發(fā)布時間：2018-04-11 04:04

  本文選題：高管薪酬差距 + 晉升激勵　； 參考：《復旦大學》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：委托-代理問題一直是公司治理的一項重要課題,而圍繞這一問題,企業(yè)家和學術界也設計了各種各樣的管理層激勵措施。而在管理層內部實行差別化的薪酬體系,在股權激勵制度尚不健全的內地公司中,被認為是解決委托-代理問題的一種可行的方案。上市公司高層管理人員之間的薪酬差距該如何設定也成為普遍關注的問題。隨著中國股票市場的不斷成長和發(fā)展,已有不少學者從錦標賽理論和行為理論兩個不同的角度,對中國上市公司高管薪酬差距與公司績效之間的關系進行了深入研究,并通過實證分析驗證上市公司高管薪酬差距對績效的影響。上市公司高管薪酬差距是否能推動公司業(yè)績增長已經成為衡量高管薪酬差距合理性的標準,也成為公司制定薪酬政策的重要參考。然而,業(yè)績和收益往往與風險相伴,在考慮業(yè)績增長維度的同時,公司風險將怎么變化?在經濟環(huán)境惡化時關注這些風險顯得尤為重要。隨著薪酬差距的增加,公司高管人員在不斷增強的激勵之下很可能采取更加激進的公司政策和決策,提升自身業(yè)績以期獲得升職加薪,而這可能給公司帶來更大的風險。另外,在高的薪酬差距也可能導致高管團隊成員之間的不公平感增加,破壞公司高管團隊之間的合作,也將增加公司經營的風險。本文將著重研究上市公司高管薪酬差距對公司風險的影響,從公司風險的角度為上市公司高管薪酬設定提供參考。 本文選取了2002-2010年滬深兩市上市公司作為研究樣本,運用面板數(shù)據(jù)分析的方法,研究了上市公司高管薪酬差距對公司經營業(yè)績波動性及股價波動性的相關關系。實證結果表明,上市公司高管薪酬差距與公司經營業(yè)績波動性及股價波動性之間存在顯著的正向相關關系,公司高管薪酬越大,公司風險也隨之增加。同時,本文對國有企業(yè)與非國有企業(yè)高管薪酬差距對公司風險影響的差異性進行了檢驗,在控制公司特征變量之后,發(fā)現(xiàn)企業(yè)實際控制人性質對公司風險具有影響,國有企業(yè)風險水平要低于非國有企業(yè)。同時,國有企業(yè)高管薪酬差距對公司風險的影響程度要高于非國有企業(yè)。在上市公司薪酬設計過程中,公司應結合業(yè)績維度和風險維度做出綜合考量,以確定合理的高管薪酬差距。
[Abstract]:The principal-agent problem has always been an important subject of corporate governance, and around this problem, entrepreneurs and academia have also designed a variety of management incentives.But the implementation of differential compensation system within the management, in the stock incentive system is not perfect in the mainland companies, is considered to be a feasible solution to the principal-agent problem.How to set the pay gap between the top management of listed companies has become a common concern.With the continuous growth and development of China's stock market, many scholars have conducted in-depth research on the relationship between executive compensation gap and corporate performance of listed companies in China from two different angles: tournament theory and behavior theory.And through empirical analysis to verify the impact of executive pay gap on performance of listed companies.Whether the executive pay gap of listed companies can promote the growth of corporate performance has become the standard to measure the rationality of executive pay gap and an important reference for companies to formulate compensation policies.However, performance and earnings are often accompanied by risk. How will the risk change when considering the dimension of performance growth?It is particularly important to pay attention to these risks when the economic environment deteriorates.As the pay gap increases, executives are likely to take more aggressive corporate policies and decisions, with growing incentives, to improve their performance in the hope of getting a raise, which could put the company at greater risk.In addition, the high pay gap may lead to an increase in the sense of inequality among members of the executive team, undermining the cooperation between the executive team, will also increase the risk of operating the company.This paper will focus on the listed companies pay gap on corporate risk impact, from the perspective of corporate risk for listed companies to provide a reference for executive compensation setting.This paper selects the listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2002 to 2010 as the research samples, using panel data analysis method to study the relationship between executive compensation gap and operating performance volatility and stock price volatility of listed companies.The empirical results show that there is a significant positive correlation between the executive compensation gap and the volatility of operating performance and stock price of listed companies, and the higher the executive compensation, the higher the corporate risk.At the same time, this paper tests the difference of executive compensation gap between state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises on corporate risk. After controlling the characteristic variables of the company, it is found that the nature of the actual controller has an impact on corporate risk.The risk level of state-owned enterprises is lower than that of non-state-owned enterprises.At the same time, the effect of executive compensation gap on corporate risk is higher than that of non-state-owned enterprises.In the process of salary design of listed companies, the company should make a comprehensive consideration combining the performance dimension and the risk dimension to determine the reasonable executive pay gap.
【學位授予單位】：復旦大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F272.92;F832.51;F224

【參考文獻】

相關期刊論文 前10條

1 周蓓蓓;曹建安;段興民;;上市公司高管相對薪酬差距與公司績效相關性研究[J];商業(yè)研究;2009年02期

2 肖繼輝,彭文平;上市公司總經理報酬業(yè)績敏感性研究[J];財經研究;2004年12期

3 黃再勝;王玉;;公平偏好、薪酬管制與國企高管激勵——一種基于行為合約理論的分析[J];財經研究;2009年01期

4 薛求知;韓冰潔;;高級經理人激勵與上市公司經營業(yè)績關聯(lián)性實證檢驗[J];財貿研究;2007年04期

5 張正堂;李欣;;高層管理團隊核心成員薪酬差距與企業(yè)績效的關系[J];經濟管理;2007年02期

6 魏剛;高級管理層激勵與上市公司經營績效[J];經濟研究;2000年03期

7 林浚清 ,黃祖輝 ,孫永祥;高管團隊內薪酬差距、公司績效和治理結構[J];經濟研究;2003年04期

8 諶新民,劉善敏;上市公司經營者報酬結構性差異的實證研究[J];經濟研究;2003年08期

9 王浩;黃小玲;;上市公司高管團隊長期薪酬差距與公司績效關系研究[J];科技進步與對策;2010年13期

10 李增泉;激勵機制與企業(yè)績效——一項基于上市公司的實證研究[J];會計研究;2000年01期

，

本文編號：1734332