本文選題：高管減持　切入點：內(nèi)部人交易　出處：《西南財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：自上世紀90年代開始,我國一直在探討資本市場的建設(shè),創(chuàng)業(yè)板作為高科技企業(yè)融資發(fā)展壯大的一個重要平臺,歷經(jīng)種種挫折終于在2009年10月30日呈現(xiàn)在資本市場上 創(chuàng)業(yè)板的出爐無疑是我國多層次資本市場建設(shè)過程中濃墨重彩的一筆,它的出生被人們寄予了太多的期望,希望中國的企業(yè)能早日誕生如美國微軟、思科這樣的國際一流公司,希望在創(chuàng)業(yè)板上看到中國民營企業(yè)的閃光點,希望為推動我國資本市場多層次平臺架構(gòu)的建設(shè)做出貢獻……如此種種,無不看出創(chuàng)業(yè)板在中國經(jīng)濟發(fā)展中的重要性。 然而,自創(chuàng)業(yè)板開市那天起,就讓人們大跌眼鏡,“三高”現(xiàn)象的出現(xiàn)、高成長性的質(zhì)疑、高管辭職、高管減持套現(xiàn)等負面影響一浪高過一浪,人們不禁開始懷疑創(chuàng)業(yè)板是否能夠健康的可持續(xù)發(fā)展,基于這樣的背景,本文打算抓住創(chuàng)業(yè)板高管減持這個核心來開展研究,以期望創(chuàng)業(yè)板能夠更好的發(fā)展。 本文第一章為導(dǎo)論。介紹了本文的研究背景,研究意義,研究框架和內(nèi)容安排,研究方法及研究的預(yù)期貢獻。 第二章為理論基礎(chǔ)與文獻綜述。通過委托代理理論,信息不對稱理論的概述分析,再從內(nèi)部人交易和高管持股的文獻兩方面進行綜述,其中對國內(nèi)、國外有關(guān)內(nèi)部人利用信息優(yōu)勢獲得超額收益的文獻進行研究方法、研究角度等方面的綜述分析,對高管持股與企業(yè)經(jīng)營業(yè)績的相關(guān)性進行回顧分析,為下文的實證研究奠定基礎(chǔ)。 第三章為創(chuàng)業(yè)板概況分析與研究假設(shè)。從創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司上市市盈率上市成長性、高管減持、高管離職情況四方面進行數(shù)據(jù)統(tǒng)計分析,為創(chuàng)業(yè)板高管的減持提供理論依據(jù)和數(shù)據(jù)支持,同時根據(jù)以往學(xué)者對公司重要股東的減持原因進行梳理分析,從公司內(nèi)部與外部市場兩方面提出本文的研究假設(shè)。 第四章為實證分析。以2009～2010年創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市的公司為研究樣本,進行變量定義、模型設(shè)定,運用STATA12.0統(tǒng)計軟件和EXCEL2007辦公軟件進行統(tǒng)計分析及多元回歸分析,找尋高管減持的動因。其中主要圍繞創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司內(nèi)部估值、公司業(yè)績與外部市場環(huán)境對高管減持的影響三方面進行研究分析。 第五章為研究結(jié)論、建議及展望。通過前面的實證研究,發(fā)現(xiàn)了高管減持的三個動因,分別是公司估值、業(yè)績前景、股票市場的波動性均會影響高管減持。當(dāng)公司估值過高、股票市場波動越大時,高管越有可能大規(guī)模減持；而公司業(yè)績優(yōu)良,發(fā)展前景較好時,高管減持的比例越少。據(jù)此,本文提出了四個相關(guān)建議,打算從高管持股、公司治理、職業(yè)經(jīng)理人發(fā)展、創(chuàng)業(yè)板退市制度等方面進行建設(shè)改進。最后提出了本文的不足及未來的一些研究方向,以期未來有更多優(yōu)秀的文章出現(xiàn),以饗讀者。 本文的預(yù)期貢獻有： (1)由于中國股票市場制度的原因,以前有大量股票處于非流通狀態(tài),為了解決同股不同權(quán),同股不同價,增加股票的流通量,解決歷史遺留問題,國家相關(guān)部門一直在積極研究股權(quán)分置改革,為完善資本市場建設(shè),加快市場化進程改革而努力。直到2005年開始進行股權(quán)分置改革以后,我國的股票市場贏來了全流通時代,內(nèi)部人交易頻繁增多,這時才逐漸有中國學(xué)者開始研究中國的內(nèi)部人交易情況,其中以2008年10月曾慶生發(fā)表的《公司內(nèi)部人具有交易時機的選擇能力嗎?——來自中國上市公司內(nèi)部人賣出股票的證據(jù)》一文為典型代表。因此通過本文的研究,可以進一步豐富中國內(nèi)部人交易的研究內(nèi)容。 (2)創(chuàng)業(yè)板是2009年10月30日才開市的新板塊,對于創(chuàng)業(yè)板高管減持雖然是社會熱點問題,但通過數(shù)據(jù)收集進行實證研究的人較少,本文通過創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司內(nèi)部特征與創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場自身波動性的結(jié)合,運用實證研究方法,研究高管減持的動因,具有一定的創(chuàng)新性。 本文的不足在于： (1)本文只單獨研究了創(chuàng)業(yè)板高管減持這一現(xiàn)象,對于現(xiàn)在主板市場、中小板市場上高管頻繁的減持沒有進行對比研究。 (2)現(xiàn)在中外很多學(xué)者對于內(nèi)部人持股變動,普遍采用事件研究法(Event Study),通過利用不同的時間窗口期,考查高管減持的時點和獲得收益的情況,這樣能更精確的研究公司內(nèi)部人的減持情況,以證實高管作為內(nèi)部人是否具有額外的信息優(yōu)勢進行股票減持,謀求超額收益的事實。 (3)高管同時也有增持的行為,這種增持與高管減持可以進行對比研究,發(fā)現(xiàn)更多高管股份變動的秘密。
[Abstract]:Since the 90s of last century, our country has been exploring the construction of capital market. As an important platform for the development and growth of high-tech enterprises, gem has been on the capital market in October 30, 2009 after all kinds of setbacks.
