本文選題：財(cái)務(wù)舞弊　切入點(diǎn)：董事會(huì)特征　出處：《西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：我國(guó)的資本市場(chǎng)自上世紀(jì)90年代建立以來,到目前已經(jīng)取得了飛速的發(fā)展。與此同時(shí),財(cái)務(wù)舞弊也隨之產(chǎn)生和發(fā)展,大有層出不窮之勢(shì),如瓊民源、紅光實(shí)業(yè)、鄭百文、猴王股份、華源制藥和天頤科技等眾多上市公司的財(cái)務(wù)舞弊行為浮出水面,然而這只是冰山一角,因此有關(guān)上市公司財(cái)務(wù)舞弊行為的問題已成為社會(huì)上的熱點(diǎn)話題,上市公司財(cái)務(wù)舞弊行為的屢屢發(fā)生,將會(huì)導(dǎo)致人們對(duì)資本市場(chǎng)不信任,同時(shí)也有可能導(dǎo)致社會(huì)信用危機(jī),信用危機(jī)的存在可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致市場(chǎng)低迷,而低迷的市場(chǎng)又將導(dǎo)致融資困難,使得企業(yè)的利潤(rùn)率下降,并最終引發(fā)財(cái)務(wù)舞弊行為的發(fā)生,這是一個(gè)惡性循環(huán)的過程。如果對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)舞弊行為視而不見,或者不嚴(yán)加打擊和治理,必將影響我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)健康、有序地發(fā)展。因此,對(duì)上市公司財(cái)務(wù)舞弊的研究將成為人們關(guān)注的重點(diǎn)。 股東大會(huì)選舉產(chǎn)生董事會(huì),并且賦予了董事會(huì)監(jiān)督和戰(zhàn)略決策職能。董事會(huì)在公司當(dāng)中擁有最高的決策權(quán),同時(shí)又是公司的內(nèi)部監(jiān)督機(jī)構(gòu)。董事會(huì)不僅要負(fù)責(zé)挑選、評(píng)價(jià)和更換公司經(jīng)理層并確定其薪酬水平,同時(shí)還要對(duì)公司的重大經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)和投資計(jì)劃進(jìn)行決策和統(tǒng)籌。作為公司所有者股東的代理人和公司重大決策的參與人,董事的責(zé)任非常重大。董事會(huì)治理是為保障董事會(huì)科學(xué)決策和監(jiān)督以及促成董事會(huì)高效的運(yùn)作而所做的機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)和制度安排。董事會(huì)治理是公司的內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制,是公司治理的核心,起著非常重要的作用。根據(jù)國(guó)外董事會(huì)治理理論和一些經(jīng)驗(yàn)數(shù)據(jù)可以得知,若一個(gè)董事的會(huì)的結(jié)構(gòu)合理和運(yùn)作有序,這將必然是一個(gè)高質(zhì)量的董事會(huì)。如果董事會(huì)能夠有效地發(fā)揮其監(jiān)督和戰(zhàn)略決策職能,公司的價(jià)值就會(huì)大大的增大,經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)也會(huì)大大提升,從而財(cái)務(wù)舞弊發(fā)生的可能性也將大大地降低。反之,在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)激烈的資本市場(chǎng)中,無效的董事會(huì)將必然導(dǎo)致公司舞弊行為的存出不窮甚至破產(chǎn)或被收購(gòu)。 因此,要想公司的業(yè)績(jī)得以提高,降低財(cái)務(wù)舞弊發(fā)生的可能性,就必須要確保公司治理的核心-董事會(huì)能夠發(fā)揮其應(yīng)有的戰(zhàn)略決策和監(jiān)督的作用,要想董事會(huì)能夠發(fā)揮其作用,就必須完善董事會(huì)治理機(jī)制,這些就可以通過董事會(huì)的結(jié)構(gòu)及特征來反映了。不同的董事會(huì)特征對(duì)公司業(yè)績(jī)的影響不同,對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)舞弊的影響也不同。國(guó)內(nèi)外已有許多學(xué)者從多方面對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)舞弊問題進(jìn)行過深入的研究和探討。因此本文從董事會(huì)特征入手,通過上市公司的實(shí)證數(shù)據(jù)研究董事會(huì)的各種特征對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)舞弊的影響作用,然后找出有利于降低財(cái)務(wù)舞弊發(fā)生的特征,以便在實(shí)務(wù)中加以推廣,這也是本文的貢獻(xiàn)所在。本文一共分為五個(gè)部分： 第一部分：導(dǎo)論。本部分主要是對(duì)論文的背景、目的及意義進(jìn)行簡(jiǎn)要的闡述,并概括出了論文的研究思路和創(chuàng)新點(diǎn),這為后面的研究做鋪墊。 第二部分：文獻(xiàn)綜述。本部分主要是對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外有關(guān)董事會(huì)特征與財(cái)務(wù)舞弊的文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行了簡(jiǎn)要的回顧,分別從董事會(huì)規(guī)模、獨(dú)立董事比例、董事會(huì)會(huì)議次數(shù)、財(cái)經(jīng)專業(yè)型獨(dú)立董事、領(lǐng)導(dǎo)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、專業(yè)委員會(huì)的個(gè)數(shù)和董事會(huì)人員持股比例這七個(gè)方面與財(cái)務(wù)舞弊之間的關(guān)系來著手,并在此基礎(chǔ)上對(duì)前人的研究加以評(píng)述。本部分將為下文的研究提供了借鑒依據(jù)。 第三部分：理論分析。本部分介紹了董事會(huì)的定義；概括了董事會(huì)的監(jiān)督和戰(zhàn)略決策職能以及董事會(huì)規(guī)模、獨(dú)立董事比例、董事會(huì)會(huì)議次數(shù)、財(cái)經(jīng)專業(yè)型獨(dú)立董事比例、公司領(lǐng)導(dǎo)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、專業(yè)委員會(huì)的個(gè)數(shù)和董事會(huì)人員持股比例7個(gè)董事會(huì)特征；隨后介紹了公司治理理論當(dāng)中的委托代理理論、現(xiàn)代管家理論和資源依賴?yán)碚?