本文選題：交叉持股　切入點(diǎn)：公司治理　出處：《西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：在國外資本市場中,企業(yè)為了進(jìn)行資本運(yùn)作和擴(kuò)張,往往采用交叉持股的手段。在我國,交叉持股的發(fā)展歷史并不長,但速度卻非常快。隨著我國經(jīng)濟(jì)的飛速發(fā)展,交叉持股在未來很長一段時(shí)間內(nèi)將會(huì)越來越廣泛地得到應(yīng)用。發(fā)達(dá)國家的歷史經(jīng)驗(yàn)告訴我們,交叉持股在給企業(yè)帶來莫大好處的同時(shí),也帶來了一些弊端,如控制權(quán)扭曲、損害股東及債權(quán)人權(quán)益等。因此,應(yīng)當(dāng)對交叉持股進(jìn)行有效地引導(dǎo)規(guī)制,否則不但無法充分發(fā)揮其積極的作用,還會(huì)對資本市場帶來弊端,進(jìn)而對社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)的穩(wěn)定發(fā)展產(chǎn)生影響。而由于交叉持股在我國的發(fā)展歷史并不長,因此對交叉持股的研究還不夠成熟,從目前的研究文獻(xiàn)來看,對交叉持股的理論綜述較多,但實(shí)證上的研究范圍不及國外的廣,深度也不及國外的高。 本文回顧了國內(nèi)外交叉持股現(xiàn)象的有關(guān)理論,總結(jié)了相關(guān)的實(shí)證研究,根據(jù)我國上市公司所處的制度環(huán)境,從理論上對上市公司交叉持股與公司治理的關(guān)系進(jìn)行了闡述,并從實(shí)證上進(jìn)行了全面、系統(tǒng)的分析,希望能夠?qū)ξ覈鲜泄窘徊娉止蓪局卫淼挠绊懹幸粋�(gè)全面的認(rèn)識。本文的具體研究內(nèi)容如下： 首先,文章的開篇是導(dǎo)論。這一部分主要介紹本文的研究目的及意義,研究內(nèi)容,本文所使用的研究方法以及本文的亮點(diǎn)。 在導(dǎo)論的基礎(chǔ)上,本文對交叉持股進(jìn)行了簡單的概括,即文章的第二章,主要包括交叉持股的涵義和分類、起源和發(fā)展、利弊分析以及我國上市公司交叉持股的現(xiàn)狀。同時(shí),在該部分對交叉持股的不同解釋進(jìn)行了總結(jié),并對本文所研究的交叉持股的范圍進(jìn)行了界定。 在文章的第三章,本文對有關(guān)交叉持股方面的現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行了綜述。國外學(xué)術(shù)界對交叉持股的研究己經(jīng)進(jìn)入全面展開的階段,尤其在日本公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)中交叉持股現(xiàn)象理論及實(shí)證研究方面取得了豐富的成果。而國內(nèi)的研究則偏重于法律法規(guī)上的完善和補(bǔ)充,以及從會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)角度看交叉持股對上市公司財(cái)務(wù)記賬方面的影響,近年來也有少數(shù)的實(shí)證分析。因此,本章主要對國外的研究進(jìn)行綜述,并對國內(nèi)的研究進(jìn)行了總結(jié)。 第四章是理論分析與假設(shè)的提出。本章是全文的理論依據(jù),主要闡述了與本文研究內(nèi)容及方法相關(guān)的理論知識,分為三部分：首先,對公司治理理論以及交叉持股對公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的影響進(jìn)行了論述,主要指交叉持股對公司治理的影響,包括交叉持股帶來的少數(shù)股權(quán)控制問題(Controlling-minority structure,簡稱CMS)1和內(nèi)部人控制問題,并得出,交叉持股可以使企業(yè)以較少的資金來控制更多的股份,從而有利于資本運(yùn)作；其次,闡述了信息不對稱理論,并分析了交叉持股對信息不對稱程度的影響,包括對持股集團(tuán)內(nèi)部和外部兩個(gè)角度,并進(jìn)一步企業(yè)的融資決策產(chǎn)生一定的影響；最后,對代理理論以及交叉持股對代理成本的影響進(jìn)行分析,包括交叉持股對股東與債權(quán)人之間的代理問題的影響和對股東與管理層之間的代理問題的影響,并得出交叉持股使得代理成本增加的結(jié)論。在理論分析的基礎(chǔ)上,該部分分別針對交叉持股在這三方面的影響提出了三個(gè)重要的假設(shè)。 在理論分析的基礎(chǔ)上,文章的第五部分進(jìn)行了實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)：第一,提出研究假設(shè)；第二,樣本劃分和數(shù)據(jù)的選取,根據(jù)我國上市公司交叉持股比例普遍較低的特殊情況,將樣本公司分為兩個(gè)子樣本,交叉持股比例在10%以上的為高持股比例樣本,10%以下的為低持股比例樣本,以此完善模型；第三,研究設(shè)計(jì),變量的定義、預(yù)期符號及假設(shè)以及回歸模型的建立,明確指出采用變量及回歸模型的原因；第四,模型運(yùn)行結(jié)果的分析,主要包括描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)、相關(guān)性分析以及模型的運(yùn)行結(jié)果分析,根據(jù)運(yùn)行結(jié)果分析各個(gè)變量的顯著性及模型的擬合優(yōu)度,從數(shù)理角度對運(yùn)行結(jié)果是否符合研究假設(shè)給予評價(jià),并解釋其符合或者不符合假設(shè)的原因。 基于本文的理論探討和實(shí)證分析,對交叉持股對公司治理的影響有以下幾點(diǎn)總結(jié)： (1)上市公司交叉持股,對成員企業(yè)之間的公司治理產(chǎn)生顯著的影響。交叉持股有進(jìn)一步加大控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)2的分離程度的作用,使得“CMS”問題和內(nèi)部人控制問題更加嚴(yán)重,在此情況下,交叉持股的公司可以用較少的資本來控制更多的股份,從而達(dá)到“四兩撥千斤”的效果,有利于進(jìn)行資本運(yùn)作。 (2)上市公司交叉持股,對信啟、不對稱程度并沒有顯著的影響。交叉持股促使參與持股的企業(yè)形成企業(yè)聯(lián)盟,不易于出售股票,外部企業(yè)的信息不對稱程度增加,外部融資成本增加,企業(yè)傾向于股權(quán)投資。同時(shí),交叉持股可能會(huì)加重“CMS”問題,這可能緩解外部企業(yè)的信息不對稱程度,外部股權(quán)流動(dòng)性較強(qiáng),外部融資成本降低,企業(yè)優(yōu)先選擇債務(wù)融資。因此,交叉持股對集團(tuán)外部的信息不對稱程度有一定的影響,但由于的本文研究方法及數(shù)據(jù)有限,其綜合表現(xiàn)還無法確定。 (3)上市公司交叉持股比例較低時(shí)對代理成本的影響并不顯著,而在交叉持股比例較高時(shí),企業(yè)經(jīng)理層相互之間的監(jiān)督作用被弱化,企業(yè)內(nèi)外部的治理機(jī)制不能有效地發(fā)揮其效用,進(jìn)而代理問題變得更加嚴(yán)重,代理成本增加。 本文是一篇關(guān)于上市公司交叉持股對公司治理的影響的實(shí)證研究,在現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)的基礎(chǔ)上,選擇了幾個(gè)比較有新意的角度進(jìn)行了研究,主要有以下幾點(diǎn)： (1)本文對交叉持股的研究角度比較新穎。關(guān)于交叉持股,無論是理論還是實(shí)證,國內(nèi)外學(xué)者都進(jìn)行了廣泛且大量的研究,但關(guān)于交叉持股對公司治理等方面的影響,國外研究成果較多,而國內(nèi)研究很少。本文從公司治理、信息不對稱以及代理理論出發(fā),針對我國上市公司交叉持股的現(xiàn)狀,采用理論與實(shí)證研究相結(jié)合的方法,系統(tǒng)地研究了上市公司交叉持股對公司治理的影響。 (2)研究樣本的劃分方法比較新穎。對于交叉持股的實(shí)證研究,當(dāng)前的學(xué)者采用最多的就是選擇配對樣本進(jìn)行對比檢驗(yàn),但這種選擇樣本的方法得到的實(shí)證結(jié)果僅僅反映了交叉持股公司與非交叉持股公司在所研究問題上的表現(xiàn)是否有區(qū)別,不能反映交叉持股比例高低對所研究問題的影響程度。因此,本文在全樣本的基礎(chǔ)上,根據(jù)我國上市公司交叉持股的持股比例普遍較低(絕大部分在10%以下)的特點(diǎn),對全樣本進(jìn)行了劃分,將持股比例在10%以上的公司劃分為高持股比例樣本,否則為低持股比例樣本。 但本文的研究也存在著局限性： (1)研究的樣本空間較小。本文對上市公司加以條件限制進(jìn)行篩選之后,最終只有139家上市公司滿足限制條件,盡管文章研究了三年的數(shù)據(jù),但有些重要指標(biāo)的回歸結(jié)果仍然不太理想。另外,本文的部分?jǐn)?shù)據(jù)完全靠手工收集,在收集的過程中可能會(huì)有遺漏,導(dǎo)致回歸結(jié)果出現(xiàn)一定的偏差。 (2)回歸模型的設(shè)計(jì)相對單一。本文在實(shí)證中運(yùn)用了SPSS統(tǒng)計(jì)軟件,對模型的樣本數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行了普通最小二乘法(OLS)回歸分析,而針對研究假設(shè)所設(shè)計(jì)的模型也是簡單的線性回歸模型,并沒有考慮到其他相關(guān)的模型,研究結(jié)果受到了一定的限制。 (3)研究方法相對較少。本文僅僅采用了普通最小二乘法(OLS)對模型的樣本數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行了簡單的回歸,盡管對樣本進(jìn)行了分類,分別討論了兩種不同情況下交叉持股對公司治理的影響,但研究方法的單一使得所得出的研究結(jié)果的準(zhǔn)確性受到一定的影響。 基于文章分析探討以及所得出的結(jié)論,我國上市公司在進(jìn)行交叉持股的時(shí)候,應(yīng)該合理利用其優(yōu)勢,避免其弊端,同時(shí),政府應(yīng)對上市公司交叉持股應(yīng)該給予足夠的重視與合理的監(jiān)督,正確的引導(dǎo)其健康發(fā)展,避免其不利影響：對于上市公司,在進(jìn)行交叉持股的時(shí)候應(yīng)該嚴(yán)格控制持股比例；對于監(jiān)管部門,應(yīng)當(dāng)完善信息披露制度,規(guī)定上市公司交叉持股的信啟、應(yīng)當(dāng)進(jìn)行披露。
[Abstract]:In the overseas capital market, enterprises in the capital operation and expansion, often using cross shareholding means. In China, the history of cross shareholding is not long, but the speed is very fast. With the rapid development of China's economy, cross shareholding for a long period of time will be applied more and more widely in the future. The historical experience of the developed countries tells us that cross shareholdings in great benefits to enterprises, it also brings some drawbacks, such as control of distortion, damage the rights and interests of shareholders and creditors. Therefore, cross shareholding should be effectively guide the regulation, otherwise not only can not fully play its positive role, but also bring disadvantages on the capital market, and the stability of social and economic development impact. Because cross shareholding in our country's history is not long, so the research on cross shareholding is not mature enough, from the current According to the research literature, there are many theories about cross shareholding, but the scope of empirical research is less than that of foreign countries, and the depth is not as high as that of foreign countries.
This paper reviews the related theories of domestic and foreign cross shareholdings, summarizes the relevant empirical research, according to the institutional environment of Chinese listed companies, from the theory of cross shareholding and corporate governance of listed companies is discussed, and from the demonstration of a comprehensive, systematic analysis, hope to be able to have a a comprehensive understanding of the impact of cross shareholding of listed companies on corporate governance. The main research contents of this paper are as follows:
