本文選題：上市公司　切入點：公司治理　出處：《山東大學》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：由于我國證券市場的發(fā)展還不成熟,股權(quán)融資遠遠不能滿足上市公司的融資需求,債務融資仍然是中國上市公司的主要融資來源,而債務成本關(guān)系著企業(yè)的融資效率,影響著企業(yè)的效益。但是近幾年來,我國上市公司的債務資金成本卻并不理想。債務資金成本嚴重影響著上市公司的融資情況,一旦債務資金成本偏高,就會使得公司的融資能力降低,最終導致公司在可盈利項目投資能力上欠缺,使得公司的業(yè)績和效益有所下降。 公司治理機制是公司用來處理不同利益相關(guān)者之間責、權(quán)、利關(guān)系的一系列制度安排,而公司治理的核心是降低現(xiàn)代企業(yè)管理制度中的代理成本。國內(nèi)外的研究表明,上市公司債務資金成本受到公司治理機制的影響,綜合水平較高的治理機制能夠在一定程度上降低公司的債務資金成本。但中國的上市公司治理機制還并不完善,對于其作用還頗有爭議,國內(nèi)鮮有文獻對其進行全面研究。 本文選取深交所上市的公司2005年至2009年的A股市場的數(shù)據(jù),采用規(guī)范研究與實證研究相結(jié)合的方法,從股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、董事會治理和高管激勵角度,對我國上市公司治理機制現(xiàn)狀及其對公司債務資金成本影響的實證研究,發(fā)現(xiàn)其存在的主要問題,并在此基礎(chǔ)上提出相應的對策和建議,為改善上市公司債務資金成本奠定了基礎(chǔ)。 本研究的實證結(jié)論包括： (1)在股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)變量中,國有股持股比例與公司債務資金成本成正相關(guān)；法人股持股比例與債務資金成本不相關(guān)；流通股持股比例、第一大股東持股比例和前5位大股東持股比例與債務資金成本呈負相關(guān)。 (2)在董事會治理變量中,董事會規(guī)模和兩職合一比例與債務資金成本呈正相關(guān)；年度董事會會議和監(jiān)事會會議次數(shù)以及獨立董事比例與債務資金成本呈負相關(guān)。 (3)在高管激勵變量中,董事會持股比例和高管持股比例與債務資金成本呈負相關(guān)；監(jiān)事會持股比例和經(jīng)理層持股比例與債務資金成本不相關(guān)。 根據(jù)上述實證研究結(jié)果,本研究分別對我國上市公司國有股調(diào)整、董事會運作效率提升以及高管激勵效果等方面給出了建議,以期提高我國上市公司治理效果,從而降低上市公司債務資金成本。
[Abstract]:Because of the immature development of China's securities market, equity financing is far from meeting the financing needs of listed companies. Debt financing is still the main source of financing for listed companies in China, and the cost of debt is related to the financing efficiency of enterprises. However, in recent years, the cost of debt funds of listed companies in China is not ideal. The cost of debt funds seriously affects the financing situation of listed companies, once the cost of debt funds is on the high side, It will reduce the financing ability of the company, and eventually lead to the lack of investment ability in profitable projects, and the performance and efficiency of the company will be reduced. Corporate governance mechanism is a series of institutional arrangements used by companies to deal with the relationship among different stakeholders, and the core of corporate governance is to reduce the agency cost in modern enterprise management system. The cost of debt funds of listed companies is influenced by the corporate governance mechanism. A higher comprehensive governance mechanism can reduce the cost of debt funds to a certain extent. However, the governance mechanism of listed companies in China is not perfect. Its role is still controversial, there are few domestic literature on its comprehensive study. This paper selects the data of A share market of listed companies from 2005 to 2009 in Shenzhen Stock Exchange, adopts the method of combining normative research with empirical research, from the perspective of equity structure, board governance and executive incentive. An empirical study on the current situation of corporate governance mechanism and its impact on the capital cost of corporate debt in China is made, and the main problems are found out, and the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions are put forward. In order to improve the cost of debt funds of listed companies to lay the foundation. The empirical conclusions of this study include:. Among the variables of equity structure, the proportion of state-owned shares is positively related to the cost of debt funds; the proportion of corporate shares is not related to the cost of debt funds; the proportion of shares held by circulating shares is not related to the cost of debt funds; The proportion of the largest shareholders and the top five shareholders have negative correlation with the cost of debt funds. 2) in the governance variable of the board of directors, the size of the board of directors and the ratio of two positions in one place are positively correlated with the cost of debt funds, and the frequency of the annual board meetings and the meetings of the board of supervisors and the proportion of independent directors are negatively correlated with the cost of debt funds. Among the executive incentive variables, the proportion of board holding and the proportion of senior management holding are negatively correlated with debt capital cost, while the proportion of board of supervisors and manager has no correlation with debt capital cost. According to the above empirical research results, this study gives some suggestions on the adjustment of state-owned shares, the improvement of the efficiency of board of directors and the incentive effect of senior executives, in order to improve the governance effect of listed companies in China. So as to reduce the cost of debt funds of listed companies.
【學位授予單位】：山東大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F275;F832.51;F224

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