并對(duì)這三個(gè)理論各自存在的缺點(diǎn)加以評(píng)述,如：代理理論的理論假設(shè)過于狹窄,它把人認(rèn)為天生就具有偷懶和機(jī)會(huì)主義行為,現(xiàn)代管家理論克服了委托代理理論研究假設(shè)的不足,但是該理論的假設(shè)缺乏現(xiàn)實(shí)性,不太可能用實(shí)證數(shù)據(jù)來加以檢驗(yàn);緊接著介紹了董事會(huì)在公司治理體系當(dāng)中的地位；最后介紹了財(cái)務(wù)舞弊的定義和財(cái)務(wù)舞弊成因的四個(gè)基本理論,其分別為冰山理論、三角理論、GONE理論和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)因子理論。本部分將為下文提供理論支持。 第四部分：實(shí)證分析。也是文章的重點(diǎn)章節(jié)。首先,筆者在前人對(duì)董事會(huì)特征和財(cái)務(wù)舞弊研究的相關(guān)理論的基礎(chǔ)上,從董事會(huì)7個(gè)特征方面分別提出了7個(gè)研究假設(shè),分別是董事會(huì)規(guī)模與財(cái)務(wù)舞弊呈負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系、獨(dú)立董事與財(cái)務(wù)舞弊負(fù)相關(guān)、財(cái)經(jīng)專業(yè)型獨(dú)立董事與財(cái)務(wù)舞弊負(fù)相關(guān)、董事會(huì)會(huì)議次數(shù)與財(cái)務(wù)舞弊正相關(guān)、兩職合一與財(cái)務(wù)舞弊正相關(guān)、專業(yè)委員會(huì)的個(gè)數(shù)與財(cái)務(wù)舞弊負(fù)相關(guān)和董事會(huì)人員持股比例與財(cái)務(wù)舞弊負(fù)相關(guān)。 在數(shù)據(jù)的選取方面,數(shù)據(jù)來源于我國(guó)滬市和深市所有的上市公司,從中篩選出了186家財(cái)務(wù)舞弊的上市公司,同時(shí)找到186家非財(cái)務(wù)舞弊的上市公司作為配對(duì)樣本,在選取配對(duì)樣本時(shí),筆者參考Beaslev在1996年所采用的方法。這些樣本數(shù)據(jù)的選擇年度在2003年-2010年之間,筆者結(jié)合前人研究的理論成果,將董事會(huì)特征具體量化為7個(gè)可衡量的指標(biāo),另外還選取了公司資產(chǎn)規(guī)模、財(cái)務(wù)杠桿、公司的盈利狀況這三個(gè)變量作為控制變量。然后用SPSS17.0軟件對(duì)兩組樣本進(jìn)行描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)、Pearson相關(guān)系數(shù)分析、配對(duì)T檢驗(yàn)和Logistic回歸分析。 通過描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)發(fā)現(xiàn),在董事會(huì)規(guī)模方面,舞弊公司和非舞弊公司的均值非常接近；獨(dú)立董事方面,兩樣本之間幾乎不存在任何差異；在董事會(huì)會(huì)議次數(shù)上,兩類樣本公司在最大值和最小值之間懸殊的比較大,且兩均值之間的差異也比較大；在財(cái)經(jīng)專業(yè)型獨(dú)立董事比例方面,非舞弊公司當(dāng)中的財(cái)經(jīng)專業(yè)型董事比例比舞弊公司的比例要高；領(lǐng)導(dǎo)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)方面,兩樣本之間相差不大；在專業(yè)委員會(huì)的個(gè)數(shù)上,兩類樣本在最大值、最小值和均值上都完全相同,但其均值之間存在差異；董事會(huì)人員持股比例方面,舞弊公司的樣本均值為0.34%,非舞弊公司的均值為0.38%,兩者之間從表面上來看雖然相差很小,但實(shí)際上相差的還是非常大,因?yàn)樗袠颖竟局凶畲蟮亩聲?huì)人員持股比例也不到1%。 最后通過配對(duì)T檢驗(yàn)和回歸分析,可以得到以下結(jié)論：董事會(huì)會(huì)議次數(shù)與財(cái)務(wù)舞弊顯著正相關(guān);財(cái)經(jīng)專業(yè)型獨(dú)立董事比例、專業(yè)委員會(huì)的個(gè)數(shù)和董事會(huì)人員持股比例與財(cái)務(wù)舞弊顯著負(fù)相關(guān)；董事會(huì)規(guī)模與財(cái)務(wù)舞弊不顯著負(fù)相關(guān)；獨(dú)立董事比例和兩職合一與財(cái)務(wù)舞弊不顯著正相關(guān)。 第五部分：對(duì)策建議和展望。本部分針對(duì)董事會(huì)特征與財(cái)務(wù)舞弊關(guān)系,就如何對(duì)董事會(huì)進(jìn)行改進(jìn)和完善提出了一些對(duì)策建議。主要包括以下幾點(diǎn)：第一,削減不必要的董事會(huì)會(huì)議次數(shù),提高效率和質(zhì)量：第二,增加財(cái)經(jīng)專業(yè)獨(dú)立董事的比例,完善獨(dú)立董事知識(shí)結(jié)構(gòu)；第三,完善專業(yè)委員會(huì)的立法規(guī)定；第四,適度推行董事會(huì)人員持股。最后對(duì)本文的研究提出了不足和展望。 本文的創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)在于：①新解釋變量的引入。國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)者對(duì)董事會(huì)特征與財(cái)務(wù)舞弊的研究,大部分都是把審計(jì)委員會(huì)的設(shè)置作為董事會(huì)特征的一個(gè)變量,只考慮了審計(jì)委員會(huì)的作用,而沒有考慮到提名委員會(huì)、薪酬委員會(huì)等其他各種專業(yè)委員會(huì)的作用,本文創(chuàng)新地引入了專業(yè)委員會(huì)作為董事會(huì)特征的一個(gè)變量,研究其對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)舞弊的影響。②研究視角獨(dú)特。國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)者對(duì)上市公司財(cái)務(wù)舞弊的研究大多集中在財(cái)務(wù)舞弊的成因上,但本文是從董事會(huì)特征的角度出發(fā),尋找其與財(cái)務(wù)舞弊之間的關(guān)系,希望能夠通過設(shè)置合理的董事會(huì)特征從而達(dá)到抑制財(cái)務(wù)舞弊現(xiàn)象,另外本文選取了7個(gè)董事會(huì)特征對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)舞弊進(jìn)行影響分析,較以前的研究具有系統(tǒng)性。③研究樣本豐富。本文中樣本的研究年度跨度大,為2003年-2010年,除了不滿足條件被剔除的樣本外,涵蓋了中國(guó)證監(jiān)會(huì)、上海證券交易所和深圳證券交易所正式立案調(diào)查,并通報(bào)批評(píng)和公開譴責(zé)的非金融類上市公司。
