本文關(guān)鍵詞： 定向增發(fā) 定價(jià)基準(zhǔn)日 累計(jì)超額收益率 持股比例　出處：《沈陽(yáng)工業(yè)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：股權(quán)分置改革后，定向增發(fā)正逐步成為我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)中股權(quán)再融資的重要方式之一。對(duì)上市公司來(lái)說(shuō)，定向增發(fā)可以為公司未來(lái)的發(fā)展和成長(zhǎng)提供資金；對(duì)投資者來(lái)說(shuō)，定向增發(fā)為他們提供了很好的投資機(jī)會(huì)。然而，定向增發(fā)作為一種新的融資方式，相關(guān)的法律法規(guī)還不夠完善，存在如定價(jià)基準(zhǔn)日不夠明確、董事會(huì)權(quán)限過(guò)大之類(lèi)的問(wèn)題，使大股東通過(guò)壓低增發(fā)價(jià)格或者增發(fā)有瑕疵的資產(chǎn)向自己輸送利益成為可能，如何對(duì)上市公司定向增發(fā)行為進(jìn)行分析和鑒別便成為了投資者當(dāng)前緊迫而重要的任務(wù)。 本文選取了2008-2011年已經(jīng)完成定向增發(fā)的深滬兩市的主板上市公司為研究樣本，采用事件研究法和統(tǒng)計(jì)檢驗(yàn)，分析上市公司大股東在定向增發(fā)中的代理行為。本文首先從定價(jià)基準(zhǔn)日前后上市公司股價(jià)的變化情況進(jìn)行分析，將全部樣本按認(rèn)購(gòu)對(duì)象分為以大股東為主和以機(jī)構(gòu)投資者為主的兩種，分析不同增發(fā)對(duì)象分組下，定價(jià)基準(zhǔn)日前后的累計(jì)超額收益率的變化情況。結(jié)果表明，以大股東為主的定向增發(fā)中，定價(jià)基準(zhǔn)日前后分別有有負(fù)的和正的累計(jì)超額收益率；以機(jī)構(gòu)投資者為主的定向增發(fā)中，定價(jià)基準(zhǔn)日前后分別有正的和負(fù)的累計(jì)超額收益率，且二者均有統(tǒng)計(jì)上的顯著性。以上結(jié)果證實(shí)了以大股東為主的定向增發(fā)中，定價(jià)基準(zhǔn)日前20日大股東有操縱股價(jià)相對(duì)升高的行為，定價(jià)基準(zhǔn)日后20日股價(jià)則相對(duì)逐漸降低；以機(jī)構(gòu)投資者為主的定向增發(fā)中，，定價(jià)基準(zhǔn)日前20日大股東有操縱股價(jià)相對(duì)下降的行為，而定價(jià)基準(zhǔn)日后20日的股價(jià)則相對(duì)有所上升。接著本文對(duì)大股東定向增發(fā)注資問(wèn)題進(jìn)行了驗(yàn)證，試圖通過(guò)檢驗(yàn)金融機(jī)構(gòu)在增發(fā)前后對(duì)上市公司持股比例的變化情況來(lái)推斷出上市公司大股東是否存在增發(fā)有瑕疵資產(chǎn)的行為。結(jié)果表明，金融機(jī)構(gòu)在上市公司定向增發(fā)后對(duì)上市公司的持股比例普遍低于增發(fā)前的持股比例，可以推斷這是由于上市公司增發(fā)有瑕疵資產(chǎn)而產(chǎn)生的。本文對(duì)投資者對(duì)上市公司定向增發(fā)行為的鑒別和相關(guān)機(jī)構(gòu)的管理具有一定的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。
[Abstract]:After the reform of split share structure, private placement is gradually becoming one of the important ways of equity refinancing in China's securities market. For listed companies, it can provide funds for the future development and growth of the company. Private placement offers them a good investment opportunity. However, as a new financing method, the related laws and regulations are still not perfect, such as the pricing benchmark date is not clear enough, the board of directors has too much authority, and so on. It is possible for large shareholders to transfer profits to themselves by lowering the price of additional issue or issuing defective assets. How to analyze and identify the behavior of listed companies' directional placement has become an urgent and important task for investors at present. This paper selects the listed companies listed on the main board of Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange, which have completed the directional placement in 2008-2011, as the research samples, and adopts the event research method and the statistical test. This paper analyzes the agency behavior of large shareholders of listed companies in directional placement. Firstly, this paper analyzes the stock price changes of listed companies before and after the pricing benchmark day. All the samples are divided into two types according to the target of subscription: the majority shareholder and the institutional investor. The change of the cumulative excess return rate before and after the base date of pricing is analyzed under the groups of different issuing objects. The results show that, There are negative and positive accumulative excess returns before and after the base date of pricing, and there are positive and negative accumulative excess rates of return before and after the pricing base day in the directional additional offerings mainly by institutional investors. The above results confirm that the majority shareholders have the behavior of manipulating the stock price rising relatively in 20th before the benchmark date of pricing, and the stock price decreases gradually in 20th after the benchmark date of pricing; In targeted offerings dominated by institutional investors, the majority shareholders had the behavior of manipulating the relative decline of stock prices on 20th before the benchmark pricing date. However, the share price in 20th after the base date of pricing is relatively higher. Then, this paper verifies the problem of private additional capital injection of large shareholders. This paper attempts to infer whether the majority shareholders of listed companies have the behavior of issuing defective assets by examining the changes of the shareholding ratio of listed companies before and after the issuance of additional shares by financial institutions. The proportion of financial institutions holding shares in the listed companies after the IPO is generally lower than that before the issuance, It can be inferred that this is due to the issuance of defective assets by listed companies. This paper has a certain practical significance for investors to identify the behavior of directional issuance of listed companies and the management of related institutions.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：沈陽(yáng)工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F275;F832.51;F224

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