本文選題：創(chuàng)業(yè)板 + 高管�。� 參考：《華東政法大學》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：依據(jù)W ind資訊的數(shù)據(jù)統(tǒng)計，從2010年11月1日我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的第一批限售股份解禁的一年多來，創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司高管辭職并減持個人所持該上市公司股票的行為頻繁，其目的就是希望當限售股解禁期到來時能合規(guī)出售其手中所持有的股份，從而變現(xiàn)獲利。高管辭職、股東出售股票，這種現(xiàn)象在證券市場看起來再正常不過了，也是符合法律自由的，但是深入分析這些急于套現(xiàn)的高管的動機，，就可以看出他們?yōu)樘赚F(xiàn)而辭職的行為其實是違背道德正義的，該現(xiàn)象背后也隱藏著很多制度性的法律缺漏。 本文試圖通過客觀分析創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司高管過度持股減持現(xiàn)象現(xiàn)有的法律規(guī)制情況及亟需完善的各方面，再有針對性地介紹境外創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場先進的法律制度，緊密結(jié)合現(xiàn)實問題，提出一個完善創(chuàng)業(yè)板相關(guān)法律制度的建議，以期防范高管大規(guī)模持股減持現(xiàn)象的再次發(fā)生，從而建立一個和諧穩(wěn)定共贏的創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場。 本文主要分為三章，第一章主要通過介紹創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司高管持股減持的法律現(xiàn)狀，分析該現(xiàn)象的巨大危害，從而進一步挖掘該現(xiàn)象植根的制度性土壤，這些問題主要包括發(fā)行審核制度存在漏洞、股票發(fā)行定價的超高募現(xiàn)象、監(jiān)管制度不完善、上市公司內(nèi)部結(jié)構(gòu)混亂以及缺乏可訴性法律責任追究機制幾個方面。 第二章以第一章為基礎(chǔ)，針對創(chuàng)業(yè)板法律制度現(xiàn)存的主要問題，有針對性的介紹境外創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場先進發(fā)行審核、監(jiān)管、上市公司內(nèi)部治理以及法律責任追究制度，比如發(fā)行注冊制，英國AIM市場的“終身”保薦人制度、荷蘭及美國的發(fā)行定價制度、德國以及我國臺灣地區(qū)先進的集體訴訟制度等，依據(jù)我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板實際情況，比照境外相關(guān)先進制度，為我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板法律制度的完善提供借鑒。 第三章結(jié)合前兩章的分析，對如何完善我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板法律制度以規(guī)制高管持股減持現(xiàn)象進行具體法律設(shè)想。借鑒第二章介紹的境外創(chuàng)業(yè)板先進制度和經(jīng)驗聯(lián)系我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板實際，提出以發(fā)行審核、綜合監(jiān)管、上市公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)以及法律責任追究等相關(guān)法律制度為主要著手點進行完善，并提出相應(yīng)法律設(shè)想，試圖從根源上杜絕高管大規(guī)模持股減持現(xiàn)象得以生存的可能性，實現(xiàn)維護投資者利益、著眼于創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的長遠發(fā)展以及保障創(chuàng)業(yè)板健康有序發(fā)展的目的。
[Abstract]:According to the statistics of W ind information, since November 1, 2010, the first batch of restricted shares of gem listed companies in our country have been lifted for more than a year, the executives of gem listed companies resign and reduce their individual holdings of the listed companies' shares frequently.The aim is to cash in on the release of restricted shares by selling their holdings in compliance.The resignation of senior executives and the sale of shares by shareholders seem perfectly normal in the stock market and are also in line with the freedom of law, but an in-depth analysis of the motivations of these executives eager to cash out,It can be seen that their resignation for cash is actually against moral justice, and there are many institutional legal gaps behind this phenomenon.This paper attempts to objectively analyze the existing legal regulations on the phenomenon of overholding and reduction of senior executives in gem listed companies and the various aspects that need to be improved, and then introduce the advanced legal system of the overseas gem market.Combining with the practical problems, this paper puts forward a suggestion to perfect the relevant legal system of gem, in order to prevent the phenomenon of large-scale stock holding reduction of senior executives from happening again, and thus to establish a harmonious and stable gem market with win-win situation.This paper is divided into three chapters. The first chapter analyzes the great harm of the phenomenon by introducing the current legal situation of the listed companies on the gem, and further excavates the institutional soil of the phenomenon.These problems mainly include the loopholes in the system of issuing and auditing, the phenomenon of super-high price raising, the imperfect supervision system, the confusion of the internal structure of listed companies and the lack of litigable legal liability investigation mechanism.The second chapter is based on the first chapter. In view of the main problems existing in the gem legal system, the second chapter introduces the overseas gem market advanced issue audit, supervision, internal governance of listed companies and legal liability investigation system.For example, the issue registration system, the "lifelong" sponsor system in the British AIM market, the issue pricing system in the Netherlands and the United States, the advanced class-action litigation system in Germany and Taiwan, and so on, are based on the actual situation of China's gem.Comparing with overseas advanced system, it can provide reference for the perfection of China's gem legal system.The third chapter combined with the analysis of the first two chapters, how to improve the gem legal system to regulate the phenomenon of executive ownership reduction carried out a specific legal assumption.Referring to the advanced system and experience of the overseas gem introduced in the second chapter, in connection with the reality of the gem in our country, it is proposed to issue the gem for examination and comprehensive supervision.The internal governance structure of listed companies and legal liability investigation and other related legal systems are the main starting point to improve, and put forward the corresponding legal assumptions, trying to prevent the phenomenon of large-scale stock holding reduction from the root of the possibility of survival.To protect the interests of investors, to focus on the long-term development of gem listed companies and to ensure the healthy and orderly development of gem.
【學位授予單位】：華東政法大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：D922.287;F832.51

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