本文選題：次大股東　切入點(diǎn)：投資過度　出處：《西南交通大學(xué)》2012年博士論文

【摘要】：公司治理一直是近些年來學(xué)者們研究的重點(diǎn)問題,其中股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)又是公司治理的重點(diǎn)問題,合理的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)有利于公司治理的完善和中小投資者利益的保護(hù)。隨著我國股權(quán)分置改革的完成,我國上市公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)逐漸趨于合理,并且隨著終極控股股東控制權(quán)的減少和次大股東控制權(quán)的增加,次大股東在公司治理中的地位逐漸顯現(xiàn)出來,其在加強(qiáng)對(duì)控股股東的監(jiān)督與制衡和保護(hù)投資者利益方面已經(jīng)開始發(fā)揮著重要作用。特別是在我國2008年發(fā)生的國美控制權(quán)之爭(zhēng),使人們?cè)俅握J(rèn)識(shí)到了次大股東在公司治理中的重要作用。 本文按照終極控制人的性質(zhì)將我國的上市公司分為國有、家族和其他三種類型,同時(shí)按照能夠追索到的次大股東終極控制人類型將次大股東分為國有、家族、機(jī)構(gòu)投資者和其他四種類型,分別研究了在不同的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)下,不同類型的上市公司里次大股東對(duì)公司投資、代理成本、公司透明度和公司價(jià)值的影響。本文的主要研究?jī)?nèi)容如下： (1)在絕對(duì)控股股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)下,次大股東不能對(duì)控股股東的投資行為發(fā)揮有效的監(jiān)督作用；當(dāng)控股股東與次大股東性質(zhì)相同時(shí),次大股東能夠影響公司的投資過度；當(dāng)次大股東為機(jī)構(gòu)投資者時(shí),不能夠減緩公司的投資不足與投資過度現(xiàn)象；當(dāng)負(fù)債水平低時(shí),次大股東會(huì)促進(jìn)公司的投資過度行為。 (2)多個(gè)大股東股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)下,次大股東沒有發(fā)揮降低經(jīng)理層和公司股東之間的代理成本,而且有可能增加經(jīng)理層的機(jī)會(huì)主義傾向,尤其是次大股東控制權(quán)增加時(shí),對(duì)股權(quán)代理成本具有顯著的影響；大股東之間控制權(quán)制衡度和現(xiàn)金流量權(quán)制衡度均對(duì)股權(quán)代理成本有顯著的正向影響,控制權(quán)制衡度的變化對(duì)股權(quán)代理成本的影響更大。 (3)次大股東不能夠提高我國上市公司的信息透明度,相反,隨著次大股東持股比例的增加,公司的透明度反而會(huì)降低；當(dāng)次大股東為機(jī)構(gòu)投資者時(shí),公司的透明度較高；當(dāng)次大股東與控股股東類型相同時(shí)公司的透明度會(huì)較低；當(dāng)上市公司類型為國有時(shí)或者是股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)為控制性股東股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)時(shí),次大股東此時(shí)由于自己的能力有限更多的選擇是不作為,此時(shí)不能夠影響公司的透明度。 (4)絕對(duì)控股的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)下的次大股東對(duì)公司價(jià)值的影響較小。在多個(gè)大股東股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和股權(quán)分散的情況下,Z指數(shù)越小,越有利于提高公司價(jià)值。另外,當(dāng)次大股東類型不同時(shí),其對(duì)公司價(jià)值的影響也不相同,并且他們之間存在著顯著的區(qū)別。次大股東控制權(quán)與公司價(jià)值顯著的負(fù)相關(guān),次大股東控制權(quán)越高,公司價(jià)值也就越低。前兩大股東性質(zhì)的異同也會(huì)對(duì)公司價(jià)值造成影響,當(dāng)控股股東與次大股東性質(zhì)相同時(shí),次大股東控制權(quán)與公司價(jià)值顯著負(fù)相關(guān)。公司規(guī)模對(duì)公司的價(jià)值也會(huì)造成影響,當(dāng)控股股東與次大股東性質(zhì)相同時(shí),公司規(guī)模越大,越有利于公司價(jià)值提高,當(dāng)控股股東與次大股東性質(zhì)不相同時(shí),公司規(guī)模越大,越不利于公司價(jià)值的提高。
[Abstract]:Corporate governance has been the focus of scholars in recent years, the ownership structure is the key problem of corporate governance, ownership structure and reasonable protection to improve corporate governance and the interests of small investors in China. With the completion of the equity division reform, the ownership structure of listed companies is becoming more and more reasonable, and with the increase and reduce the time of large shareholder control right of ultimate controlling shareholders control the status of large shareholders in corporate governance will emerge gradually, the strengthening of the controlling shareholders of supervision and balance and protecting the interests of investors has played an important role. Especially in China's 2008 battle for control of Gome again, make people aware of the important role of large shareholders in corporate governance.
In this paper, China's listed companies into the state in accordance with the nature of the ultimate controller of the family, and the other three types, and according to the ultimate recourse to the control of major shareholders, major shareholders of the human type is divided into state-owned, family, institutional investors and other four types were studied in different ownership structure. Different types of Listed Companies in the big shareholders of the company investment, agency cost, affect the company's transparency and the value of the company. The main research contents of this paper are as follows:
(1) in absolute control of ownership structure, large shareholders can not the investment behavior of the controlling shareholders play an effective supervisory role; when the controlling shareholders and shareholders at the same time, large shareholders can affect the company's over investment; when the second largest shareholder for institutional investors, are not able to slow down the company's investment and insufficient the phenomenon of excessive investment; when the debt level is low, large shareholders will promote the excessive investment behavior of the company.
(2) multiple large shareholder equity structure, major shareholders did not play to reduce the agency cost between managers and shareholders of the company, and may increase the manager's opportunism, particularly the control rights of large shareholders increases, has a significant impact on the equity agency cost; major shareholders control balance degree and the cash flow rights restriction of equity agency cost has a significant positive effect, control balance changes impact on the equity agency cost more.
(3) big shareholders can not improve the information transparency of listed company in China, on the contrary, with the increase of the proportion of large shareholders, corporate transparency will reduce; when the second largest shareholder for institutional investors, corporate transparency is higher; when the big shareholders and the controlling shareholder of the company will be the same type of transparency low; when the types of listed companies for the country or sometimes the ownership structure controlling shareholder ownership structure, large shareholders because of their limited ability to more choice is not as at this time can not affect the transparency of the company.
(4) the ownership structure under the absolute control of the second largest shareholder has little effect on the value of the company. Scattered in a number of large shareholder equity structure and equity under the condition that the Z index is smaller, more conducive to enhance the value of the company. In addition, the types of large shareholders and its influence on the value of the company is not the same, and between them there is a significant difference. Large shareholder control and corporate value significantly negative correlation, big shareholder control is higher, the value of the company is lower. The similarities and differences of the top two shareholders properties will also affect the value of the company, the controlling shareholder and the second largest shareholder property. At the same time, large shareholder control and corporate value is significantly negatively related to firm size. The value of the company will be affected, when the controlling shareholders and shareholders at the same time, the company scale is larger, more conducive to improve the value of the company, when the controlling shareholders and major shareholders At the same time, the larger the scale of the company, the less the value of the company.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F271;F832.51

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