股權(quán)分置改革后我國(guó)上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)企業(yè)績(jī)效的影響研究
本文選題:上市公司績(jī)效 切入點(diǎn):股權(quán)分置改革 出處:《新疆財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文 論文類(lèi)型:學(xué)位論文
【摘要】:股權(quán)激勵(lì)作為一種長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)方式和新型分配制度,主要是通過(guò)降低代理成本來(lái)解決委托代理問(wèn)題,提高企業(yè)績(jī)效,這種激勵(lì)方式在發(fā)達(dá)的西方國(guó)家已經(jīng)得到廣泛應(yīng)用,并取得良好效果,股權(quán)激勵(lì)的有效實(shí)施需要各種成熟的條件,股權(quán)分置改革后我國(guó)股票市場(chǎng)實(shí)現(xiàn)全流通,實(shí)行股權(quán)激勵(lì)的市場(chǎng)環(huán)境得到改善,同時(shí)國(guó)家出臺(tái)了相關(guān)的管理法規(guī)對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃進(jìn)行規(guī)范,這為進(jìn)一步推行股權(quán)激勵(lì)奠定了基礎(chǔ)。對(duì)于這些新特點(diǎn)的出現(xiàn)對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)效果產(chǎn)生何種影響?本文對(duì)此進(jìn)行研究,從而檢驗(yàn)我國(guó)股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施的效果,這為進(jìn)一步完善我國(guó)企業(yè)薪酬制度和績(jī)效考核制度提供依據(jù),對(duì)進(jìn)一步完善股權(quán)激勵(lì)理論和公司治理理論具有重要的現(xiàn)實(shí)和理論意義。 本文首先對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)的相關(guān)理論和文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行回顧,接著對(duì)股權(quán)分置改革后我國(guó)上市公司實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)環(huán)境的變化進(jìn)行闡述,并按行業(yè)、控制權(quán)性質(zhì)和激勵(lì)模式對(duì)股權(quán)分置改革后我國(guó)上市公司實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的基本情況進(jìn)行描述,本文先通過(guò)橫向和縱向?qū)蓹?quán)激勵(lì)的效果進(jìn)行定性分析,接著進(jìn)行定量分析,并引入控制變量分析,另外還引入虛擬變量對(duì)不同控股性質(zhì)和激勵(lì)模式企業(yè)的股權(quán)激勵(lì)效果進(jìn)行進(jìn)一步分析,最后根據(jù)理論和實(shí)證分析的結(jié)果對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)的效果進(jìn)行總結(jié),,并提出相關(guān)政策建議。
[Abstract]:Equity incentive as a long-term incentive and a new distribution system, mainly through reducing agency costs to solve the principal-agent problem, improve corporate performance, this incentive has been widely used in developed western countries. The effective implementation of equity incentive requires a variety of mature conditions. After the split share structure reform, the stock market in our country has realized full circulation, and the market environment of equity incentive has been improved. At the same time, the country has issued the relevant management regulations to regulate the equity incentive plan, which lays the foundation for the further implementation of the equity incentive. What impact does the emergence of these new characteristics have on the equity incentive effect? This paper makes a study on this, so as to test the effect of the implementation of equity incentive in China, which provides the basis for the further improvement of the compensation system and the performance appraisal system of our country's enterprises. It has important practical and theoretical significance for further perfecting equity incentive theory and corporate governance theory. This paper first reviews the relevant theories and literatures of equity incentive, and then expounds the changes of the environment of equity incentive for listed companies in China after the reform of split share structure, and according to the industry, The nature of control right and incentive mode describe the basic situation of equity incentive of listed companies in China after the reform of split share structure. Firstly, this paper makes qualitative analysis on the effect of equity incentive through horizontal and vertical analysis, and then carries on quantitative analysis. The control variable analysis is introduced, and the fictitious variable is also introduced to further analyze the equity incentive effect of enterprises with different holding nature and incentive mode. Finally, according to the results of theoretical and empirical analysis, the paper summarizes the effect of equity incentive. And put forward relevant policy recommendations.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:新疆財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2012
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】:F272;F832.51
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