The gem released is undoubtedly the construction process of thick and heavy in colours of our multi-level capital market of a pen, its birth has been placed too much hope, hope Chinese enterprise as soon as possible such as the birth of the United States Microsoft, CISCO leading international companies like, want to see the flash point Chinese of private enterprises in the gem. I hope to contribute to promote the construction of China's capital market multi-level platform. So, all seen the importance of gem in Chinese in economic development.
However, since the gem opening day, let people surprise, "three high" phenomenon, questioned the high growth of the executives to resign, executives cash holdings of the negative impact of a wave, people begin to wonder whether the gem can be healthy and sustainable development, based on this background, this paper to seize the gem executives holdings of this core to carry out research, in the hope of the gem to better development.
The first chapter is the introduction. It introduces the research background, research significance, research framework and content arrangement, research methods and the expected contribution of the research.
The second chapter is the theoretical basis and literature review. Through the principal-agent theory, the theory of asymmetric information analysis, summarized from insider trading and executives holding the document two, the domestic research methods of foreign related internal use of information superiority to obtain excess returns in the literature, research angles of analysis. The correlation between managerial ownership and corporate performance were analyzed, laying the foundation for the following research.
The third chapter is the overview of the gem analysis and research hypothesis. From the GEM listed companies listed earnings growth, reduction of executives, executive turnover of four aspects of the statistical analysis of the data, and provide a theoretical basis and data support for the gem executives holdings, according to scholars on the company's major shareholder holdings reasons to sort out the analysis, this paper puts forward the research hypotheses from two aspects of internal and external market.
The fourth chapter is the empirical analysis. In the 2009~2010 years of GEM listed companies as research samples, variable definition, model setting, statistical analysis and multiple regression analysis using STATA12.0 statistical software and EXCEL2007 office software, drivers for reduction of executives. Mainly on the GEM listed company internal valuation, the performance of the company and the external market environment the reduction of executives of the three aspects of research and analysis.
The fifth chapter is the conclusion of the study, suggestions and prospects. Through previous empirical research, found three causes reduction of executives, respectively is the valuation of the company performance, stock market volatility will affect the reduction of executives. When the company is overvalued, the volatility of the stock market is large, the more likely the large-scale reduction of executives holding company; and excellent performance, good prospects for development, reduction of executives proportion less. Accordingly, this paper puts forward four suggestions, to corporate governance, managers from the executive ownership, occupation development, gem delisting system in the aspects of construction improvement. Finally the shortcomings and some future research direction is put forward in the future, more excellent articles appear to readers.
The expected contributions of this article are as follows:
(1) due to Chinese stock market system, before a large number of non tradable stock in the state, in order to solve the shares with different rights, shares with different price, increase the circulation of stock, resolving historical issues, the relevant state departments have been actively studying the reform of non tradable shares, in order to improve the construction of capital market, accelerate market the process of reform efforts. Until 2005 began the reform of non tradable shares, China's stock market to win the full circulation times, insider trading frequently increased, then gradually Chinese scholars began to study the internal transaction China, ability to choose which published by Ceng Qingsheng in October 2008 "company insiders with transaction time the Chinese? -- from the listed company to sell the stock as a typical representative of evidence >. Therefore through this study, can further enrich the China insider trading Research content.
(2) gem is a new plate in October 30, 2009 before the opening of the gem executives holdings is the hot social problems, but through empirical research data collection of people less, through the internal characteristics of gem and GEM listed companies own volatility combined with the empirical research method, research on reduction of executives the driver has certain innovation.
The shortcomings of this article are as follows:
(1) in this paper, we only studied the phenomenon of gem executives' reduction.
Now many Chinese and foreign scholars (2) for insider trading, the event study method commonly used (Event, Study) by using different time window to examine the reduction of executives point and gain, so energy research company more accurate reduction of the internal situation, to confirm the executives as insider whether has the additional information advantage of stock holdings, seeking excess returns fact.
(3) executives also have increased behavior at the same time, which can be compared with executive reduction, and the secret of more executive stock changes is found.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F275;F272.9;F832.51

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