本文關(guān)鍵詞： 代理成本 控股權(quán)性質(zhì) 跨部門補貼 企業(yè)集團 內(nèi)部資本市場　出處：《管理科學(xué)》2014年02期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：企業(yè)集團通過內(nèi)部資本市場可以將資源從低融資約束部門轉(zhuǎn)移輸送至高融資約束部門,以緩解后者的資金約束程度,同時導(dǎo)致跨部門補貼問題,集團總部對跨部門補貼雙方的投資-現(xiàn)金流敏感性將產(chǎn)生不同的影響�；�2003年至2010年中國A股上市公司的7 181個年度樣本數(shù)據(jù),采用OLS多元回歸和固定效應(yīng)模型等實證研究方法,從投資-現(xiàn)金流敏感性角度檢驗中國企業(yè)集團的跨部門補貼及其影響因素問題。研究結(jié)果表明,中國企業(yè)集團存在明顯的跨部門補貼現(xiàn)象,部門經(jīng)理層代理成本的增大既能減輕集團對補貼方的資源轉(zhuǎn)移程度,又能減弱集團對被補貼方融資約束的緩解作用,說明跨部門補貼主要在經(jīng)理層代理成本較低的部門之間進行。大股東代理成本即控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)的分離加重了補貼提供方的資源轉(zhuǎn)移程度,卻促進了被補貼方融資約束的緩解;控股權(quán)性質(zhì)從非國有控股到國有中央政府控股,企業(yè)集團的跨部門補貼問題逐步減輕。
[Abstract]:Through the internal capital market, enterprise groups can transfer resources from low-financing constrained sectors to high-financing constrained sectors, so as to alleviate the degree of financial constraints of the latter, and at the same time lead to cross-sector subsidies. The group's headquarters will have different effects on the investment-cash flow sensitivity of cross-sector subsidies. Based on 7,181 annual sample data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2010, By using OLS multiple regression and fixed effect model, this paper examines the cross-sector subsidies of Chinese enterprise groups and their influencing factors from the perspective of investment-cash flow sensitivity. There is obvious cross-sector subsidy phenomenon in Chinese enterprise groups. The increase of agency cost of department managers can not only reduce the degree of resource transfer to subsidy parties, but also weaken the role of group to alleviate the financing constraints of subsidised parties. It shows that the inter-departmental subsidy is mainly carried out among the departments with lower agency cost at the manager level, and the separation of the agency cost of the large shareholder that is, the right of control and the right of cash flow increases the degree of resource transfer of the subsidy provider. However, it promotes the easing of the financing constraints of the subsidised parties; the nature of controlling shares from non-state holding to state-owned central government holding, the cross-sector subsidy problem of enterprise groups is gradually alleviated.
【作者單位】： 電子科技大學(xué)經(jīng)濟與管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金(71102054) 中央高�；究蒲袠I(yè)務(wù)費專項資金(ZYGX2010J124)~~
【分類號】：F275;F832.51

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