[Abstract]:Since the capital market of our country since the last century, established in 90s, has been achieved rapid development. At the same time, with the emergence and development of financial fraud, has great potential as qiongminyuan, emerge in an endless stream, Hongguang, Zheng Baiwen, houwanggufen, financial fraud and Huayuan Pharmaceutical Tianyi Science and technology and many other listed companies surfaced however, this is just the tip of the iceberg, the financial fraud of listed companies has become a hot topic, the financial fraud of listed companies have occurred, will lead to distrust of the capital market, but may also lead to social credit crisis, the credit crisis may lead to market downturn, but the downturn the market will lead to the financing difficulties, the decline in corporate profit margins, and ultimately lead to the occurrence of financial fraud, this is a vicious cycle of the process. If we ignore or ignore the financial fraud, we will affect the healthy and orderly development of China's capital market. Therefore, the research on the financial fraud of listed companies will become the focus of attention.
The general meeting of shareholders elected the board of directors, and board of directors with oversight and strategic decision-making functions. The board of directors have the highest decision-making power in the company, and the company's internal oversight bodies. The board of directors is not only responsible for selection, evaluation and replacement of company managers and determine its salary level, at the same time, the company's major business plan activities and investment decision-making and co-ordinate. As people involved in the shareholders and the company agent of major decisions, the responsibility of the directors of the board governance is very significant. Institutional arrangements for mechanism design and for the protection of the board of directors of scientific decision-making and supervision as well as the operation of the board of directors, and to make the governance of the board of directors is the company's. The internal governance mechanism is the core of corporate governance, plays a very important role. According to the board of directors governance theory and empirical data show that if a The board of directors of reasonable structure and orderly operation of this must be a high quality of the board of directors. If the board can effectively play its oversight and strategic decision-making functions, the value of the company will be greatly increased, operating performance will be greatly enhanced, and thus the possibility of the occurrence of financial fraud will be greatly reduced and. And in the fierce competition in the capital market, is the board of directors will inevitably lead to the retention of corporate fraud is not poor or even bankruptcy or acquisition.
