本文關鍵詞： 基金管理人 顯性激勵 BS期權 管理費率　出處：《中南林業(yè)科技大學》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：證券投資基金在走過130多年的發(fā)展歷程后依然顯示出勢不可擋的發(fā)展態(tài)勢,近十年來增長了近百倍。證券投資基金是一種實行組合投資、專業(yè)管理、利益共享、風險共擔的集合投資方式。由于投資基金是以委托的方式請他人代為投資和管理,因此,其從設立到終止都要支付一定費用。在林林總總的基金的費用列表中,基金管理人的報酬是其中最為重要的一項,稱為基金管理費,因為作為基金運作過程中最主要的費用支出,故而對基金凈收益從始至終都有著重大影響。在基金管理費這個問題上,由于需要由基金投資者承擔,所以他們希望管理費用越少越好；但作為收入方,基金的運作和發(fā)展需要管理費來支撐,加上出于自身利益考慮,基金管理人必然希望管理費用越多越好。于是,就形成了基金管理人和基金投資者之間的嚴重利益沖突,因此本文建立一種有效的激勵機制,既給予基金管理人合理的報酬以激勵其向投資者提供質量更佳的投資服務,又保護投資的利益不受損害。另外本文利用布萊克斯科爾斯期權定價模型來設計基金管理費率,達到既激勵管理人又保護投資者的雙重效果,使得基金管理人顯性激勵機制得到進一步改進和完善。 本文的具體研究內容如下： 第一部分為緒論,具體介紹研究背景、研究意義,主要研究內容與研究方法,國內外的研究動態(tài),以及本文的研究重難點和創(chuàng)新點。 第二部介紹本文研究的主要理論基礎及文獻綜述。 第三部分對我國基金管理人顯性激勵機制進行必要性分析且介紹我國現(xiàn)有顯性激勵的現(xiàn)狀和存在的問題。 第四部分在對國外基金發(fā)展有了充分了解的基礎上,細致分析國外基金管理人的顯性激勵機制,與我國的狀況進行對比,吸取經驗教訓,為政府制定基金管理人激勵政策和基金公司制定激勵機制提供實踐指導。 第五部分具體利用BS期權定價模型對我國基金管理費率進行實證的研究與設計。 第六部分在前文所分析的基礎上,針對我國基金管理人顯性激勵機制所存在的問題提出一系列的具體對策。 第七部分即為結論部分。
[Abstract]:After more than 130 years of development, securities investment funds still show an unstoppable trend of development, which has increased nearly 100 times in the past ten years. Securities investment funds are a kind of portfolio investment, professional management, and benefit sharing. A pooled form of risk-sharing. Since investment funds are invested and managed on behalf of others on a commissioned basis, there is a fee to be paid from establishment to termination. The remuneration of the fund manager is one of the most important items, known as the fund management fee, because it is the most important expense in the operation of the fund. Therefore, it has a significant impact on the net income of the fund from beginning to end. On the issue of fund management fees, since they need to be borne by the fund investors, they want the less management costs the better; but on the income side, The operation and development of the fund need to be supported by management fees. In addition, for the sake of its own interests, the fund manager must want as much as possible to manage the expenses. As a result, a serious conflict of interest between the fund manager and the fund investors is created. Therefore, this paper establishes an effective incentive mechanism, which not only gives the fund manager a reasonable reward to encourage them to provide investors with better quality investment services, In addition, this paper uses Blackscholes option pricing model to design the fund management fee rate, which can not only motivate the manager but also protect the investor. So that the dominant incentive mechanism of fund managers has been further improved and improved. The contents of this paper are as follows:. The first part is the introduction, which introduces the research background, research significance, main research content and research methods, domestic and foreign research trends, as well as the important difficulties and innovations of this paper. The second part introduces the main theoretical basis and literature review. The third part analyzes the necessity of dominant incentive mechanism of fund manager in China and introduces the present situation and problems of dominant incentive mechanism in China. On the basis of full understanding of the development of foreign funds, the 4th part carefully analyzes the dominant incentive mechanism of foreign fund managers, compares it with the situation in China, and draws lessons from experience. To provide practical guidance for government to formulate fund manager incentive policy and fund company to establish incentive mechanism. In the 5th part, we use BS option pricing model to study and design the fund management fee rate in China. On the basis of the previous analysis, the 6th part puts forward a series of concrete countermeasures against the problems existing in the dominant incentive mechanism of fund managers in China. Part 7th is the conclusion.
【學位授予單位】：中南林業(yè)科技大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.51

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本文編號：1543178