本文關(guān)鍵詞： 上市公司 信息透明度 大股東侵占資金 信息不對稱 信息操縱　出處：《首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：在我國一股獨大、股權(quán)集中的情況下,代理問題是大股東利用信息優(yōu)勢對中小股東的利益侵占問題。以往關(guān)于大股東侵占資金影響因素的研究很少考察上市公司信息透明度對大股東侵占資金行為的抑制作用。本文認(rèn)為信息透明度是公司治理機(jī)制的重要組成部分,能夠發(fā)揮抑制大股東侵占資金的作用。本文運用規(guī)范研究、案例研究和實證研究相結(jié)合的方法,根據(jù)信息不透明的兩個表現(xiàn)：信息不對稱和信息操縱的具體表現(xiàn),并結(jié)合實際的案例,論證了信息不透明對大股東侵占資金行為的作用,從而得出提高信息透明度將會抑制大股東侵占資金行為的結(jié)論。并據(jù)此提出了提高信息透明度,能夠起到抑制大股東侵占上市公司資金行為的假設(shè)。 為了驗證假設(shè)的可靠性,本文以在深圳證券交易所上市的2009年-2011年除金融類上市公司以外的中國上市公司為研究對象,用深交所的信息披露考核結(jié)果為信息透明度的衡量變量、審計意見類型作為穩(wěn)健性檢驗時的信息透明度替代變量和自己定義的兩個大股東侵占資金的指標(biāo)設(shè)了兩個模型,并進(jìn)行了實證分析。實證結(jié)果顯示：信息透明度與大股東侵占資金負(fù)相關(guān),即提高公司信息的透明度,能夠有效的抑制大股東侵占上市公司資金的行為。并結(jié)合結(jié)論提出了相關(guān)的政策建議：及時、完整、真實的披露關(guān)聯(lián)交易的相關(guān)信息,增加對大股東關(guān)聯(lián)投資消息的披露,鼓勵媒體信息披露以發(fā)揮其監(jiān)督作用,強(qiáng)化對信息透明度的各環(huán)節(jié)的聯(lián)動監(jiān)管,加強(qiáng)外部審計監(jiān)督；提高獨立董事比例以及獨立董事的獨立性；加強(qiáng)投資者教育以提高其自我保護(hù)意識和能力等。 本文的創(chuàng)新點在于：首先,從反面的角度分析信息透明度對大股東侵占資金的抑制作用,即從信息不透明的兩個表現(xiàn)(信息的內(nèi)生性不對稱和操縱性不對稱)結(jié)合相應(yīng)的具體案例分析了信息不透明對侵占行為的影響；其次,創(chuàng)新性的定義了大股東侵占資金的兩個變量,OCCUP1=(與大股東相關(guān))其它應(yīng)收款/年平均資產(chǎn)總額與OCCUP2=(與大股東相關(guān))應(yīng)收賬款+應(yīng)收票據(jù)+預(yù)付賬款+其他應(yīng)收款-應(yīng)付賬款-應(yīng)付票據(jù)-預(yù)收賬款-其他應(yīng)付款,若大于0則取1,否則取0。并且首次提出了審計意見類型也可作為信息透明度的衡量指標(biāo)。本文的不足之處在于：將關(guān)聯(lián)交易形成的應(yīng)收款項一概認(rèn)為是出于侵占資金的目的是片面的,應(yīng)區(qū)分降低企業(yè)成本的關(guān)聯(lián)交易和屬于利益侵害的關(guān)聯(lián)交易,且沒有關(guān)注大股東通過非關(guān)聯(lián)交易實施的利益侵害行為。
[Abstract]:In our country, with one dominant share and concentrated equity, The agency problem is the problem of the large shareholders taking advantage of the information advantage to encroach on the interests of the minority shareholders. Previous studies on the factors affecting the large shareholders' encroachment on funds seldom investigated the inhibition of the information transparency of listed companies on the large shareholders' embezzlement of funds. This paper holds that information transparency is an important part of corporate governance. This paper uses the methods of normative study, case study and empirical study, according to the two manifestations of information opacity: information asymmetry and information manipulation. Combined with actual cases, the paper demonstrates the effect of information opacity on the behavior of large shareholders' embezzlement of funds, and concludes that increasing information transparency will restrain the behavior of large shareholders' embezzlement of funds. Can play the supposition that the large shareholder encroaches on the capital behavior of the listed company. In order to verify the reliability of the hypothesis, this paper takes the Chinese listed companies except financial listed companies listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2009 to 2011 as the research objects. Using the result of information disclosure assessment of Shenzhen Stock Exchange as the measure variable of information transparency, the type of audit opinion is used as the alternative variable of information transparency in the robustness test and the two indexes defined by themselves for the embezzlement of funds by major shareholders, and two models are set up. The empirical results show that the information transparency is negatively related to the embezzlement of funds by large shareholders, that is, to improve the transparency of corporate information. It can effectively restrain the behavior of large shareholders encroaching on the funds of listed companies. In combination with the conclusion, the paper puts forward relevant policy recommendations: timely, complete and true disclosure of related party transactions, increase the disclosure of related investment information of large shareholders, To encourage the media to disclose information in order to play its supervisory role, to strengthen the linkage supervision of various links of information transparency, to strengthen the external audit supervision, to improve the proportion of independent directors and the independence of independent directors; Strengthen investor education to improve their self-protection awareness and ability. The innovation of this paper lies in: first of all, the paper analyzes the inhibition of information transparency on the embezzlement of large shareholders from a negative angle. That is, from the two manifestations of information opacity (endogenous asymmetry of information and manipulative asymmetry) combined with the corresponding specific cases to analyze the impact of information opacity on the behavior of encroachment; secondly, Innovative definition of the two variables in which large shareholders encroach on funds / other receivables / annual average total assets of OCCUP1 (related to large shareholders) and OCCUP2A (related to large shareholders) accounts receivable notes receivable other receivables-. Accounts payable-notes payable-accounts received in advance-other accounts payable, If it is greater than 0, take 1, otherwise 0. And the type of audit opinion can also be used as a measure of information transparency for the first time. The shortcoming of this paper is that the receivables formed by related party transactions are generally considered to be due to usurpation. The purpose of the fund is one-sided. We should distinguish the related party transaction which reduces the enterprise cost and the related party transaction which belongs to the interest infringement, and does not pay attention to the interest infringement behavior of the large shareholder through the non-affiliated transaction.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F275;F832.51

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 王怡;上市公司信息披露的投資者保護(hù)效應(yīng)研究[D];山西財經(jīng)大學(xué);2015年

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本文編號：1545389