Therefore, to the company's performance can be improved, reducing the likelihood of financial fraud, it is necessary to ensure that the core of corporate governance of board of directors can play its proper strategic decision-making and supervisory role, to the board of directors can play its role, it is necessary to improve board governance mechanism, structure and characteristics of these can the board of directors to reflect the different effects of the board of directors. Different characteristics on the performance of the company, on the impact of financial fraud is different. Many scholars at home and abroad from the aspects of financial fraud issues through in-depth research and discussion. This article from the board of directors of various characteristics according to the empirical data of the board of directors of listed the company will impact on financial fraud, and then find out to reduce the characteristics of financial fraud, in order to be promoted in practice, this is also the contribution. This article is divided into five parts:
The first part is introduction. This part mainly introduces the background, purpose and significance of the thesis, and summarizes the research ideas and innovations of this paper, which will pave the way for future research.
The second part: literature review. This part is a brief review of the domestic and foreign on board characteristics and financial fraud literature, respectively from the scale, the proportion of independent directors, board meetings, financial professional independent directors, leadership structure, the number of Specialized Committee and the relationship between the board of directors shareholding the proportion of the seven aspects of financial fraud to begin, and on the basis of previous studies to be reviewed. This part will provide a reference basis for the following research.
The third part: theoretical analysis. This part introduces the definition of the board of directors; summarizes the supervision of the board and the function of strategic decision and board size, proportion of independent directors, board meetings, professional finance and the proportion of independent directors, corporate leadership structure, Specialized Committee and the number of the board of directors of the staff share 7 directors characteristics; then introduces the principal-agent theory, corporate governance theory, stewardship theory and resource dependence theory, and the theory of the three shortcomings are reviewed, such as: agency theory assumes that it is too narrow, the people that are born with laziness and opportunism, overcome the modern stewardship theory research on the principal agent theory is insufficient, but the theory hypothesis of the lack of reality, is unlikely to use empirical data to test them; then introduced the board of directors Finally, it introduces the four basic theories of the definition of financial fraud and the causes of financial fraud. They are iceberg theory, triangle theory, GONE theory and risk factor theory. This part will provide theoretical support for the following.
