本文關(guān)鍵詞： 定向增發(fā) 資產(chǎn)注入 隧道行為　出處：《沈陽(yáng)工業(yè)大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：隨著股權(quán)分置改革的不斷發(fā)展，定向增發(fā)正式登上了我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)舞臺(tái)并一躍成為最主要的上市公司股權(quán)再融資方式。從我國(guó)的制度背景來(lái)看，，雖然定向增發(fā)有諸多益處，但是其又極易成為大股東對(duì)中小股東進(jìn)行隧道行為的工具。由于定向增發(fā)近年來(lái)在證券市場(chǎng)中蓬勃發(fā)展，對(duì)我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)的影響與日俱增，如果不對(duì)定向增發(fā)中的隧道行為加以研究和管制，那么廣大中小投資者的自身利益就難免會(huì)受到侵害，繼而嚴(yán)重影響到中小投資者對(duì)我國(guó)上市公司定向增發(fā)，甚至是對(duì)證券市場(chǎng)的信心。因此研究上市公司定向增發(fā)中的隧道行為對(duì)中小投資者保護(hù)工作具有積極的意義。 本文運(yùn)用了事件研究法和統(tǒng)計(jì)檢驗(yàn)相結(jié)合的方式來(lái)進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析。首先通過(guò)累計(jì)超額收益率驗(yàn)證了大股東在定向增發(fā)中可能存在操縱增發(fā)前后股價(jià)行為的假設(shè)。其次又通過(guò)在定向增發(fā)前后金融機(jī)構(gòu)持股比例的變化分析得出了大股東還有可能通過(guò)注入瑕疵資產(chǎn)來(lái)增加自身利益的結(jié)論，本文還運(yùn)用了主成分分析法來(lái)構(gòu)建機(jī)構(gòu)投資者認(rèn)同度指標(biāo)，通過(guò)對(duì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者認(rèn)同度變化的分析，驗(yàn)證資產(chǎn)注入類(lèi)上市公司在定向增發(fā)后兩年公司綜合得分排名普遍下降。最后運(yùn)用了案例分析法，先以大通燃?xì)鉃槔�，揭示了大股東為主的定向增發(fā)在增發(fā)后的累計(jì)超額收益率明顯高于增發(fā)前的累計(jì)超額收益率。再以盛屯礦業(yè)為例，發(fā)現(xiàn)大股東出售的資產(chǎn)價(jià)值被明顯的高估，金融機(jī)構(gòu)持股比例在資產(chǎn)注入后小幅下降并且公司綜合業(yè)績(jī)排名不升反降，進(jìn)一步證明了定向增發(fā)資產(chǎn)注入類(lèi)上市公司普遍存在著隧道行為致使公司業(yè)績(jī)逐年下降。 本文的研究結(jié)論為進(jìn)一步規(guī)范定向增發(fā)行為，為監(jiān)管部門(mén)制定相關(guān)監(jiān)管政策提供了依據(jù)，對(duì)于完善投資者保護(hù)工作具有積極意義。
[Abstract]:With the unceasing development of the split share structure reform, directional additional issuance has formally stepped onto the stage of capital market in China and become the most important way of equity refinancing of listed companies. From the background of our country's system, although directional additional issuance has many benefits, However, it is easy to become a tool for large shareholders to tunnel to minority shareholders. Due to the booming development of directional placement in the stock market in recent years, the impact on the capital market of our country is increasing day by day. If we do not study and regulate the tunnel behavior in the process of directional additional offering, the interests of the majority of small and medium investors will inevitably be infringed upon, and then the small and medium-sized investors will be seriously affected by the targeted issuance of listed companies in our country. Therefore, it is of positive significance to study the tunneling behavior of listed companies in directional placement for the protection of small and medium-sized investors. This paper uses the method of event research and statistical test to make empirical analysis. Firstly, through the cumulative excess return, we verify the hypothesis that large shareholders may have the behavior of manipulating the stock price before and after the IPO. Secondly, through the analysis of the change of shareholding ratio of financial institutions before and after the IPO, the conclusion that the majority shareholders may increase their own interests by injecting defective assets. This paper also uses the principal component analysis method to construct the index of institutional investor identity, through the analysis of the change of institutional investor identity. It is verified that the comprehensive scores of the listed companies in the asset injection category dropped generally two years after the directional placement. Finally, the case analysis method was used, taking Chase Gas as an example. It is revealed that the accumulated excess return rate of the large shareholder oriented placement is obviously higher than that before the issuance. Taking Shengtun Mining as an example, it is found that the value of the assets sold by the major shareholders is obviously overvalued. The proportion of financial institutions holding shares decreases slightly after the asset injection and the overall performance ranking of the company decreases instead of rising. It further proves that there is a common tunneling behavior in the listed companies with directional additional assets injection which leads to the decline of corporate performance year by year. The conclusion of this paper provides the basis for further standardizing the behavior of directional placement and provides the basis for the regulatory authorities to formulate relevant regulatory policies. It is of positive significance to improve the protection of investors.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：沈陽(yáng)工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F832.51;F275

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