable to estimate the earnings management degree based on the extended Jones model, and finds that the model is more explanatory.Finally, the correlation between corporate governance variables and earnings management is analyzed empirically.The degree of earnings management is taken as dependent variable, and the important indexes of corporate governance structure are selected as independent variables from four aspects: ownership structure, board characteristics, supervisory board characteristics and management characteristics.At the same time, the multivariate regression model is established by taking the company size and the ratio of assets and liabilities as control variables.Through descriptive statistical analysis and regression analysis, it is concluded that the proportion of independent directors is negatively correlated with earnings management, the integration of two positions is positively related to earnings management, the proportion of shareholding by the first largest shareholder is positively correlated with earnings management, and the proportion of independent directors is negatively correlated with earnings management.The proportion of the second to fifth largest shareholders is negatively correlated with earnings management; the frequency of board of supervisors is not significantly correlated with earnings management; the proportion of executive ownership has no significant correlation with earnings management;The size of the company is negatively correlated with the degree of earnings management, and the ratio of assets to liabilities is positively correlated with the degree of earnings management.Through the comparative study of earnings management in 2008 and 2010, it is found that compared with 2008 and 2009, the proportion of the largest shareholder, the proportion of independent director and the proportion of senior management are more significantly related to earnings management in 2010 than in 2008 and 2009.It shows that with the gradual improvement of the system of listed companies in China, the variables of corporate governance structure play a better role in restraining earnings management.According to the conclusion of the empirical analysis, this paper puts forward some specific suggestions on the improvement of the internal and external governance structure of listed companies in order to further improve the corporate governance structure and reduce the occurrence of earnings management behavior.To promote the healthy development of the capital market.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西安建筑科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51;F224

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