First, the introduction of the article is an introduction. This part mainly introduces the purpose and significance of the research, the research contents, the research methods and highlights of this article.
On the basis of introduction, this paper gives a brief introduction on cross shareholding, namely the article second chapter, mainly including the definition and classification of the cross shareholding, origin and development, as well as the current situation analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of cross shareholding of Listed Companies in China. At the same time, the different explanation in this part of the cross shareholding are summarized. The scope of the cross ownership and studies are defined.
In the third chapter, this paper reviews the existing literature on cross shareholding. Foreign academic research on cross shareholding has entered the stage in full swing, especially in the Japanese corporate governance structure in cross shareholding phenomenon theory and empirical research has made great achievements. But the perfection and supplement of domestic research the emphasis on laws and regulations, as well as from the accounting perspective of cross shareholding effect on financial accounting of the listed company, in recent years there have been few empirical analysis. Therefore, this chapter mainly summarizes the foreign research and domestic research are summarized.
The fourth chapter is the theoretical analysis and assumptions. This chapter is the theoretical foundation of this thesis, mainly expounds the related theories and research contents and methods of this paper, divided into three parts: firstly, the influence of corporate governance theory and cross shareholding on corporate governance structure are discussed, mainly refers to the influence of cross shareholding of companies governance, including minority ownership control problems brought by cross shareholding (Controlling-minority structure, referred to as CMS) and 1 internal control issues, and that the cross shareholding can make enterprises with less money to control more shares, which is conducive to the operation of the capital; secondly, expounds the theory of asymmetric information, and analyzes the impact of cross shareholding the degree of information asymmetry, including the ownership of the group's internal and external two aspects, and further affect the enterprise financing decision; most of the agency theory, And the theory of cross shareholding to analyze the impact on agency costs, including the impact of Cross Shareholding on the agency problem between shareholders and creditors and the impact on the agency problem between shareholders and managers, and the cross shareholdings increase the agency cost of the conclusion. Based on theoretical analysis, this part respectively according to the impact of cross shareholding in this three aspects put forward three important assumptions.
