本文選題：銀行借款規(guī)模　切入點(diǎn)：銀行借款期限　出處：《石河子大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：與其他新興市場國家一樣，我國上市公司高度集中的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、不完善的市場機(jī)制以及不健全的法律體系導(dǎo)致上市公司大股東對(duì)中小股東利益侵占的動(dòng)機(jī)十分強(qiáng)烈，Johnson等首次用“隧道行為”（Tunneling）來形容大股東這一“不光彩”的行為。大股東隧道行為不僅損害中小投資者及債權(quán)人的利益，而且對(duì)上市公司的財(cái)務(wù)績效、金融市場與資源配置效率都產(chǎn)生了消極影響�；诖蠊蓶|隧道行為的嚴(yán)重經(jīng)濟(jì)后果，學(xué)者們從公司內(nèi)部治理和外部治理兩個(gè)角度對(duì)如何抑制大股東隧道行為進(jìn)行了研究，其中就內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制而言主要從股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、董事會(huì)特征及公司基本特征等方面進(jìn)行研究，外部治理機(jī)制主要集中在社會(huì)審計(jì)、市場環(huán)境及法律環(huán)境等方面，而忽視了從大債權(quán)人銀行的角度研究債務(wù)對(duì)其的影響。作為大債權(quán)人的銀行擁有以較低的成本獲取借款企業(yè)信息的優(yōu)勢，并且具有較強(qiáng)的監(jiān)督動(dòng)機(jī)和能力，因此研究其對(duì)大股東隧道行為的治理作用具有一定的理論依據(jù)。同時(shí)，內(nèi)生于經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)軌時(shí)期的商業(yè)銀行通過一系列改革逐步走向市場化，宏觀金融環(huán)境的變化必然影響企業(yè)微觀行為，因此在我國金融市場化進(jìn)程中研究銀行債務(wù)對(duì)大股東隧道行為的治理作用并檢驗(yàn)政策的有效性，具有重要的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。 本文以2001-2010年我國A股上市公司為樣本，研究發(fā)現(xiàn)銀行借款規(guī)模對(duì)大股東隧道行為具有抑制作用，相對(duì)于短期借款而言，長期借款的治理作用更強(qiáng)；考慮了產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)后，發(fā)現(xiàn)銀行借款對(duì)非國有企業(yè)的治理作用顯著強(qiáng)于國有企業(yè)；考慮到我國宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境，目前我國正處于經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)軌時(shí)期，商業(yè)銀行的市場化改革作為宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)改革的重要組成部分必然對(duì)企業(yè)微觀行為產(chǎn)生一定影響，因此，我們以金融環(huán)境為宏觀背景分析了銀行借款對(duì)大股東隧道行為的治理作用，本文從時(shí)間（商業(yè)銀行市場化改革）和空間（地區(qū)間金融發(fā)展不平衡）兩個(gè)維度檢驗(yàn)了金融環(huán)境改善對(duì)銀行債務(wù)治理作用的影響。研究表明：商業(yè)銀行的市場化改革有效增強(qiáng)了銀行借款對(duì)大股東隧道行為的治理作用，金融發(fā)展程度越高的地區(qū)，銀行借款對(duì)大股東隧道行為的治理作用越強(qiáng)，，并且這一作用在國有企業(yè)中更為明顯。這是因?yàn)榻鹑诃h(huán)境的完善使得銀行的商業(yè)化、獨(dú)立性增強(qiáng)，進(jìn)而有效改善了國有企業(yè)中的銀企關(guān)系，而非國有企業(yè)與銀行之間本來就是真實(shí)的債權(quán)債務(wù)關(guān)系，所以，金融環(huán)境的完善對(duì)國有企業(yè)中大股東隧道行為的影響更為明顯。
[Abstract]:Like other emerging market countries, the highly concentrated ownership structure of listed companies in China, Imperfect market mechanism and imperfect legal system lead to the strong motivation of large shareholders of listed companies to encroach on the interests of minority shareholders. Johnson and others first use "tunneling" to describe this "disgraceful" behavior of large shareholders. The tunneling behavior of large shareholders not only harms the interests of small and medium investors and creditors, Moreover, it has a negative impact on the financial performance, financial market and resource allocation efficiency of listed companies. Scholars have studied how to restrain the behavior of large shareholders' tunnel from two angles of corporate internal governance and external governance. In terms of internal governance mechanism, they mainly study the ownership structure, the characteristics of the board of directors and the basic characteristics of the company. The external governance mechanism mainly focuses on social audit, market environment and legal environment, etc. The bank as a big creditor has the advantage of obtaining the information of the borrowing enterprise at lower cost, and it has strong supervision motivation and ability, while ignoring the influence of the debt from the perspective of the big creditor bank, the bank has the advantage of obtaining the information of the borrowing enterprise at a lower cost. Therefore, it has certain theoretical basis to study its governance effect on the tunneling behavior of large shareholders. At the same time, commercial banks born in the period of economic transition gradually move to marketization through a series of reforms. The change of macro financial environment will inevitably affect the microcosmic behavior of enterprises. Therefore, it is of great practical significance to study the governance role of bank debt on the tunneling behavior of large shareholders in the process of financial marketization in China and to test the effectiveness of the policy. Based on the sample of A share listed companies in China from 2001 to 2010, this paper finds that the scale of bank borrowing has a restraining effect on the tunneling behavior of large shareholders, and the governance effect of long term borrowing is stronger than that of short term borrowing. It is found that bank borrowing has a stronger effect on the governance of non-state-owned enterprises than that of state-owned enterprises. Considering the macroeconomic environment in China, China is now in a period of economic transition. The market-oriented reform of commercial banks, as an important part of macroeconomic reform, must have a certain impact on the microcosmic behavior of enterprises. Therefore, we analyze the governance effect of bank loans on the tunneling behavior of large shareholders against the macro background of the financial environment. This paper examines the effects of the improvement of financial environment on the governance of bank debt from the two dimensions of time (market-oriented reform of commercial banks) and space (unbalanced financial development among regions). The results show that: commercial banks are market-oriented. The reform has effectively strengthened the governance role of bank loans on the tunneling behavior of major shareholders. The higher the level of financial development, the stronger the governance effect of bank loans on the tunneling behavior of large shareholders, and the more obvious this role is in state-owned enterprises. This is because the improvement of financial environment makes banks more commercialized and independent. Thus, the relationship between banks and enterprises in state-owned enterprises is improved effectively, and the relationship between non-state-owned enterprises and banks is the real creditor's rights and liabilities. Therefore, the improvement of financial environment has a more obvious impact on the tunneling behavior of large shareholders in state-owned enterprises.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：石河子大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51

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