The fourth part is empirical analysis. This is the key chapter. Firstly, based on the relevant theory and previous research on the characteristics of financial fraud of the board of directors on the board of directors from the aspects of 7 features were proposed 7 hypotheses, which is the size of the board of directors has a negative correlation with financial fraud, independent directors and financial fraud negatively related to financial professional independent directors is negatively correlated with financial fraud, financial fraud and the number of meetings of the board of directors is positively related to the two level one and financial fraud are related with the number of Specialized Committee, financial fraud and negatively related to the board of directors shareholding ratio is negatively correlated with financial fraud.
In the selection of data, data from the Shanghai and Shenzhen all listed companies, selected from the 186 financial fraud of listed companies, and find 186 non financial fraud of listed companies as paired samples, the selection of paired samples, the method adopted by Beaslev in 1996. These samples the selection of the annual data in the years between 2003 -2010, combined with the theoretical results of previous studies, the characteristics of the board of directors for the 7 specific quantitative measurable indicators, it also selects the company asset size, financial leverage, the three variables the company's profitability as control variables. Then the two groups of samples by descriptive statistics SPSS17.0 software, Pearson correlation analysis, paired T test and Logistic regression analysis.
Through the descriptive statistics, the size of the board of directors, fraud companies and non fraud companies mean very close; independent directors, two sample almost no difference; in the number of meetings of the board, the two Sample Firms in between the maximum and minimum gap is relatively large, and the difference between the mean value of two relatively large; the proportion of independent directors in the financial professional, non fraud companies financial professional directors proportion is higher than the proportion of the company's fraud; aspects of leadership structure, difference between the two samples; in the number of Specialized Committee on the two types of samples in the maximum, minimum and mean value are exactly the same, but there are differences between the mean; the board of directors shareholding ratio, fraud sample average was 0.34%, the average non fraud companies was 0.38%, between the two from the surface to see though The difference is very small, but in fact, the difference is very large, because the largest share of the board of directors in all Sample Firms is less than 1%..
The paired T test and regression analysis, the following conclusions can be obtained: there was significantly positive correlation between the number of board meetings and financial professional financial fraud; the proportion of independent directors, the Specialized Committee and the number of the board of directors shareholding ratio and financial fraud is negatively correlated; the size of the board of directors and financial fraud is not significant negative correlation; the proportion of independent directors and the two level one of financial fraud is not significantly correlated.
The fifth part: suggestions and outlook. This part aims at the relationship between board characteristics and financial fraud, the board of directors on how to improve and perfect some suggestions. Mainly includes the following points: first, to reduce unnecessary board meetings, to improve the efficiency and quality: second, increase the financial professional independent directors the proportion of independent directors, perfect knowledge structure; third, perfect the legislation of the Specialized Committee; fourth, appropriate implementation of board of directors shareholding. The last of the paper put forward the deficiencies and prospects.
The innovation of this paper is: the introduction of the new explanatory variables. The researches on board characteristics and financial fraud, most of them are the audit committee as a set of variable characteristics of the board, only consider the role of the audit committee, and did not consider the nomination committee, remuneration committee and other various Specialized Committee the role of a variable in this paper, the introduction of innovative Specialized Committee as the feature of the board of directors, to study its effect on financial fraud. The unique research perspective. The causes of the financial fraud of listed companies at home and abroad are mostly concentrated in the financial fraud, but this is a feature from the board's point of view, looking for the relationship between with the financial fraud, hoping to set up a reasonable board characteristics so as to prevent financial fraud, this paper selects 7 Board of directors. Sign of impact analysis on financial fraud, the system compared with the previous research. The research sample is rich. This paper study the year span sample, 2003 -2010 years, but does not meet the conditions to be excluded out of sample, covering the Chinese Commission, the Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange official investigation, and informed criticism and denounce the non-financial listed companies.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51;F224

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