On the basis of theoretical analysis, the fifth part of the article makes an empirical test: first, put forward the research hypothesis; second, sample selection and data classification, according to the special situation of China's listed company cross shareholding ratio is generally low, the Sample Firms will be divided into two sub samples, cross shareholding ratio of more than 10% for the high stake the proportion of sample, below 10% for the low stake samples, in order to improve the model; third, study design, variable definitions, symbols and expectations hypothesis and establish regression model, clearly pointed out by reason of variables and regression model; fourth, analysis of model results, including descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and model analysis the operation results, according to the operation results of fitting analysis of significant variables and model goodness, from the perspective of mathematical operation results are consistent with the hypothesis evaluation And explain why it conforms to or does not conform to the hypothesis.
Based on the theoretical and empirical analysis of this paper, the effects of Cross Shareholding on corporate governance are summarized as follows:
(1) the cross shareholding of listed companies have a significant impact on corporate governance between member enterprises. With further increase the degree of Cross Shareholding Separation of control rights and cash flow rights 2 the role of making the "CMS" problem and the problem of internal control is more serious, in this case, cross shareholding companies can use less the capital to control more shares, so as to achieve the "42 pounds" effect, is conducive to capital operation.
(2) cross shareholdings of listed companies, the information asymmetry, and no significant impact. Cross shareholding participation in the ownership of the enterprise to form the enterprise alliance, not easy to sell the stock, the degree of information asymmetry outside the enterprise increasing external financing costs increase, enterprises tend to equity investment. At the same time, cross shareholding may increase CMS "problem, which may alleviate the degree of information asymmetry outside the enterprise, external equity strong liquidity, reduce external financing costs, corporate debt financing preference. Therefore, have a certain impact on cross shareholding group external information asymmetry degree, but the research methods of this paper and due to the limited data, the overall performance is uncertain.
(3) the listed company cross shareholding is low influence on the agency cost is not significant, but in the cross shareholding ratio is high, enterprise managers mutual supervision function is weakened, the internal and external governance mechanism can not effectively play its effectiveness, and agency problems become more serious, the increase of agency costs.
This paper is an empirical research on the impact of cross shareholdings on corporate governance. Based on the existing literature, several innovative perspectives are selected.
(1) the research angle of cross shareholding is relatively new. About the cross shareholding, whether theoretical or empirical, domestic and foreign scholars have carried out extensive and a lot of research, but on the impact of Cross Shareholding on corporate governance and other aspects, many foreign research results, but the domestic research is few. From the corporate governance of information. Asymmetry and agency theory, in view of the current situation of cross shareholdings of Listed Companies in China, using the method of combination of theory and empirical research, systematic study of the influence of cross shareholdings of listed companies on corporate governance.
(2) the research sample division method is novel. The empirical research on cross shareholding, the scholars using the most is the choice of paired samples for comparison test, but the empirical sample selection method to get the results reflect only cross Holding Company and non cross Holding Company in the research on the question of whether there are differences in performance, can not reflect cross shareholding ratio of the level of influence on the study. Therefore, based on the full sample, according to the shareholding proportion of cross shareholding of Listed Companies in China are generally low (mostly below 10%) characteristics of the whole sample were divided, the shareholding of more than 10% companies into high stake the proportion of the sample, or for the low stake samples.
However, there are limitations in this study.
(1) small samples. After the research of the listed company to limit the final screening, only 139 listed companies meet the conditions, the article studied three years of data, but the regression results of some important indicators still not ideal. In addition, this part of the data collected in the collection entirely by hand. The process may be missed, leading to the regression results there is a certain deviation.
(2) the design of regression model is relatively simple. This paper uses SPSS statistical software in the empirical research, the sample data model of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis, linear and according to the research hypothesis design model is the simple regression model, and do not take into account other relevant research results by the model. A limit.
(3) research methods are relatively few. The paper only adopted the ordinary least squares (OLS) model of the sample data of a simple regression, although the samples were classified, two different cases of Cross Shareholding on corporate governance are studied, but the research method makes the accuracy of results obtained from a single the affected.
The analysis and conclusions based on Chinese Listed Companies in cross shareholdings, should make use of its advantages, avoid the disadvantages, at the same time, the government should cross shareholdings of listed companies should be given sufficient attention and reasonable supervision, the right to guide its healthy development, to avoid the adverse effect of the listed: companies should strictly control the shareholding ratio when cross shareholding; for regulators should improve the information disclosure system, regulations of cross shareholdings of listed companies on the information, and shall be disclosed.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F276.6;F832.51;F224

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